On Dec. 8 Brussels hosted another session of the Ukraine-NATO Commission and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at the foreign ministerial level. The Ukrainian delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk, who, according to official reports, updated Commission members on the current socioeconomic situation in Ukraine, the progress of democratic reforms, and Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities. The meeting participants also evaluated Ukraine’s progress on the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan, in particular the annual Ukraine-NATO Target Plan. They also discussed the draft plan for next year.
At one time many hopes were placed on this session. Some even hoped that Ukraine’s relationship with the alliance would be promoted to the level of the Membership Action Plan. Apparently, this will have to wait. There are many reasons, but they boil down to the fact that alliance members have misgivings about the consistency of Kyiv’s foreign policy: will Ukraine do an about-face in its foreign policy after the 2006 parliamentary elections? It is obvious that before the elections Ukraine should not expect to make significant progress in its Euro-Atlantic integration. This does not mean, however, that the nation’s leadership should sit back and do nothing. In essence, how the elections turn out depends on the leadership’s actions. Ukraine’s movement toward NATO is complicated by many factors that involve both domestic and foreign policies. Even though Russia has not officially objected to Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, its actions speak the opposite. Much depends on the efforts of the Ukrainian leadership and its readiness to undertake efforts to remove all the obstacles to integration. The Day asked Foreign Minister Borys TARASIUK a number of questions concerning Ukraine’s Euro- Atlantic integration.
“What is your assessment of Kyiv’s fulfillment of the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan?”
“Much has been accomplished in the three years of implementing the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan. At the same time, I have to say that it became possible to implement certain crucial measures solely owing to the political will of the country’s new leadership.
“For example, the idea to introduce a one-stop customs service was envisioned in the 2003 Ukraine-NATO Target Plan, but it is only thanks to President Yushchenko’s personal principled stance that tangible results have been seen this year. The same goes for the transformation of our border troops into law enforcement detachments modeled on Europe’s. This transformation is much needed, given the fact that, according to NATO experts, the level of illegal migration in Ukraine is 20 to 25 times higher than the EU average.
“As for the action plan ‘Questions of Security and Defense and Military Issues’, it mostly deals with the reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A decision was made this year to start a review of the entire security sector, which is similar to the defense review we conducted.
“At the same time, some of the things envisioned by the Action Plan are still being implemented. For example, we are still fulfilling the commitments that Ukraine undertook when it joined the Council of Europe in 1995. Even though nearly all the international legal documents have been signed and ratified, and most of the commitments relating to the reform of the Ukrainian legislation and practice of its application have been fulfilled, we still have not endorsed a new Criminal Procedural Code, reformed the prosecution system, ratified the European social charter, or transferred the penitentiary system to the Ministry of Justice along with the responsibility for registering individuals who enter or leave the country. Still, these things will not spoil the generally positive tone of the discussions on the future relationship between Ukraine and NATO. The transformations in our country are so striking that it is simply impossible to overlook them.”
“How did NATO respond to the fact that on Nov. 2 the Ukrainian parliament voted down the memorandum on mutual understanding between Ukraine and NATO concerning the use of Ukraine’s strategic transport aviation in NATO operations and exercises? Will this affect the alliance’s use of Ukraine’s transport aviation?”
“The Nov. 2 deliberations in parliament on whether to ratify the memorandum on the use of Ukraine’s strategic transport aviation in NATO operations and exercises represented an attempt by certain political forces to capitalize on the problematic issues in Ukraine’s relationship with the alliance.
“The adoption of this memorandum was quite deliberately blocked by politicians who nevertheless realize the benefits of this agreement, especially the fact that it creates more jobs for people involved in our transport aviation and additional budget revenues. After all, at stake here are prospects of the Ukrainian aviation industry and security of future markets for the Ukrainian military and defense complex.
This decision has negative political consequences for Ukraine. The failure to ratify this agreement is harming Ukraine’s image of an active participant of international cooperation in the security sphere and casts doubt on our determination to honor our international commitments.
“This time, unfortunately, state interests were sacrificed for political expediency. That this agreement serves our interests is attested by the fact that it was supported by three Ukrainian governments: in 2004 the Yanukovych government empowered Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk to sign this memorandum; the Tymoshenko government submitted this document for consideration by parliament; and the Yekhanurov government supported this agreement during its ratification last November. Another agreement between Ukraine and NATO, the Memorandum on Ukraine’s support for NATO operations, signed in 2002 by the Yanukovych government, was ratified in 2004 by the current parliament.
“This inconsistency is regrettable. I hope that common sense will prevail in this matter, and that this agreement, which is necessary above all for Ukraine, will be ratified.”
“What priorities in Ukraine-NATO cooperation would you identify for the next year?”
“First of all, these should be democratic transformations in the domestic political realm. The 2006 Ukraine-NATO Target Plan is geared toward this goal. At the same time, the priorities should be such specific questions as reviewing the security sector and the ongoing reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; implementing retraining and adaptation programs for demobilized servicemen; the disposal of hazardous excessive armaments and rocket propellant; an initiative to evaluate the impact of military activities on environmental safety, etc.
“Another extremely important task is to deliver accurate information about NATO to society. Unfortunately, stereotypes about an “aggressive NATO bloc” are still being taken for granted. In reality, our citizens know very little about the fact that today’s NATO is primarily a political organization of the most developed democratic nations of Europe and North America, whose goal is collective defense against new dangers and threats that come with globalization, primarily against the threat of terrorism. The foreign ministry is working actively to bring objective information about NATO to Ukrainian citizens.”
“Do you get the impression that Russia has started to take practical steps in response to Ukraine’s movement toward the West: the EU and NATO? Could Moscow’s intentions to raise natural gas prices and suspend military-technical cooperation with Ukraine be interpreted as signs that this is happening?”
“We consider spreading democratic values, establishing rule of law, defending human rights and free speech, improving the wellbeing of our citizens, and reinforcing regional and global security the main goals of our country. Within this context, accession to the EU and NATO is not an end in itself for us. We view the acquisition of full membership in these organizations as a tool for implementing the goals we have set.
“At the same time, this strategic course is not aimed against anybody, least of all against our closest neighbors with whom we want to build a constructive business relationship. The fact that Ukraine wants to live in the ‘common European home’ does not prevent it from developing cooperation with Russia, which is without a doubt one of our most powerful partners.
“Granted, Ukraine wants to join NATO, while Russia doesn’t. But this does not prevent the latter from conducting a profound and objective dialog on a broad spectrum of issues. Since 1991 the alliance and Russia have been working jointly on various questions of security and defense. By signing in May 1997 the Fundamental Act of NATO-Russia on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security (the Charter on the special partnership between Ukraine and NATO was signed later), NATO and Russia officially registered their partnership. They undertook to develop these relations on the basis of common interests, and created a new forum toward this end: the Permanent Joint Council of NATO and Russia.
“After signing the Rome declaration to establish the Russia-NATO Council, President Vladimir Putin said, ‘Even though the views of the Kremlin and NATO do not always correspond, there are more factors that unite Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance than separate them.’ Russia is actively cooperating on the key issues of contemporary security: combating terrorism, anti-crisis management, missile defense in the theater of military operations, military reform, managing the use of air space, extraordinary civilian planning, scientific cooperation, and environmental safety, etc. Addressing these issues and developing solutions, Russia enjoys the status of a de facto NATO member. Moreover, the Russian president said in late October in an interview with a Dutch television channel that Russia ‘will adapt certain things to NATO standards, for this way it is easier to work in foreign armament markets.’
“Let me give you an example within our own context — providing aviation transport services to serve the needs of the alliance. Now that the Ukrainian parliament has rejected the opportunities afforded by this memorandum, this ‘niche’ may be quickly occupied by a third party, such as the Russian company Volga-Dnepr, which has been quite successful in providing transport services to NATO.
“Accession to NATO does not entail an automatic transition to weapons used by the alliance’s member states, which is something that Ukrainian politicians speculate about, among other things. The only requirement for the armed forces of a NATO member state is compatibility of forces and materiel, which are chosen for joint operations. In this respect Russia also maintains constructive cooperation with the alliance.
“In particular, during the informal meeting of defense ministers of NATO member states and partners in Vilnius last April Russia signed an agreement on the legal status of the armed forces of NATO member states and countries involved in the Partnership for Peace Program. According to Russia’s foreign minister, this agreement ‘will increase the operational compatibility of the armies of Russia and NATO...and establish legal possibilities for joint actions with the alliance.’
“Representatives of the Russian leadership have repeatedly stressed that the Russia-NATO partnership has become a significant factor of European stability. They also would like this cooperation to be independent of the fluctuating political situation.
“As for the question of oil and natural gas, I would like to emphasize that a country cannot be politically independent if it is economically dependent. We must proceed from this assumption when addressing the question of diversifying the sources of energy supplies. Now Ukraine is negotiating natural gas supplies with the Russian Federation, which proposes tripling the price of natural gas starting in 2006. Ukraine’s position boils down to this: our country is ready to switch from barter schemes to monetary payments, but insists on doing this gradually and in a coordinated manner, especially since there are corresponding long-term bilateral arrangements and international norms. Without a doubt, because of the two countries’ certain interdependence, higher fuel prices for Ukraine will also have an impact on Russia.
“I would like to believe that the announced intentions are merely Russia’s way of boosting its position during the talks, not a final decision. In my view, the leaders of both Ukraine and Russia understand that no one will benefit from creating problems, because this would only complicate things for both sides. Therefore, we must hold talks and refrain from making hasty decisions and abrupt unilateral moves. I think that the problems in the sphere of natural gas prices and military cooperation will be resolved in the immediate future on the bilateral level, taking into account the situation within the Eurasian space in general.
“I would also like to stress that the European Union is following the situation closely and realizes that attempts (on Russia’s part — Ed.) to do a “shock experiment” on Ukraine might have adverse consequences for the security of the entire European continent.”
