This is the third time in a row that the key question of the Ukrainian post-election political process and inter-clan intrigues is how to get rid of Yulia Tymoshenko, just like in 2005 and 2006. How can she be squeezed out of the government system and kept from occupying the prime minister’s post?
Personally, I only have the foggiest notion of what industrial, financial, energy-related, international, humanitarian, military, and social policies the Tymoshenko cabinet will be pursuing. (Nor can I imagine any policies of a cabinet headed by other people.)
First of all, you cannot wade into the same river twice: it is not a good idea to judge Prime Minister Tymoshenko 2007 by comparing her to Prime Minister Tymoshenko of 2005 or Deputy Prime Minister Tymoshenko of 2000 because people tend to change, some for the better and some for the worse.
Second, wise people learn from their own mistakes, other people’s mistakes, imaginary mistakes, and hypothetical ones. People who are not wise not only make their own mistakes but also repeat other people’s mistakes.
Third, advanced people try to grow and develop, while non-advanced ones do not: they degrade and become hidebound — spiritually, intellectually, and physically.
Fourth, the political process resembles the Brownian movement of particles and is dependent on such a large number of contradictory factors and oblique conditions that sometimes it is impossible to predict even the general direction of certain processes.
Therefore, one can only make a tentative and hypothetical assessment of the direction and strategy of a Tymoshenko-led Cabinet of Ministers in 2007 on the basis of her statements (changing the gas-supply pattern by disbanding RosUkrEnergo, nationalizing dubiously privatized businesses, such as the Luhansk Diesel Locomotive Plant, abolishing the military draft on Jan. 1, 2008, etc.) and the BYuT program called Ukrainian Breakthrough.
But when a very large number of male heavyweights with diametrically opposing political views have been wracking their brains for almost three years on how to bar one lone fragile lady from power, this is truly perplexing. One has to conclude that “the Tymoshenko threat” is the main generator of the current Ukrainian political process.
There are two well-tested techniques against her. The first one is the “2005 technique”: she was appointed prime minister in February 2005 but with limited powers, and she held this post only briefly. A few months later, after a series of economic crises (sparked by gas, sugar, and meat problems), and after Oleksandr Zinchenko’s exposure of the “dear friends.” the president dismissed her from office. According to the “2006 technique,” Tymoshenko’s premiership was forestalled by the refusal of Our Ukraine to form a coalition with the BYuT and by backroom deals between Yushchenko and Yanukovych.
Tymoshenko is perfectly aware of the threats she will be facing if she occupies the “politically loaded” prime minister’s chair: take Ukraine’s one billion dollar debt to Gazprom, which cropped up right after the elections. One of her strategies (Plan B) is to remain behind in the opposition and bravely contest the next presidential elections scheduled for early 2010 according to the Constitution of Ukraine, but which may take place sooner in the conditions of Ukrainian “Brownian” politics. Meanwhile, the latest Verkhovna Rada elections showed that Tymoshenko knows far better than others how to achieve ambitious goals, even though Ukrainian politics has a Bermuda Triangle of its own, Yushchenko-Tymoshenko-Yanukovych, which keeps each of these three leaders from gaining all the power: the alliances of two against the third are unstable and save the Ukrainian political system from the winner-takes-all scenario. But whether this is good or bad is a subject that has nothing to do with political science.
Therefore, the principal question of Ukrainian politics today is under which scenario will Tymoshenko be ditched — the 2005 scenario (she will become prime minister, only to be “pushed out” and “jilted” soon after as a result of a number of crises) or the 2006 one (she will not be prime minister and will have to go into the opposition, and the prime ministership will be nominated by a “broad-based” coalition).
The NU-NS and Viktor Yushchenko are taking a dim view of the idea promoted by certain ideologues in the president’s entourage that Ukraine can and must be united by means of a consensus between the different regional clans and oligarchies. This may work in some countries, but the formula of Ukraine’s current unity, “Donetsk oligarchs + Kyiv oligarchs and bureaucrats,” and the political setup of this alliance in the shape of a “broad-based” coalition is ineffective and immoral.
The Ukrainian political process has undergone major changes in the past few years. Since the days of Machiavelli people have believed that politics is a priori immoral, if not extra-moral. But the significant events that took place in Ukraine in 2004 and 2006 showed that this is not so in reality and that moments of truth do occur in politics. And what Oleksandr Moroz did on midsummer’s eve in 2006 led to his fiasco in the latest elections and complete political downfall. The 2004 Orange Revolution showed that Ukrainian politics generally exists in a morally engaged field. This is one reason to be proud of our country.
Should Our Ukraine fail to meet its commitments under its February agreements with the BYuT, it will experience the same fate as the socialists suffered: most Ukrainian voters do not forgive betrayals and defections.
Yes, the political forces that will trespass moral lines may gain some temporary advantages, but what happened to Moroz is a case in point: now you win your 30 silver pieces (or 30 million dollars) but tomorrow you will lose everything — above all, your good name and political reputation.
So in response to the logic of the president’s entourage and the Party of Regions, which envisions two patterns of “ditching” Tymoshenko, she herself may opt for “elephant logic” (to run headlong first for the prime minister’s office and then for the presidency, overcoming resistance and carefully-orchestrated crises) and “panther logic,” i.e., jumping into the presidential chair as an opposition leader.
But the most unpredictable thing in current Ukrainian politics is the balance of threats to Yushchenko and the likelihood of a snap presidential election.
The only question to which Tymoshenko, Yushchenko, Akhmetov, and others have no answer is: where can one find the many highly-skilled, efficient, professional, and uncorrupt managers needed to fill the executive branch of power — under Tymoshenko’s leadership or somebody else’s? This is Ukraine’s problem in general, not just of individual politicians.
An experienced staff usually consists of people from the past who nevertheless know how the administrative mechanism works. Many of today’s ministers have deliberately muddled things up in their ministries so that their successors will not be able to clear them up and will sink into the mire of a crisis.
So we are facing the age-old problem of Ukrainian politics — a short seat for bench-warmers. But where will we get new players who are young and skilled?
