What will come of the new elections bill is a crucial issue in many respects. The struggle for a new electoral system (whereby votes are converted into mandates [seats in the parliament]) took place in the legal domain and at the level of political party strategies behind and over which stood certain executive groups and parliamentary forces. The conflicts caused by the bill served to illustrate the basic election campaign logic, when the key political forces seek a compromise formula. This quest was made harder by the changing political format and the appearance of new political forces, requiring a qualitatively new approach in looking for the best possible decision. Various calculations made on the basis of the possible effects and consequences of this or that version of the election bill became the dominant point on the campaign agenda.
How did it all start? First (suppose we agree on 1997 as our reference point), there was a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the winner-take-all majoritarian and proportional representation models foe elections. Actually, the debate came down to two questions: Which of the system appears more democratic? Which models will help the process of structuring political parties? The compromise finally achieved, a mixed proportional- majoritatian model, was put in place and stimulated party construction. Political parties started to gain weight so much that it paved the way not only to parliament, but also to a better political image and prestige. Yet the party construction stimuli reached further than the political forces vying for a place in the legislative sun, extending to the executive. The emergence of the party of power factor was the executive elite’s response to the new rules of the game. For the executive, mastering the proportional representation pattern was in a fashion as an attempt to form a bridgehead on the electoral field.
The 1998 parliamentary elections proved a lesson for both the parties and independent candidates. The Communist advantage, in terms of both votes and mandates, resulted from the proportional as well as majority components. The Communists would be perfectly right to state that party affiliation in the majority constituencies played a major role in the turnout. At the same time, the proportional component, an instrument of “direct” translation of votes into mandates by definition, turned into a negative factor for the so-called party of power, which attempted to make up for its low popularity among the electorate by using the so-called administrative resource (using official levers to determine voter behavior — Ed.). In fact, the administrative “capital’s” limited capabilities raised the issue of looking for a milieu in which the party of power could survive. Once again the majoritarian system was called upon to make it possible to win mandates even after collecting a small number of votes. Experience shows, however, that the majority system plays into the hand of political forces deployed on opposite political and ideological flanks. Needless to say, the other political parties claiming in-power status were less than fond of the alignment.
Among the consequences of the mixed electoral system was the emergence of new parties and the fragmentation of existing ones. Still, the criticism and negativism called forth by Ukraine’s petty party structure had the opposite effect as the number of those supporting the purely proportional system increased. The struggle for a new version of the election bill, envisaging transfer to that system, began with a successful first reading in parliament (254 ayes). What made this model suddenly so attractive? Party fragmentation, it should be noted, despite its all negative effects, had important political consequences: first, awareness that a party can become a powerful asset capable of restricting the influence of that administrative resource during the elections; and second, a party, being an institutional resource, can reduce the dependence of political subjects on the influence and control of the government bureaucracy. Most importantly, by getting seats in parliament, political parties could not only retain and reinforce their status, but also strengthen the legislature from within as an independent political institution. Thus the electoral system, as a procedural and legal anchor affecting the basic political balance, already has a different value for the political forces.
Indeed, the struggle for the new elections bill formula unfolded between the opposed political forces in different dimensions. On the one hand were political parties bidding for the new law as independent factors interested in increasing proportional representation, along with all those officially unaffiliated forces supporting the majority pattern; on the other, forces operating within two political enclaves, executive and legislative, defending their own electoral strategies. Under the circumstances, the executive elite’s strategy was geared to smoothly and gradually aligning the levers of balancing between the party and territorial parts of parliament. This cautious formula is meant as a chance for the executive to find an acceptable manner of entering the legislative domain and at the same time reduce opposition access to parliament via party lists to a minimum. Thus, the new bill’s 50:50 formula along with the new opportunities of building a democratic party system can be regarded as a tentative compromise securing a degree of parity.
Consider the strategies supported by the political forces in the situation that has developed. The start of the campaign season was marked by the formation of extensive party blocs and coalitions, although their objectives are not reduced to putting together so many ideologically like- minded parties. The key objective could be formulated as assembling the vehicle for creating a parliamentary majority even before the elections. Proceeding from this, the pivot of the coalitions being formed for the new round of elections reaches further than consolidation based on ideological compatibility. This common pivot consists in a search for political partners for the parliamentary majority. Theoretically, this majority could influence the balance of power, as in this case politics is taken a step above the level of control and influence over separate factions and legislators to that of systemic interaction with the relevant mechanism of administrative horse- trading and political concessions.
With the executive interested in consolidating the political elite and its own power has set itself the task of coordinating the efforts of the centrist and Right-centrist blocs SDPU(o), For a United Ukraine, and Our Ukraine. The Presidential Administration skillfully used the veto strategy to optimize its interests and the executive elite priorities. In addition, the presidential headquarters’ strategy is aimed at drawing all centrist forces into a broader coalition, as evidenced by various forms of control over the bloc-forming process, delegating its people like Bezsmertny and Poroshenko now actively working for the Yushchenko bloc, obliterating the boundaries of the near-authoritarian sector and the center itself as with the NLO (UFO) bloc, and dosing out the administrative resource. Creating a broad coalition and then a coalition- based parliamentary majority is important in reducing the risks involved in any single force suddenly gaining a beachhead. A favorite suddenly breaking surface could conceivably spoil the whole executive game aimed at maintaining overall uncertainty meant to prevent a single center of influence coming to the fore. Obviously, keeping the intrigue going until the presidential campaign should keep the president in the lead until all the interests and bets in the next presidential race are laid on the table for all to see.
