Modern progress across the world holds many threats, challenges and risks for Ukraine.
1. The global crisis has doubtlessly triggered deep-reaching political and technological transformations with the following consequences:
First, the gradual reconfiguration of global administrative mechanisms, specifically the formation of the G20, a degree of transformation of the G8, stated reforms of the IMF, EBRD, and other international financial institutions.
Second, this crisis has had a strong impact not so much on the US, where it began, as on many other countries, international organizations, particularly the Russian Federation and the European Union.
Third, the bipolar transition system, sometimes referred to as a monopolar one, has ceased to exist.
Fourth, the financial and economic crisis is gradually transforming the current positions and potentials of the leading international players, with the limited financial and economic opportunities causing certain countries to limit their political objectives, although a further decline could increase aggressiveness and adventurism.
Fifth, there is a dramatic increase in governmental and nongovernmental nationalism.
Sixth, there is a degree of weakening of international structures compared to national ones. After the past 20 years of diffusing sovereignty the current trend is to strengthen the nation-state.
2. The principles that previously determined the international security agenda are still effective, although undergoing essential changes. The financial crisis has served to sharpen the existing problems, among them:
First, demographic changes resulting in the spread of poverty across the world, with population growth promising at least 1.2 billion within the prognosticated period while simultaneously registering twists and turns.
Second, regional, national, ethnic, and religious confrontations, with radical ethnic and religious movements being on an upward curve, accompanied by mounting domestic and intergovernmental conflicts.
Third, international terrorism, as one of the extreme — and irrational — ways of confrontation and protest, is still there, defying all efforts to put an end to it.
Fourth, proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
Fifth, the ongoing struggle for fuel and other resources. This problem causes countries and corporations to engage in a severe competition, struggling to take possession of, or gain access to, such resources.
Sixth, the worsening environmental situation, with the negative effects of the world climate causing essential transformations in living conditions, economy, adding to health care budget appropriations, and so on.
3. Alongside global issues, Ukraine’s security agenda is affected by specific regional factors — and this involves regional as well as global players, whose influence on the regional level is effected in a special manner.
Eastern Europe’s security status is characterized primarily by the presence and interrelationship of two major military and political groups, NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The relations between the member countries appear to be improving, but there is no ruling out the possibility of mounting tensions, including conflicts, for various reasons.
At the same time, there is a minimal risk of a major armed conflict in Europe. I mean the Rodos Forum “Dialogue between Civilizations,” which involved 70 countries. There was no military threat on the agenda, with the biggest threats noted in the social and humanitarian sphere.
Let me tell you about the [Moscow-based] Post-Crisis World Institute Foundation’s findings. According to over a hundred international experts, the following five threats are the biggest for EU countries:
Loss of competitive spirit (51);
Paralysis of supranational bodies of authority (40);
Immigration influx (31);
Terrorism (31);
Outburst of radical separatism (30).
Armed conflicts are placed 11th by five experts.
It is hard to comment on this categorization. It feels probably comfortable being under NATO’s umbrella, so you can take your time working out your version of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, loss of the competitive spirit remains a clear and present danger for the countries of the Western hemisphere, what with China, India, and Brazil being close behind with their constant technological development.
I could agree with the European experts’ pacifistic moods but for one aspect. First, I’m living in Europe; second (most importantly), there is a constant increase in budget defense appropriations. On the global level, such appropriations registered an increase worth 1.5 trillion dollars in 2009, according to various estimates — six percent more than in 2008, and now we’re faced with an amazing 50 percent increment compared to 2000.
Of course, the United States determines this trend, considering that it is responsible for almost one half of the world’s military spending. Far behind one finds China (6.6 percent), France (4.2 percent), Great Britain (3.8 percent), and Russia (3.5 percent).
It is necessary to bear in mind that financial hardships will force most countries to curb defense budget spending; in fact, most European countries have made statements to this effect. Another thing worth being considered is the NATO leadership’s old call for spending at least two percent of GDP on defense has simply vanished from the agenda. This is untreatable because the abstract notions of national security and defense are practically meaningless, what with the main elements of social existence being under threat.
It is, therefore, safe to assume that in the next couple of years defense appropriations aren’t likely to be as large as this year. However, it is possible that such appropriations will be re-distributed in favor of China, India, and Brazil, all things considered, with their economies registering a higher growth rate than advanced countries.
Why such an emphasis on armaments and materiel? Research centers under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine have carried out studies known as “Productive Functioning in the High-tech Field during the Crisis.” Their findings show that such high technologies tend to show progress when hit by a crisis. Crisis appears to give a fresh impetus to high technologies; this is true of Ukraine, with its defense industry maintaining a pre-crisis level of growth.
Getting back to Ukraine’s national security policy, given today’s international environment, I would like to see the following two questions answered.
(1) Is the Ukrainian state capable of upholding its national security, in its current condition? Are its defenses, manpower and economic recourses good enough to meet current challenges and threats?
(2) What are Ukraine’s prospects in forming a new European security system?
With regard to the first question, considering Ukraine’s domestic economic hardships, social problems, dependence on energy supplies [from Russia – Ed.], demographic factors, environmental and man-caused disasters, political and public confrontation risks, Ukraine is facing a very difficult test.
On the other hand, the Ukrainian state has been rejuvenated after the last presidential campaign, so that we now have all the conditions we need to conduct an active foreign policy.
Today’s European security is determined by two international organizations, NATO and the OSCE, as well as by the United States and Russia as the most influential countries after the Soviet Union’s collapse.
President Viktor Yanukovych signed the bill in July that established Ukraine’s non-bloc status. Under this law, Ukraine takes part in projects aimed at upgrading the European collective security system, while developing neighborly relations with Russia, upholding constructive cooperation with NATO and other military and political blocs, in matters of mutual interest.
The OSCE has been universally recognized as lacking in efficiency as a guarantor of European security. This is the main reason behind the emergence of two OSCE reform options, with the first one originating from Russia’s draft European security treaty (Helsinki-2 concept) and the second being that of Javier Solana, relying on EU countries’ proposals (Helsinki-plus-concept).
Experts in the West regarded Russia’s project’s main shortcoming as that of keeping this treaty in the “rigid basket” format — in other words, handling the military threats the traditional way, with other European countries using concepts such as complex security, including the economic, humanitarian, and other components. Considering Russian Minister Lavrov’s recent statements, Russia is prepared to study new problems, such as piracy and terrorism, but it doesn’t seem to take into account problems relating to energy and environmental security. I believe that the Russian document, despite its overall controversial nature, contains a number of clauses that could indirectly help solve the problems relating to the upgrading of the external guarantees of Ukraine’s [national] security.
The following treaty clauses fully correspond to Ukraine’s interest:
— Inadmissibility of the use of force, or threatening this use, in regard to a given country’s territorial integrity and political independence;
— indivisibility of security;
— inadmissibility of any treaty member country using any other country’s territory for combat operations against any other member country;
— institution of an all-European security consulting committee;
— treaty clauses relating to collective security, being strongly reminiscent of Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty.
I believe that Ukraine’s initiatives, would help work out a European legal framework that would determine the status, rights and responsibilities of non-bloc countries, as well as provide for legal guarantees of their security.
Take Switzerland. It supported Russia’s initiative and has proposed an upgrading of the clauses concerning neutral countries.
NATO. I think we should wait to hear what the Lisbon Summit (scheduled for November 19-20, 2010) has to say.
This event was preceded by a very lively discussion, an event I’d hate to see and hear underreported by the media; I would consider this unfair and unprofessional. Below are several aspects I regard as worth being considered.
1. The need to revise NATO spheres of influence — this need is self-apparent, for even at this moment NATO can’t be regarded as a US satellite, considering that this alliance has been exposed to a yearly mounting political influence on the part of the European countries. And there are mounting controversies. The West has varying interests. Whereas settling the Afghan and Iran problems is in line with US geopolitical strategy, the European Union is interested in arranging for its own energy safety by revising relations with the Russian Federation and other CIS countries.
2. NATO globalization. NATO’s ideology — I mean its being a tool of global security — is based on the allegation that all challenges to national security in the West aren’t local but global. There is no way to overcome international terrorism by fighting it in Afghanistan, even with all NATO resources. Global threats call for global responses, hence NATO’s eastward expansion, while strengthening the military potential, broad-scale partnership projects involving member countries all over the world.
One is likely to arrive at such unlikely conclusions as NATO globalization involving as many countries as the WTO.
3. NATO-Russia relations are one of the top-priority issues to be resolved when deciding on the NATO expansion project. A number of experts in the West believe a NATO-Russia alliance would serve the interest of both sides.
Such an alliance would drastically alter NATO’s character and dramatically lower the world’s average conflict ratio. Der Spiegel carried an open letter entitled “It’s Time to Invite Russia to Join NATO” (08.03.10). The letter read: “Trans-Atlantic security needs have changed fundamentally in the last two decades. The East-West confrontation has ended, and Moscow now shares many interests with NATO. It is time for the alliance to open its doors to Russia,” say German defense experts Volker Ruehe, Klaus Naumann, Frank Elbe and Ulrich Weisser.
With regard to Russia’s current relations with NATO — I mean all the “reload” issues — it is safe to assume the existing problems will be gradually resolved while working out mutually acceptable approaches, although the progress rate is the big question, and whether Russia really wants this.
Getting back to Ukraine. The law precludes Ukraine’s NATO membership in the foreseeable future. NATO and the US have adequately responded to this situation.
On the other hand, there are twenty years of intensive cooperation in various spheres. I will not list all of the pages that constitute our common history, just several facts. Ukraine is still taking part in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program. Its rocket industry is involved in the US Towers and European Vega projects. UN secretary general has stated that NATO intends to invite Ukraine to take part in the Missile Defense project. Needless to say, Ukraine will be prepared and willing. Russia could perhaps agree to collaborate with us in this context.
In other words, Ukraine remains NATO’s old-time partner. What is there to prevent Ukraine’s NATO partnership, as its military and political ally, without becoming a full-fledged member country, if the new collective security treaty doesn’t work? This formula will probably fulfill Russia’s interest and become universally accepted.
