The essence of the problem is a historical assessment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukr. abbr., UPA) as a military formation and the political force that inspired it, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).
The All-Ukraine UPA Fraternity, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, and Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists insist on officially recognizing UPA as a combatant during World War II.
The Organization of Ukrainian [War] Veterans and supporting Left parties refuse to change the Soviet assessment of OUN and UPA. They demand that school textbooks on Ukrainian history, allegedly purposefully distorting the historical process, be dumped. They brand the OUN members and UPA servicemen as traitors of the Ukrainian people, Nazi lackeys, and war criminals.
The problem of OUN-UPA first caught the public eye in Ukraine in the fall of 1992, marking UPA’s sixtieth anniversary. UPA veterans, supported by broad public circles in Western Ukraine, urged the government to grant them the same privileges as veterans of the Soviet army and partisan movement The state responded by publishing the law of Ukraine On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of their Social Protection (October 22, 1993). The law recognizes UPA servicemen fighting the Nazis in occupied Ukraine, 1941 — 44, as combatants. After that the problem receded into the background, and not a single political force has campaigned for deleting the UPA men from the list of combatants.
However, the OUN-UPA issue has acquired a political coloration. The parties to the dispute each wants the authorities to say their piece on the matter. Officials receive mountains of letters with polarized views. The veterans’ movement split in October 1996 and the confrontation is getting worse, drawing into its orbit no so much veterans as political forces striving to use their moral authority.
In May 1997, the President of Ukraine instructed the cabinet to set up a governmental committee entitled to “study the OUN-UPA activities and work out an official stand with regard to the activities of that organization.” In September that same year, a work group was formed within the committee’s network and attached to the National Academy’s Institute of Ukrainian History. Its mission was to prepare historical findings on OUN-UPA. Its membership, apart from the institute’s researchers, includes people from the Academy’s Institute for Political and Ethnic Studies (formerly the Institute of Party History — Ed.), National Institute for Strategic Studies, Taras Shevchenko National University, SBU (security service), Committee of Ukrainian Archives, and Central State Archives of Social Organizations (i.e., party history — Ed.).
The Left has opposed the idea of using documents to verify allegations concerning OUN and UPA, voiced by both their supporters and opponents. December 29, 1997, Prof. Ivan Khmil, Chairman of the War Veterans Committee (who in the UN in 1983 asserted that the Manmade Famine of 1933 had been “a lie made up by collaborators” — Ed.), urged the legislative ad executive to aim the governmental committee at “exposing the criminal activities of OUN-UPA.” He declared he would not cooperate with the working group of historians for so long as it was led by “dilettante turncoats.” His statement made it clear that any archival quest would be unacceptable in principle. His stand tallied with that of the bureaucrats in charge of Moscow archives. They would promptly block the way for Ukrainian researchers showing an “unhealthy” interest in the OUN- UPA issue (actually, a microfilm copy of the NKVD archives on OUN-UPA was purchased some years ago by the National Archives of Canada and can be consulted in Ottawa — Ed.).
Use of Soviet documents, when studying this problem, must be accompanied by a thorough analysis of the sources.
The Ministry of Justice of Ukraine provided the work group with a large archive consisting of documents supplied by volunteer organizations and private citizens, concerning OUN-UPA and addressed in the 1990s to the President, Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Ministers, and other government agencies. Sorting out this staggering amount of correspondence was for the work group a way to show respect for all those sending the letters, hoping that their voices would be heard on high. In fact, looking only at the books in this archive alone made it clear what a staggering amount of material was available to those with access. In addition, such archival analysis gave the work group the landmarks for further quest. Knowing the specific questions worrying people, we concentrated on them when preparing the text of the historical reference. Two books of such letters were published, totaling a thousand pages.
Other works relating to the OUN-UPA issue have been prepared, with about fifteen publications already in print, with still others are nearing completion. The books are published at the Institute of Ukrainian History, each with a print run of 200 copies, meant basically for the OUN-UPA study committee. However, the main emphasis is on making a fundamental collection of documents. The bulk of such materials has been collected and the sources are being analyzed and documents archaeographically processed. The collection will appear in print in 2001, due to the Institute’s limited typographic and financial capacities.
The work group published a pilot version of the historical reference and findings concerning the OUN-UPA problem. Copies were sent to the interested organizations. The original idea was conceived so as to encourage dialogue between the researchers and broad public circles at the final stage of the project. We continue to operate in this mode, so we can make important adjustments, hear criticism (offensive at times, but I am certain we will survive), and introduce corrections in documents to make their very presence refute our opponent’s argument.
The first comments on the pilot historical reference appeared in party-affiliated newspapers and magazines. They were all critical, of course. Those willing to conduct a dialogue (e.g., Right parties and organizations) appeared to have objections not so much to the contents of the documents as to the worldview. It means that our opponents either agree with the essence of what we have to say or do not want to discuss the subject.
For many years the OUN-UPA debate was confined to the pages of party publications. The sides did not seem to hear each other. I think it would serve our purpose if The Dayallocated room for such a discussion, based on verified facts, clear Weltanschauung concepts, and tolerance — primarily with regard to our common history. A good example of such fruitful cooperation was shown by the conferences of Ukrainian and Polish historians, dealing with UPA and the Armija Krajowa during World War II, as well as with other complicated aspects of Ukrainian- Polish relationships.
The following theses ensue from the historical reference relying on an analysis of a great many authentic, mostly archival, documents. The said theses, in turn, lead to the following conclusions:
1. In the German-Polish war of 1939, the Ukrainian nationalists showed that they remained an enemy of the Polish state, as in the previous two decades; this made them a
de facto ally of Nazi Germany and also in the eyes of the latter’s leadership;
2. Sovietization of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, accompanied by brutal purges, turned both parts of OUN into inveterate enemies of the Soviet regime;
3. Severe confrontation with the Soviet regime, given warm relationships with the Nazis, explains the emergence, prior to the Nazi invasion of the USSR, of two Ukrainian battalions, Nachtigall and Roland, as part of the Abwehr [Nazi military intelligence service];
4. The attempt of OUN(B) [i.e., OUN led by Stepan Bandera] to proclaim a Ukrainian national state in the Nazi-occupied territories of the Ukrainian SSR was qualified by Berlin as a brazen challenge to the Third Reich; this made the cooperation (including military collaboration) between the Nazis and OUN(B) short-lived: from September 1939 until June 1941;
5. Concealed or open confrontation between OUN(B) and German authorities lasted from the second half of 1941 until the end of the Nazi occupation in Western Ukraine;
6. Despite purges, affecting OUN(M), Andriy Melnyk continued with attempts to come to terms with the German leadership after June 30, 1941; after the Nazis suffered a devastating fiasco in the Battle of Stalingrad, OUN(M) took an active part in the formation of the Galizien Waffen SS Division;
7. The problem of the attitude of both parts of OUN toward Nazi Germany at different stages of World War II is of historical, rather than legal significance; no party- affiliated organization can be recognized as a combatant;
8. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), formed using the armed forces of OUN(B) and other anti-Soviet units in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, immediately found itself confronted to the occupation authorities; the latter could not allow any military units to operate in the Wehrmacht rear (actually, according to the memoirs of Gen. Taras Bulba- Burovets, Army bez derzhavy, UPA was organized by people close to the Melnyk wing of OUN in 1942 but was taken over by the Bandera OUN the following year — Ed.);
9. Due to the waiting tactic adopted by the OUN(B) leadership, UPA avoided direct engagement with occupation troops from the fall of 1942 to the spring of 1943; simultaneously, it was developed as not only a military but also state structure;
10. From the spring of 1943 and to the end of Nazi occupation in the Western Ukraine, UPA engaged German garrisons and punitive detachments; as the Red Army approached, the scope and intensity of such engagements diminished; however, the OUN(B) and UPA leadership had no intention to form an alliance with the obvious losing side in the war;
11. At all stages of UPA existence, the Soviet regime with all its political, military, and security structures (partisan, army, NKVD units, and internal forces), remained the number one enemy of the Ukrainian nationalists;
12. The war between UPA and Soviet military and security structures coincides in time with the war of the United Nations (including the Soviet Union) against the fascist bloc, although these wars are entirely different by nature and origin;
13. The war between UPA and the Nazis began when the nationalists realized that their hopes for German assistance in restoring the Ukrainian state were ruined; that war was only meant to defend the civilian population;
14. The hostilities between UPA and Soviet military and security structures, after Great Britain, the US, and Poland recognized the legitimacy of the joining of the western Ukrainian territories to the Ukrainian SSR (which recognition was previously de facto), were actually a civil war; the Ukrainian nationalists waged that war for the real independence of Ukraine; the greatest tragedy of that historical period was that it was a fratricidal war.
UPA was a combatant on par with the Soviet Army in the war between the United Nations and the fascist bloc. There are no facts testifying to UPA’s participation, as a military formation, in the war against the United Nations on the German side.
