James Sherr, Senior Associate of the Conflict Studies Research Centre at the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, is well known to Ukrainian political and expert circles. It is worth considering the opinion of this British specialist on questions of Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policies because, unlike Western diplomats and NATO officials, he can frankly express Western views on processes taking place in Ukraine. In an interview in The Day, Sherr expressed his doubt that the Declaration of National Unity, signed between the leading Ukrainian political parties, the parliamentary speaker, and the president of Ukraine, will ensure the achievement of goals contained in this document. The British analyst also noted that Ukraine’s Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and his milieu do not have a clear understanding of the West. Will the new coalition, based on the anticrisis coalition, bring stability to Ukraine? What price did President Viktor Yushchenko pay for the appointment of Arsenii Yatseniuk as Minister of Foreign Affairs? Answers to these and other questions are in the following exclusive interview with British analyst James SHERR.
What are the risks or benefits of the creation of the Coalition of National Unity? What role will Kinakh play here? Is there any possibility that the coalition will destabilize the situation in Ukraine?
“Despite its name, the Coalition of National Unity is the latest manifestation of disunity in the country. It signifies a further, and uglier, intensification of the struggle for power, rather than reconciliation between social and political forces. The Party of Regions is the real power in this coalition, and, by joining it, its partners are seeking to share power rather than advance principles of their own. This party is an organism devoted primarily to one thing: power and its accumulation. We can therefore expect further efforts to take control of institutions that stand in its way.
“Mr. Kinakh is an extremely experienced, tested, and competent figure. He understands the system of power in Ukraine at least as well as anyone, and he is truest to his own nature when he operates at the center of it. His principle is stability. Whoever is in power — Kuchma, Yushchenko, Yanukovych — he will want to be in the center, mitigating extremes, countering amateurism, and maintaining administrative continuity. More than once he has stopped the ship from sinking. The problem is that the ship doesn’t go anywhere. So opposition is not in Kinakh’s bloodstream, and it was probably naive to suppose that his period in opposition would last.”
Don’t you think this is a betrayal?
“Let others answer that question. Even before the third round of presidential elections in 2004, the Orange ranks were swelled by the very sort of people who are swelling the ranks of the Regions now: people who wanted to be on the side of power; people who had too much to lose to risk real opposition. Quite a number of Ukrainian analysts therefore warned that at the first sign of real trouble, these fellow travelers would abandon the ship. I have never disagreed with them.”
How can the West influence Yanukovych and prevent him from seizing all power in his hands?
“The best thing we can do is hold up a mirror: ‘This is the image of Ukraine in the West; do you like this image? Do you think it advances Ukraine’s interests?’ And we need to ask constructively but clearly: ‘What are your goals in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community? Do you understand the means required to achieve these goals? Do you think you can possibly achieve them with the means you have chosen?’ We must avoid two mutually destructive courses of action. The first would be isolating Yanukovych. The isolation of Kuchma was a monumental strategic error. The second is treating Yanukovych like ‘our guy.’ He isn’t. He just has our PR. We need to approach one another with clarity and without illusions.”
Does Yatseniuk’s appointment mean that Yanukovych and Yushchenko have found some sort of compromise?
“Only at the most tactical and damaging level. I suspect the compromise will be the leadership of the SBU. Predictions are perilous for any analyst, but I will take the risk and air my suspicion that the SBU chairmanship will go to one of Radchenko’s people. After all, Radchenko’s people have already been returning to the SBU in recent months.”
How do you assess Yatseniuk’s potential and possibilities?
“Borys Tarasiuk’s performance will be a very tough act for any new minister to follow. But he is no longer minister, and that’s that.”
“ What do we know of Yatseniuk? He is young, capable, sharp, ambitious, and loyal to the president and, despite his stint at the Ministry of the Economy, without real diplomatic experience. What are the positives? As an outsider, he might be able to take a fresh look at the MFA. The MFA is an unusually professional structure and, for the most part, persuaded of the necessity of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course. But it has also become somewhat tired. It is certainly very bureaucratic. Quite a few younger officials and diplomats find its hierarchies oppressive. And of course, it is woefully underfinanced. Many of the brightest and most motivated people simply can’t afford to work there. So it needs someone who knows how to manage money, and it needs someone who knows how to stimulate and consolidate the talents and excellence that resides in the place.
“Second, as someone who has succeeded in the world of business, he might be able to connect the economic, political, and security dimensions in a more inventive and effective way than we sometimes have seen in the past. What are the possible negatives? They are obvious. He might be too arrogant to understand and respect the collective wisdom of this very special institution. Alternatively, he might be too intimidated by professionals to conduct some overdue reforms. So, in other words, there are real unknowns about Yatseniuk.
“But let’s understand the real challenges: first, as I have said, reform and revitalization; second, the EU. It is essential that the ground of discussion shift from discussions about ‘perspectives’ and membership to discussions about integration: joint steps to produce tangible improvements in the spheres of visas, trade, investment, and energy. Let these changes occur first, and then let’s discuss the question of membership. Second, continuing the work pursued by Borys Tarasiuk to strengthen understanding about NATO, both within Ukraine’s structures of government and administration and at the public level. Ideology must be toned down in this discussion. But concrete, reasoned responses are needed not only in response to legitimate public concerns but to disinformation and mendacious attacks upon NATO.
“Third, the newest but one of the most serious challenges of all: energy security. As a security problem, it rightly is a central focus of the Presidential Secretariat and the RNBO. But it is also a challenge of foreign relations. Not enough decision makers in the EU know who is doing what in the sphere of energy policy in Ukraine. Despite the exceptions and disagreements amongst EU members, inside the EU there is an increasingly sound and coherent vision about the nature of the problem and the nature of the solution. In Ukraine there are those who share this vision, and it is in Ukraine’s national interest that the EU and other states support them.”
Do you believe that Yanukovych is being sincere when he speaks of EU membership? Do you agree with those who suggest he would also like to conclude a Membership Action Plan with NATO when political conditions are right?
“First, it is only as a European state that Ukraine has legitimacy as an independent state. So almost any Ukrainian prime minister would say what the prime minister says about the EU. For us, the main question is what is being done, not what is being said. Yet there are those in Yanukovych’s tent who would like to frame the question in such a way that, when nothing is done, Ukraine’s voters will blame the EU for it, rather than the government itself.
“Second question: no, I do not agree that Yanukovych is interested in the MAP or trying to find a way towards it. But in the months and years ahead, could events in Russia, the Caucasus, or Ukraine itself induce him to change his mind? I wouldn’t rule it out.”
Another very important question: American anti-missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. The president has one position and the Coalition of National Unity another.
“With two exceptions, the United States — more specifically, the Pentagon — handled this question badly. The Pentagon did not adequately coordinate its steps with the State Department, and as a result the consultation process left much to be desired, not only in Ukraine but in Poland and the Czech Republic.
“But the exceptions...First, that mistake has since been remedied, and because it has — because Ukraine’s president and the Ministry of Defence — have now been fully briefed from a policy and technical point of view, there is very firm support of the decision and rationale behind it.
“Second, the one country that was properly consulted was Russia. Russia was fully briefed both at the NATO-Russia Council and at the bilateral level. Neither the Kremlin nor the MOD is in any confusion. They understand that no one seeking to target Russia’s offensive missiles would choose to deploy these missiles and deploy them in these locations.
“So why has Russia described this as an offensive step? First, those generals who wish to see budget increases for strategic rocket forces — and who, in addition, want to revoke the Intermediate - Range Nuclear Forces Treaty — see the US deployments as a useful bludgeon in their own internal arguments. Second, the Kremlin itself sees this as yet another issue that can be used to cause problems inside NATO and, of course, between NATO and its partners, such as Ukraine.”
Do you agree with General Obering that Ukraine can help Iran not to produce ballistic missiles?
“So long as Ukraine scrupulously adheres to the UN sanctions against the Iran regime, it should not be made to assume further burdens over this. Ukrainians will not easily forget the precedent set at Bushehr, where Ukraine abandoned a very lucrative assistance program without receiving most of the promised compensation and where, of course, the ground vacated by Ukrainians was promptly filled by Russians. If Russia is genuinely considering the suspension of nuclear fuel deliveries to Iran, then that would be an important step.”
Do you believe that the United States will be more secure after deploying these weapons?
“Consider the wider question: the nuclear threat as perceived by the West. We have just been having a very public discussion about this wider question in Britain, where the first steps have been taken to replace our Trident submarine-based strategic missile deterrent. Uncertainties surrounding Iran are bad enough. But for all these uncertainties, Iran at least has a long state tradition, a rich and ancient culture, and a sophisticated, if often cunning and treacherous, approach to the outside world. But if President Musharraf is overthrown by Islamists in Pakistan, have our unilateral nuclear disarmers seriously thought about the dangers we would face? We will not be talking about sophisticated and worldly political traditions then but about unbridled, unworldly fanaticism, about nuclear weapons in the hands of people whose motto is ‘Let justice be done even if the world perish.’ This is why no one in the West has criticized Russia for modernizing its nuclear weapons, and we therefore wish they would accord us the same understanding and privilege.
