Sociologists say that with the parliamentary elections just four months away public confidence in Ukrainian power institutions has dropped to the level registered in the final years of Leonid Kuchma’s presidency. A survey conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in collaboration with the Ukrainian Sociology Service (Nov. 17-29, 2005; 2,000 respondents in all regions of Ukraine, with a 2.2 percent margin of error) shows that most citizens do not trust the militia (trust/distrust ratio: -35 percent). Next comes the Verkhovna Rada (-31%). The courts and prosecutor’s offices place third (34 percent). Against this background the government does not look too bad (-28 percent). President Viktor Yushchenko scored minus 12 percent.
Only nonpolitical institutions registered a positive rating of public confidence: the church (+38 percent) and the Armed Forces (+8 percent). Ukrainian journalists can also feel proud; the media received a rating of +16 percent. According to Iryna Bekeshkina, head of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the survey indicates that there is not a single politician in Ukraine whose level of public confidence exceeds that of distrust. More than half the respondents (51 percent) believe that “everything happening now in Ukraine is going in the wrong direction.” Three times fewer respondents (27 percent) feel that events are following the right course, and 22 percent were not sure.
How do you explain these ratings?
Olha BALAKIRIEVA, Social Monitoring Center, Ukrainian Institute for Social Research:
Public confidence in the current government is dropping dramatically. The people in power have failed to use that tremendous credit of trust that they were given last year. As for the reasons, the first one is the lack of care for the man in the street, for raising his living standard. Unfortunately, the new government is paying more attention to some speculative, populist things. The impression is that from the very beginning the government was aimed at winning the parliamentary elections rather than taking real steps to influence the living standard. As for social payments, they have been increased nominally, not actually.
The consequences of instability and uncertainty about tomorrow are beginning to emerge. Our relations with Russia are incomprehensible, as are the prospects of solving the energy and gas issues. All of this is adding to the negative balance.
Another factor is incompetence. The government’s statements and commentaries on phenomena over which it cannot control are very indicative. Why talk about a five-percent barrier for political parties when you can’t do anything about it? This initiative would be supported by many, but to talk about it when nothing can be changed means showing that this government doesn’t act, it only talks.
The situation with Piskun is similar. How could they make such a decision, which the justice minister still cannot defend today? This is not even weakness, but incompetence.
Viktoria PODHORNA, political scientist, director of the Social and Political Projection Center:
The first reason is the nonfulfillment of the main task undertaken by the new government. The main idea with which people went to stand on the Maidan was to have a fair new government, people with new principles, new thinking, who were prepared to work not in order to serve their own corporate interests but the nation — in other words, being able to listen to what the people want. Nothing like this actually happened. If you ride the crest of the revolutionary wave, you are faced with a colossal responsibility. If you don’t keep your promises, the ensuing disillusionment can be very quick and sharp.
Number two. Yushchenko’s team doesn’t actually have a strategy for developing Ukraine, a clear-cut national development plan oriented toward the European tradition. And so what the government does is either populistic, meant to produce a quick effect, as in the case of Tymoshenko’s cabinet, or it is something amorphous, something that people don’t understand. They can’t understand what goal the new government is trying to achieve. There are no guidelines, no awareness of a definite political course and the responsibility for it.
Number three. Non-professionalism. Of course, I can’t say that all the cabinet members are non-professionals; there is the excellent professional Arseniy Yatseniuk. Yuriy Yekhanurov is not a bad manager.
But the President’s Secretariat looks rather weak. The people don’t expect this government to be an authoritarian force, like the previous regime. The strength of a government must be the logic of what it does, the perspicuity of the steps it takes, and the responsibility it assumes for them. Most importantly, there must be dynamism, something we don’t have at all. Professionals must be involved and we have them. A whole generation of Ukrainians has studied in the West. Who is using these people? They thought they would be needed. They all stood on the Maidan. No one needs these people, no one has tried to make them part of the public administration. There has been nothing but talk. An attempt to introduce presidential readings was probably the only one that was aimed at listening to professionals, the national elite.
Ihor BALYNSKY, political scientist, Western Information Corporation (Lviv):
First, in almost one year of the Orange government this society has not been offered an alternative option of national development. Everything has been kept on the level of slogans and comparisons with the Kuchma regime. In reality, there is nothing concrete behind these slogans. This is very important not for the ordinary voter but the people who shape public opinion, for bearers of positions. Second, I actually don’t think that the current drop in public confidence in the government is explained by the scandals in the governing team. Our society has seen that the government consists of people with absolutely different world views, morals, and strategic thinking. Our society has seen what a heterogeneous team actually means; heterogeneity exacerbated by huge scandals.
People can’t clearly formulate their attitude to the government. Is the government capable of protecting the interests of an individual or of large groups of people? This government is so unstructured, so unconsolidated that the people want to wait and see what other steps this government will take, and then they will pass their final judgment. I think that this aspect will be very important on the eve of the elections. The electorate will assess the government from the standpoint of consolidation and the ability to think systemically, on the level of all elements.
The third aspect that I would link to the drop in public confidence is the strategic mistakes of the government, not the tactical ones. In my opinion, Viktor Yanukovych owes his current ratings to two things: the signing of the memorandum with the government, which, in fact, legalized Yanukovych in the eyes of his electorate as the actual champion of their interests. The government also hasn’t learned to acknowledge — let alone correct — its mistakes. It hasn’t even learned to admit its mistakes and declare its readiness to correct them. This is very important because publicity and transparency are formed not according to the presence or absence of temnyky, but on the level of the government’s reaction to criticism. If there is no response to criticism, such a government will make voters cautious and this attitude will eventually grow into a level of distrust.
