The Kremlin’s relatively calm response to Ukraine’s decision to set its sights on NATO membership should not be misunderstood by anyone. It came on the eve of the Russia-NATO summit, not the best time, just as Rome was not the best place to stamp one’s foot. The fact remains that Moscow is still far from enthusiastic NATO expansion, despite the unprecedented entente between Russia and the West.
Kyiv finally declared that Ukraine would eventually join NATO. It has wanted to do so for the past decade, but for Moscow. And the stand was formulated not so much as a decision but as a decision to make that decision, joining whatever NATO would eventually become after expanding in the coming years.
There is little doubt that Moscow’s great leap (by our standard) into the Atlantic, after two years of marching in the Eurasian direction, was the result of a Russian-NATO geopolitical maneuver. While some of our politicians were eternally vigilant, trying to spot tanks advancing from the “aggressive Western bloc,” NATO had entered the suburbs of Natalia Vitrenko’s Konotop from the East.
Kyiv, with its justified apprehension, ended up in a zone of silence, a blind valley, at the side of the road, or any other such figurative place when trying to decide where it was. This spurred it into making unprecedentedly decisive declarations. The Financial Times wrote that Europe became irritated by Moscow and Washington showing such rapprochement, so what Kyiv was supposed to do?
Russia, after opposing any, even the most innocent contacts between Ukraine and NATO, is now ahead of us in its relationship with the alliance. Many in Kyiv scold Moscow for double standards, yet what is allowed Jupiter is not allowed the bull. Also, such accusations are far from justified, first, because Ukraine has traditionally lagged behind Russia in every sphere, and secondly, power has changed hands in Russia and the new leadership shows a sober approach in assessing Russia’s role in this world. Also, the world itself has changed. Seeing NATO approach the Russian border slowly but surely, Vladimir Putin decided to take advantage of the situation. By stepping toward NATO he showed true political courage, and Lord Robertson is correct in assuming that it was done contrary to public opinion and mute opposition within the Russian military and security ministries and agencies.
Among other things, the opponents of Russian-NATO rapprochement insisted that Russia’s neighbors would take advantage of the situation to justify their own pro-Atlantic political stand. And Ukraine has done just that.
The timing was right, on the eve of the Russia-NATO summit binding Moscow by diplomatic formalities, so it could not lash out at Kyiv. In fact, Russian Ambassador Chernomyrdin, who had only several weeks ago rather sharply criticized the Ukrainian idea of associate EU membership, now declared that “building relations with NATO is Ukraine’s sovereign prerogative,” in an uncharacteristically unemotional tone.
Vladimir Putin has also demonstrated Olympian calm. Some news agencies misinterpreted his statements in Rome as supporting Ukraine’s plans. In actuality, the Russian president made it clear that Ukraine could go very far in its relations with NATO, but never a step ahead of Russia. He stressed that Russia’s attitude toward NATO expansion remains the same: as negative as ever before. Moscow adamantly refused to take part in the Prague summit to grant the Baltic states NATO membership.
Most likely, Russia decided that it would not have any problems making Ukraine’s road to NATO membership as long as conceivably possible. As a member of the Twenty, even without a veto, Russia now has an ample opportunity to influence the discussion.
That Russia will put up with Ukrainian-NATO rapprochement seems highly unlikely. In fact, Moscow is sure to actively resist it, and Kyiv will shortly come under heavy political and economic pressure.
An analysis of comments by Ukrainian politicians makes it possible to assume that many were taken complete unawares by the NSDC resolution. Thus, Heorhy Kriuchkov and Petro Symonenko made controversial statements. Viktor Yanukovych made it clear that the Party of the Regions cared little about the problem – let the experts deal with it. Some in the party of power regard this crucial foreign political decision as a non-binding act of the NSDC (as though the meeting were not presided over by the head of state). Most politicians are in no hurry to make their stand public knowledge.
There is a constitutional pro-Atlantic majority in Verkhovna Rada, as evidenced by the campaign programs, which are, of course, far from always carried out. The differences between the United Ukraine, Our Ukraine, and Tymoshenko bloc are not likely to prevent them from voting for Euro-Atlantic integration. In fact, internal United Ukrainian differences might well turn out to be considerably stronger, for this presidential formation includes those supporting both the Atlantic and Eurasian vectors. The parliament, however, is certain to support every Atlantic initiative by the executive.
The stand taken by the Ukrainian military is also important. Its interest is purely material; one of the membership qualifications is increased military spending. Sociologists also report positive shifts in public opinion.
Becoming European from within, however, remains the key prerequisite for both EU and NATO membership. This is a problem the ruling political elite cannot and does not want to solve. Those in power have long secured themselves access to Europe, but securing the European standard for the rest of the people faces this elite with numerous limitations and the need to discard old techniques of solving economic and political issues.
This is precisely why Russia has nothing to worry about for the time being. NATO’s enthusiasm about having Ukraine remains questionable, as is Ukraine’s ability to meet the rigid selection criteria in the foreseeable future.
