For the time being, the European Union has adopted a wait-and-see attitude to internal changes in Ukraine and is refraining from voicing critical comments, let alone harsh criticism. This conclusion follows the recent one-day visit to Kyiv by a European politician with a very long and important-sounding title. High Representative of the European Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana had a very busy schedule during his July 19 visit to Ukraine because of the very short timeframe allocated for his meetings. In six hours Solana was crammed in talks with the president, prime minister, foreign minister, and the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. The lack of time was obvious, and, according to our sources, the high EU representative left Kyiv later than planned.
Today EU officials are not reluctant to talk about the priority they attach to developing relations with Ukraine, but only within the framework of the neighborhood policy. Membership is not discussed, of course, and EU diplomats are practically begging their Ukrainian colleagues to wait and not rush with their application for membership. It is easy to understand the EU member states, especially given the critical mass of problems plaguing the EU: the failed referendums, the budget crisis, rising unemployment, etc. It appears that having welcomed Turkey, the EU is careful not to step on the same rake twice. This is not to say that the door to the EU has been temporarily shut on Ukraine (after all, the founding documents of the EU grant any European nation the right to join the EU after achieving certain standards). It is just that European politicians fear being misunderstood by their population. The fact that opinion polls suggest considerable public support for Ukraine’s accession (especially in contrast to Turkey’s accession) does not mean that this will continue for much longer. So far the EU is searching for a strategy for its future relations with Ukraine. It has taken a timeout of sorts by signing the joint Action Plan for the next three years.
To all appearances, the question of Ukraine’s accession to the EU was not raised during Solana’s visit to Kyiv, which is rather strange because Brussels couldn’t have missed the recent statement by President Viktor Yushchenko. During his visit to Austria he stated that Ukraine intends to apply for EU membership early next year. This information circulated in the Ukrainian political community at least this past April, and The Day wrote about this long before the president’s visit to Austria. It is not ruled out that there is an ulterior motive behind the plan.
The application for membership will be made just ahead of the 2006 parliamentary elections, when the leaders will have to report to the nation on the progress that has been made after one year on promises of European integration, which the president made in his inaugural speech.
The submission of the application would appear to reflect the serious intentions of the “revolutionary” leadership. Before the elections few will mind the fact that the submission of the application does not necessarily entail membership and that it might take years to review the application. Rejection is also a possibility. Moreover, Solana’s silence does not signal the EU’s approval of Ukraine’s intention to apply for membership. It is just that Brussels officials made all of this clear a long time ago and do not want to repeat themselves.
Javier Solana is known in Ukraine as one of the staunchest supporters of close ties between Kyiv and Brussels. During his last visit he even promised to study the Ukrainian language. It remains to be seen whether he belongs to the as yet small club of European politicians who would like the EU to embrace Ukraine by offering it membership prospects.
It is certain, however, that he favors Ukraine, if only because of his very friendly personal relations with individual members of the Ukrainian leadership, which in itself is significant given the political allergy that the EU leadership had for their former Ukrainian partners. Speaking in an interview with The Day a month ago, Javier Solana described the current level of cooperation with Ukraine as “unprecedented dynamism.” Proof of this is the allocation of substantial funds for reforms in Ukraine and regular visits by European commissioners, who until recently used to visit only aspiring EU member states. Moreover, the EU seems to be the last one to have preserved an optimistic view of the processes unfolding in Ukraine. Whereas the US has started to voice concerns over what is happening in Ukraine, especially in the economy, the EU is quite tolerant even of certain miscalculations. In particular, Javier Solana stressed in Kyiv that relations between Ukraine and the EU “have become closer than they were yesterday.” “In the past six months much has been done, which deserves high appreciation,” he said. Such appraisals would be welcome only if they fully reflected reality. Proof of official Washington’s concerns is US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst’s recent interview in The Day, in which he voiced reservations about the internal trends in Ukraine. Evidence of the Americans’ concerns is the recent article by Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation.
Recently another prominent American expert told The Day that the Ukrainian leadership is going through a period of celebrity fever and is deaf to criticisms, except in individual cases, when they are expressed by heads of state. Therefore, it would make sense for Javier Solana to use his high standing with the Ukrainian leaders to point out weak spots and recommend ways to avoid mistakes in the future. It is doubtful, however, that Solana is ready to perform such advisory functions. The EU is firmly confident that Ukraine is making gradual progress along the path of reforms, even if not without difficulties. European diplomats also point out that they are quite satisfied with the way Kyiv is fulfilling the Action Plan. But what about the certain miscalculations pointed out by numerous experts (uncertainty surrounding reprivatization processes, government regulation of pricing, etc.)? In response to this one EU diplomat said in an interview with The Day: “Perhaps there are mistakes. But whenever you speak about them, you compare Ukraine’s integration into the EU with that of other nations. Do you think Poland or Romania did not make mistakes? They did and a great deal more.” Apparently at least two things can account for the EU’s lenient stance. First, the EU has too many problems of its own to be dispensing advice to Ukraine and thereby undertaking large commitments. Second, the EU is in fact pleased with what is happening in Ukraine. But for how long? Won’t those recommendations be too late if and when they are offered?
Meanwhile, the impression is that the EU, much like Ukraine, is confining its attention to questions of secondary importance, the only exception being the efforts to resolve the Transdnistrian crisis. During his visit to Kyiv, Javier Solana expressed the hope that Ukraine will become a WTO member in the immediate future. This, however, is not news, since the EU could not hope otherwise a priori. Ukraine and the EU long ago signed all the necessary protocols, which resolved all problem issues, enabling Brussels to support Kyiv in its WTO membership bid. In what appears to be another “old” theme with a “novel” touch, the EU representative pointed out that Ukraine will shortly be granted market economy status: “I cannot name the day when Ukraine will be recognized a market economy, but this day of recognition is very near.” (In this case everything depends on Ukraine, which is expected to honor all of its obligations, in particular the obligation to refrain from government regulation).
Most importantly, Javier Solana said that the EU is ready to assist Ukraine in resolving the Transdnistrian conflict according to the plan proposed by Ukraine. Notably, Russia, which is party to the talks, recently proposed that Ukraine revise the so-called Yushchenko Plan. Until recently experts reported that the EU is not entirely pleased with Kyiv’s peace plan, since the Ukrainian initiative lacks a clear definition of Transdnistria’s future status (according to Ukraine’s proposal, this question has to be resolved independently by Chisinau and Tiraspol, since attempts to impose obligations from day one might scare the parties away from the negotiating table). Apparently, Brussels has accepted Kyiv’s arguments, but would still like to have some influence on the peace effort. Proof of this is Solana’s statement: “Europe is giving a positive answer to Ukraine’s request for assistance in the resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict. Already in early fall we will begin work on this issue.”
Solana’s trip to Ukraine can hardly be called just a side visit. A recess period is starting in both Ukraine and the EU. It is therefore easy to predict that reforms will be shelved yet again. Solana’s impressions of his recent visit to Kyiv will most likely last until October, when the Ukraine-EU summit is slated to take place in Kyiv. Its results will largely determine how the EU will welcome the application for membership early next year. Perhaps then EU representatives will offer their evaluations of how serious the nation’s leaders are about making good on their promises and intentions.
