Trends on both sides of the Atlantic are undermining the half century of partnership between North America and Europe. If these challenges become the cockpit of rivalry, allowing one side to seek advantage over the other, the world will a become less peaceful, less stable, and less prosperous place.
What forces are beginning to drive America and Europe apart? One is the extent to which North America’s center of gravity is shifting westwards. California long ago overtook New York as the most populous US state. British Columbia plays an increasingly important role in Canada. Silicon Valley and Microsoft are both on the West Coast. Japan, despite recent difficulties, remains an economic giant. And China is, for the US, both its greatest opportunity as a market and its greatest potential superpower rival.
Today, trade disputes have come closest to fracturing transatlantic relationships. Attempts by the US to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction, including the attempt to ban British businessmen from visiting Cuba, incite European resentment. European attitudes toward the import of Caribbean bananas and hormone treated beef arouse strong reactions in North America. The trading relationship will remain difficult to manage, for commercial interests do differ. Governments are increasingly called upon to assist their own companies. Conflicts are inevitable.
Threats to the Atlantic partnership from Europe are equally ominous, led by the drive toward European integration. This is, in part, explicitly motivated by a desire to create a European rival to US power. I say, in part, for not all who espouse a single European state are anti-American. But a number of them are.
In France, during the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, one poster used by campaigners for a ‘Yes’ vote featured a Yankee cowboy squashing the globe beneath his boots. The byline read: “Faire l’Europe c’est faire le poids” (To build Europe is to give us weight).
President Mitterrand was more vivid: “France does not know it, but we are at war with America. Yes, a permanent war, a vital war, a war without death.”
“Yes, they are very hard, the Americans, they are voracious, they want undivided power over the world.” Recently, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, launched a sweeping attack on the US, repeated his description of it as a “hyperpower”. Many advocates of the euro wish to see it rival the dollar as an international reserve currency.
Within defined limits, and provided that decisions are taken by consensus, there is a case for a common EU foreign policy. EU members have many interests in common. It makes sense for those common interests to be safeguarded and addressed by cooperative, coordinated action. But as the potential for action of this kind increases so the potential for conflict with North America increases. European countries have different policies from the US on Cuba, Israel, Iraq and Libya to name just a few.
So far, these differences are managed without impairing the alliance’s fundamental harmony. But it is not difficult to foresee situations in which the differences might become acute. What if the EU were to take a fundamentally different view to the US on transferring advanced technology to China? How long would it be before relations with China became a cockpit of transatlantic rivalry?
Most sensitive of all is the future of military relations between Europe and North America. For fifty years this has been the keystone of partnership despite the complexities caused by the fact that not all European members of NATO are members of the EU and not all EU members of EU are members of NATO. The Western European Union (WEU), which includes all the relevant countries, has provided the organizational structure for preserving and promoting partnership.
As a result of an initiative by the UK government, the WEU is to be absorbed into the EU. The UK government signed an agreement with France at St. Malo which provides for military cooperation between the countries “inside and outside” NATO. Other agreements refer to building an autonomous European defense capability. It is not difficult to see how European military cooperation outside the NATO framework has profound implications for the Atlantic partnership. The part played by the UK in promoting this initiative calls into question the extent to which Britain will perform its traditional bridge building role.
This is not to deny the potential of that role, which remains important. It is, moreover, a role that Britain would no longer be able to play if it left the EU as is sometimes advocated. But even within the EU, Britain’s role can no longer be taken for granted by the US.
The Cold War was the glue which held both shores of the Atlantic together. Strains and stresses paled when compared to the Soviet threat. That glue has dissolved. Because the threat no longer exists, many think that risks can be run.
This is a profoundly mistaken and superficial view, though undoubtedly widespread in Europe, with some adherents in Britain. If partnership is replaced by rivalry and rivalry becomes hostility both Europe and America will be the losers. Some may say, indeed do say, that Europe could never rival North America and that any attempts to do so are doomed to failure. I agree. But attempting such rivalry damages the partnership.
Many problems faced by the post Cold War world can best be overcome by Europe and America acting together. Kosovo is one example. Even in faraway East Timor there is British and American support for the main Australian contingent.
If instead of working together Europe and North America exploit problems for their own purposes and make them a focus of rivalry and hostility, the rest of the world would be gravely disadvantaged. What if, say, Taiwan and China were to face off? Would Europe and America be on the same side? What if Europe and America found each other at odds over some future conflict in the Balkans? What if they found themselves backing opposing combatants?
To preserve the Atlantic partnership great effort is needed to ensure that the policymakers on both sides are alert to the dangers. Often the transatlantic dimension, the need to promote partnership, cannot be the decisive factor in decisions. But if it is not overlooked, if those in positions of responsibility are resolved to do all they can to minimize the strains and mitigate the damage, danger can be averted. Without such efforts, the Atlantic partnership, at the moment of its greatest prosperity, could be doomed to drift and divorce.
