The GUUAM summit in Yalta, ending last weekend, was most closely followed by international organizations, as evidenced by a salutatory message of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the presence of dignitaries from fourteen countries and international organizations. Washington also took the event very seriously, sending Ambassador to Ukraine Pascual and the State Department’s William Taylor, coordinator of aid to the independent states. The latter said his country would provide GUUAM any kind of assistance, including financial aid. Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage also sent a message of greetings. Moscow’s response was wary and Russian Ambassador Viktor Chernomyrdin turned out to be the most popular figure at the summit. The event ended in the signing of a declaration on concerted action to uphold stability and security in the region, an agreement on cooperation in combating terrorism, and the most important and long-awaited agreement on a free trade area. “We want to show everybody an example,” stated Ukrainian President Leonid. Kuchma. And so GUUAM (or GUAM) had finally received an opportunity to become a practical rather than theoretical entity — and practical efforts must be this essence, as declared a year ago, also in Yalta.
Such keen interest in GUUAM is most likely explained quite simply. But for Uzbekistan allegedly planning to withdraw (although Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Shamansur Shakhalilov told The Day in Yalta, “You won’t find the word withdrawal in any of our documents”), such rumors would have had to be engineered by Georgia or even by Ukraine. Earlier Uzbekistan official statements had it that Tashkent was suspending its membership, but that it did not rule out its renewal. Diplomatic sources in Kyiv claimed the free trade area agreement had not been signed last year precisely because of Uzbekistan.
Leonid Kuchma said in Yalta that GUUAM’s most important task was in becoming “the most promising and best link between Europe and the Asian-Pacific basin,” “secure most favorable conditions of the Europe- Caucasus-Asia commodity traffic,” and “carry out the Eurasian oil transport project.” In other words, implementing the free trade agreement will be the first step in winning confidence and proving the organization’s viability. Only then will Uzbekistan be likely to cast aside its doubts (that is why “the republic will closely follow the developments in the region”), considering that today its relations with the United States are at a fundamentally new level after September 11, and that other states might join GUUAM. Romania and Bulgaria are most often mentioned in this context, although neither has anything to say on the subject.
From a purely pragmatic standpoint, Russia wants Ukraine and Europe to buy Russian, not Caspian oil. That was probably why a discussion started a year ago about how Ukraine has no need of GUUAM but did not reach its goal, contrary to the organizers’ expectations, although it did slow down contacts within GUUAM.
Another point is that Uzbekistan’s doubts were caused, among other things, by GUUAM’s own passivity.
Whatever has been said and written about the advantages of multilateral — with GUUAM and Euro-Asian EC — and bilateral relations between all countries, it is perfectly clear that Russia and the Eurasian Economic Community would benefit from the weakening of GUUAM in geopolitical and economic terms. On the contrary, its strengthening would cause Russia to lose its positions in the south, on the Caspian Sea, and in the Caucasus.
Naturally, there are forces determined to take advantage of this factor. That was why Viktor Chernomyrdin showed such a reserved response to the free trade agreement, saying that bilateral cooperation would be considerably more advantageous. On the other hand, Ukraine once again has an opportunity to actually benefit from the geopolitical situation; at this stage rivalry may well be replaced by cooperation, especially since the CIS free trade agreement is skidding and the one between Moscow and Kyiv is not performed (Russia demands Ukraine’s Eurasian EC membership).
In this sense, rumors of GUUAM’s death are greatly exaggerated, although it is also true that no organization can avoid a crisis. The Yalta summit showed that GUUAM is today the crossroads of numerous bilateral and world interests, especially in view of the situation that has developed after September 11. And so the formation of the Business Council and sector work groups in Yalta, specializing in transport, electrical engineering, economy, trade, communications, information technologies, culture, tourism, science, education, struggle against terrorism and organized crime, drug trafficking, and the initiative of setting up the GUUAM Parliamentary Assembly were actual steps in the direction of the most important agreement. Simultaneously, they were points of external containment force application - as there is little doubt that such forces are already at play. It is also safe to assume that from now on Moldova will be a focal force application point, considering that President Voronin’s speech at the summit was the most critical one and he addressed the greatest number of grievances to the participants.
In view of this, GUUAM has a difficult future, for it will have to sustain the application of polarized forces, meaning that it has to enhance its safety margin. Well, there is a time-tested method to do so: combining efforts in carrying out what has been planned and declared. Most challenges and problems facing us today know no boundaries. Therefore, cooperation is not a choice but a necessity, Kofi Annan stressed in his message to GUUAM.
