The new political reform project, voiced by Oleksandr Moroz and Petro Symonenko at a news conference, then seconded by President Kuchma in his holiday address, allows one to view Ukraine’s political future from a different perspective. The current parliamentary majority, with the Communists alone, may have 300 votes (in the unlikely event of 100% attendance, of course). Being joined by the Socialist Party, the majority would practically guarantee the passage of any bill agreed upon by the factions.
How will the new president fit into the new pattern? This, as well as the election procedures and powers vested in the head of state, forms the key aspect of the proposed political reform. There are three reasons for approaching the issue this way.
First, none of the negotiating parties is interested in having Viktor Yushchenko as the next president with that office’s current powers. Sources closely associated with the powers that be voice their concern (not without reason) about Mr. Yushchenko making concessions to his business apostles and launching a great redistribution of property. The Communists fear that he would steer a middle course with the radicals, banning the Communist Party of Ukraine. Oleksandr Moroz wants the political reform and does not believe that good President Yushchenko would be willing to share his powers with anyone.
Second, none of the parties (the executive branch, the Communists, and the Socialist Party) has a single presidential candidate at the moment, in case of an early election. Hard as they try to look and sound otherwise, the Communists do not have anyone to challenge Petro Symonenko standing a fair chance of making it to the second round of the presidential campaign although he is not likely to get any further. As for the other candidates, their chances are best described as good or nonexistent. The executive might come out with its candidate sometime closer to the election date, but nothing so far.
Third, the political reform implies mainly a series of coordinated measures to enhance political responsibility in the parliament and government. Here those favoring concessions have no questions. The stated project tallies with the opposition’s memorandum concerning the political reform (except for such matters as grain and reinforced local authorities). It is also true, however, that the Left is skeptical about the regime actually intending to conduct elections on a proportional basis, but this problem is being worked on.
Viktor Yushchenko appears to be opposed to the political reform. Until recently, Our Ukraine’s stand consisted in demanding proportional representation and passing bills amending the constitution. Naturally, the said bills, even if passed, would not introduce any radical changes in the fundamental law, meaning that Yushchenko’s coalition government would look very much like that of Yanukovych’s.
Thus there are three options.
WEAK — STRONG
Option 1 is the proposals debated by the leaders of the leftist factions, together with Viktor Medvedchuk. The stated project is a big step taken toward the CPU, in terms of both content and transition provisions. Naturally, all the sensitive aspects (e.g., elections to be held within the year, a permanent majority, the right to appoint the officials in charge of the military and security ministries and agencies, along with the heads of local state administrations, and all those other traps for the opposition) were edited out of the final text of the draft.
Enough is known to assume that the draft proposes a rather strong head of state. The president would be given the right of veto in the parliament and to disband it in certain cases. Considering that such powers are not characteristic of the head of a parliamentary republic, the draft further proposes a mechanism allowing the president to be elected by an overwhelming majority of votes in the parliament. The authors apparently believe that this clause will make it possible to elect a true leader actually chosen by the whole nation, one prepared to take into account the interests of most deputies rather than a simple government coalition.
The transition clauses envision presidential elections in keeping with the old procedures (albeit conferring fresh powers on the electee), to be effected in 2004. In 2006, the new Ukrainian parliament would have to elect another president. This pattern makes it clear that the new head of state would be yet another figurehead, as proposed by Symonenko last spring. The Communist leader’s concept is clear enough; the centrist forces discredited themselves under Viktor Yushchenko, so Ukraine would play out the Moldova scenario in 2006. Yury Lutsenko, in turn, proposed to elect the president for a term of a year and a half, provided he would have the same authority as before, so he could terrorize “enemies of the people” (Lutsenko added that this was necessary so “the newly elected president could destroy the clans for the opposition”).
Mykola Tomenko and Volodymyr Malynkovych objected, saying the next president could not be elected that way, while having an interim head of state would be unfair to the electorate. Both were not very truthful, considering that both are Yushchenko exponents. On certain occasions, the Ukrainian parliament has registered over 300 ayes (as when electing Pavlo Lazarenko Prime Minister) so that a small-time president would be perfectly in order, if and when he and his electorate had been duly forewarned. Otherwise being unable to elect the next head of state empowered to disband the parliament would mean prolonging the office of an “interim” president, for an indeterminate term.
The point here is different. Everybody knows that Viktor Yushchenko could become president in 2006 only if the required number of the people’s deputies are members of Our Ukraine. This is something even the most optimistic analysts are not sure about. Setting up a larger coalition to serve his purposes would be impossible. His experience as premier and people’s deputy shows that he cannot and will not learn to cooperate with the parliament. Whether this results from his idealism or authoritarianism is not important.
One way or another, the stated political reform looks too complicated, and even now its chances of being adopted are being called into question. Should the Ukrainian president be allowed such authority now, so the next could be elected by 337 deputies?
WEAK — WEAK
It would be natural for this project to help transform Ukraine into basically a parliamentary republic, denying the president the kind of authority that would make him a strong political figure. He would remain a figurehead, representing Ukraine in international affairs, retaining his rank as Commander-in-Chief, but unable to order the Verkhovna Rada disbanded, veto bills, and so on. Such a president could be elected using a qualified or even simple majority.
This approach, regardless of its transition clauses, would cause an angry response from the Yushchenko camp and even from those in power. Needless to say, both would have their own presidential candidates, but there would be substantive differences to consider.
On the one hand, a situation like this would have a direct bearing on the political reform, since at this point one could wonder about who would be in a position to dissolve parliament — considering that such dissolution is regarded by the authors of the bill as an absolutely necessary component of the system of political accountability.
Conferring this right on the president or premier looks poorly justified, meaning that there should be an independent body of authority and also that changes would have to be made regarding the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court. However, the judiciary’s status in Ukraine is such that allowing the courts the said privilege would sound like a bad joke.
On the other hand, big business (not even those favoring the executive) wants a system that really works with restrictions and counterweights. A weak president would not fit into the usual pattern. Moreover, the relatively small number of votes required to get him there would mean that there could be no such counterweights, since both the head of state and premier would belong to the same bloc.
Petro Symonenko, accordingly, proposed to cancel the premier’s post, so the Ukrainian parliament would elect a president who would be head of both the state and cabinet (sort of a chancellor). However, from the standpoint of preserving the system of restrictions and counterweights, supposing that the forces in power could lose the parliamentary campaign, this option is a lesser possibility, for the president would have too much authority in his hands.
STRONG — STRONG
A way out of this situation appears rather simple; leaving everything the way it was laid down in the parliamentary majority’s bill, while having the president elected by a nationwide vote. The president could, in fact, be vested with broader powers (say, that of appointing heads of state administrations upon the premier’s recommendation).
In this case, the head of state would be placed above politics and would be able to tell all those ruffians off, using his official and moral authority, acting as an unbiased umpire. Then normal restrictions and counterweights would form, with the political system becoming a genuinely parliamentary-presidential one. Then neither those favoring the current regime nor the Left would be afraid of Viktor Yushchenko, who would be completely free to use his popularity and satisfy his political ambitions. This, however, would not be likely to cause any damage or impede the process of its own oligarchs, etc.
THIRD VERSION
The new political reform bill would extend Verkhovna Rada’s term to five years and that the president to be elected by popular vote in 2004 resign as soon as the parliament to be elected in 2006 elects a new president. The proposal also provides for early revocation of a people’s deputy if he/she has been absent without good reason from one hundred plenary meetings in a year or if a deputy elected on a political party’s or bloc’s ticket has not officially entered, has withdrawn, or been expelled from his/her political force’s faction. The bill says that Constitutional amendments will come into force four month after being adopted. This document, already registered, has been cosponsored by 233 people’s deputies.
