Ukraine and Poland have come out from under the same overcoat, the Warsaw Pact. Now the Polish Army has been donning the NATO uniform for a year, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine are going their own way. As our generals say, building the military has assumed clearly national features. But recently Warsaw has been advising its strategic comrade, Kyiv, more and more to pay attention at last to the Polish experience in defense reform, if only to avoid unnecessary pitfalls. The only question is whether we are prepared to heed this advice, thinking to ourselves, “There you are. Now those Poles are also poking in their noses with advice.” But still, let us try to feel the difference.
HAS FRIENDSHIP “NOT YET PERISHED?”
“If we hadn’t been preparing to join NATO, nobody knows when we would have opted for fast and quite painful reforms in the army,” the Polish Ministry of Defense says. Now the new NATO member’s army numbers 210,000, having been cut by almost half in ten years. This is 100,000 less than the officially reported strength of the Ukrainian army, although Poland’s defense budget at $3 billion is almost ten times that of Ukraine. To us this sum looks astronomical. Moreover, these expenditures go up in proportion to GDP growth, while Polish growth indices are by far the greatest in the new Europe.
Among Poland’s current defense priorities are adaptation of the army to NATO standards, professionalization, learning English, and modernization of the required arsenals. As advised by NATO, emphasis is put on rapid deployment forces and their mobility rather than on the ability of the army to conduct lengthy and broad-scale hostilities by means of generously manned land forces. “This is expensive and irrational,” the Polish military say, citing the example of allied actions against Iraq and Yugoslavia, where air raids alone were enough to achieve the desired result. Thus both air defense and air force are focused on. The first thing Poland did for its air defense system was to replace the traditional Soviet friend-or-foe identification system, still employed by Ukraine and Russia, with the one used in NATO. This year, Poland should complete, in cooperation with NATO, the formation of an air space control system. Six Polish- made radars have been ordered, and half their installation cost will be paid for with NATO funds. This is part of those $660 million NATO is to invest in the infrastructure of its new member. In addition, US banks have extended Poland a twelve-year $100 million loan on very favorable terms to help it meet NATO requirements. Besides the radars, this includes modernization of airfields at Malbrok, Kszesiny, Swidwin, Miroslawiec, and Minsk-Mazowiecki, as well as others that can receive in an emergency NATO air force groups, including AWACS and heavy transport planes.
But NATO membership has not diminished Poland’s interest in the reliable and friendly relations with Ukraine, its nonaligned neighbor. “We always carefully watch developments in your country. And we have worried very seriously more than once about your independence. For there is no independent Poland without independent Ukraine,” these words of Polish- born American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski were often repeated in the defense agency’s strategic studies department. In practice, it is with Poland that Ukraine shows its most fruitful cross-border military cooperation: meetings of defense ministers, general staff chiefs, and commanders of the two adjacent military districts — the Krakow-based one in Poland and Ukraine’s Western Operational Command — have become so usual that it is even difficult to count them. In general, last year the two armies carried out 32 joint actions instead of the 43 planned, but they also conducted 12 unscheduled ones. “Fifty or so joint actions is a small figure for our large armies. But in future we should carry out operations more concrete than mere ritual shows,” the Warsaw spokesman said at NATO headquarters.
In concrete terms, the finest achievement was the 1996 decision to form a joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion. The unit with a total strength of 600 servicemen is based on the 24th Iron Division and the 14th brigade of the Polish army stationed in Przemysl. Each side maintains and trains its own half at home, only to join them during exercises. “In joining NATO, we were waving this battalion as if it were a flag. For this was know-how. None of the new candidates could boast of such a thing. And now Ukraine, too, has one foot in NATO thanks to this battalion,” the Brussels Pole said. But Poland is beginning to become slightly irritated that Ukraine has not yet ratified the agreement on the formation of this joint military unit. Due to the absence of legal grounds, this battalion failed to be sent to Kosovo a year ago to make up part of the NATO-led KFOR. Now Kyiv and Warsaw have already announced that the joint battalion will finally go to Kosovo in July. Moreover, there are already Ukrainian and Polish peacemakers working together there. But if Kyiv fails to ratify the battalion agreement then, de jure separate and independent “halves” will be sent to Yugoslavia, although the military will be talking, of course, about a single unit.
Warsaw also fails to understand why Kyiv declines to sign a Ukrainian- Polish agreement on guarding military secrets. It is utterly impossible to implement joint military and technical projects without this. For example, the project of the joint modernization of T- 72 tanks has gradually been forgotten. On the other hand, the two countries are now cooperating in the development of anti-tank missile defense systems. But this is a drop in the ocean of what could be. Or perhaps Ukraine is deterred from signing a military secrets agreement with Poland because it has concluded a similar one with another strategic neighbor, Russia, especially in the light of espionage mania between Poland and Russia. Warsaw left this version without comment, noting that Kyiv had been repeatedly told that precisely kind of document was necessary for full-fledged cooperation.
Ukraine also keeps silent about Polish military proposals to form a joint expert group to discuss and put forward recommendations for restructuring the armed forces and the defense budget, reforming the education system, and, of course, introducing civilian control over the armed forces. “Even if Ukraine is not going to join NATO, it is worth using much of what the alliance suggests. We have tested this in our own experience. Why step again on the same rake that once bumped us on the head?” the Poles have tried to convince us. And even I could see with the naked eye the logic in such words.
MUTINY OF THE GENERALS
It is known that a general remains a general even in Africa, let alone Poland and Ukraine where the generals’ and officers’ corps were brought up in Warsaw Pact Communist traditions. This upbringing formed assurance and conviction that the military are a race apart living by its own laws and rules, and the civilian “starlings” (weenies might be a good American equivalent — Ed.) have no place.
After Poland had broken away from the Warsaw Pact, a civilian was appointed Defense Minister. This was and still is an important sign of democratic control over the army. But this is in theory. The main thing is how this control, which sometimes makes the generals wince, works.
In 1994, during a military exercise attended by the Polish President, the generals decided to seize this opportunity and voted no confidence in then Minister of Defense Piotr Kolodzejczyk. It is said that by an irony of fate the exercise was also attended by Ukraine’s first civilian Minister of Defense, Valery Shmarov. Mr. Shmarov hardly knew at the time that he would also face serious problems with his generals two years later: firstly, with Anatoly Lopata, Chief of the General Staff, who categorically opposed the idea of forming five to seven operational commands instead of three military districts in Ukraine. The general staff chief was backed by heads of the defense ministry’s seven departments, who refused to sign the draft of the proposed reform. But what was Kyiv’s and Warsaw’s reaction to the clearly expressed mistrust of the generals toward the actions of political power? At first glance, it was similar. Gen. Lopata was dismissed as chief of the general staff. This was followed later by another wave of staff replacements. It was the same in Poland: none of the generals who tried to pressure the civilian minister served in the army two years later. And what then?
A year later, Poland drew up a law by which only a civilian can be Minister of Defense and determines the structure of his ministry. Under the current provisions, all three deputy ministers must also be civilian. This also applies to department chiefs. As of today, civilians account for 53% of the 800-strong staff in the Polish Defense Ministry. As they say there, this is a transition period: the number of military personnel is to fall drastically in the next five years. Also reduced will be the general staff, now employing 1200 persons. Only 30 of 50 generals are to remain. The role and standing of the general staff will also change. “The Ministry of Defense will supervise assisted by, but not via, the general staff. The latter will turn from a governing element into a planning and consultative institution,” I was told in Warsaw.
What is in focus now is the training of civilian employees who will hold the leading places in the Defense Ministry and be able to speak and debate with the military on a par, as far as professional level is concerned. The military themselves can also contend for these places, but only after they resign their commissions and undergo the necessary tests on a general basis. And even now colonels prefer civilian clothes in Defense Ministry corridors. In Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, only Anatoly Dovhopoly, the only civilian deputy minister, can perhaps afford this luxury.
Ukrainian national law allows either a civilian or a military person to be Minister of Defense. But de facto , the military Olympus is designed in such a way that it can work effectively only under the supervision of a military man. The declared separation of powers between the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, so much trumpeted as a major breakthrough to democracy, is, by all accounts, neither fundamental nor profound. The General Headquarters is firmly imbedded in the sturdy body of the Ministry of Defense as one of its structural subdivisions.
Now imagine a situation such that Ukraine dares to appoint a civilian as Defense Minister. Following the example of democratic countries and wishing not to repeat the destiny of Shmarov, who worked surrounded tightly by the military, this person will have to form a civilian Ministry of Defense or, in other words, radically restructure it. These reverberations would immediately touch upon all “structural subdivisions,” including the General Staff which, with due account of the experience of truly democratic states, should not in fact depend in its work on what political party has won, who the President is, or whom the government appointed as Minister of Defense. As to the powers of general staffs, it is still open to question which of the two has more of these: the Polish one, now being progressively reduced, as it counts on the NATO headquarters strategists, or ours which must plan and organize the defense of a nonaligned country. The question is not only in the capabilities of the army and navy but also in the attitude of all other arms- bearing institutions which chafe at their subordination to the General Staff.
A civilian ministry and a military general staff is the checks-and-balances system practically tested in almost all European countries. Poland took advantage of precisely this experience, without stopping halfway as we did. But this is only the visible tip of the iceberg. “In 1990, when Poland was making defense appropriations, the Ministry of Defense submitted only four pages for parliamentary debate: everything was top secret. Now it is 100 text pages giving a very detailed description of defense expenditures. Yes, the authorities may alter some articles during the year, but in this case they must explain their logic in detail,” says Bronislaw Komarowski, chairman of the Sejm defense committee.
Our military economists claim that Ukraine’s defense budget is also based on European standards, and we need not be embarrassed. I wish it were so. But let me again quote the Polish lawmaker: “We have set up expert groups in all parliamentary committees, mainly composed of retired servicemen. And it is very interesting to watch them sometimes oppose the military’s proposals in search of the best solution. Otherwise, any army can swallow any amount of money.” It is the recommendations and conclusions of these experts that are taken into account by Sejm members when they assess the defense agency’s demands regarding either the budget or defense reforms, said former deputy minister of defense under Lech Walesa. Such expert groups, in accordance with the clause on parliamentary committees, can also be set up by our People’s Deputies. But I have never happened to hear of anything lie this.
Of course, each of us considers himself smarter than any number of experts. Then he understandably knits his brows, pretending he knows the difference between the objectives and capacities of a military district and those of an operational-territorial command. Especially if this is embellished with a phrase about the achievements and successes of the nation’s military arts. Here, as they put it, the politician can come unstuck and the military given a blank check. Secondly, our politicians and statesmen are used to taking what they are told for granted, without making much effort to see the nuts and bolts, when it comes to things of national importance, but not to them personally. I wonder what conclusions Polish Sejm experts would draw if Poland suddenly decided to arm itself with a guided-missile cruiser, when the navy only has enough fuel for one frigate to put to sea. And this fuel was given by the Americans.
STRATEGIC BUFFER
“Poland was the first to recognize the independence of Ukraine. If Canada should lay claim to this, we must take into account the time difference. Warsaw is closer to Kyiv than Ottawa is,” Polish diplomats affirm. The National Security Strategy of Poland, adopted on January 4, 2000, states that Ukraine is one of the important factors of European security, and Warsaw will promote strengthening democratic power in Kyiv and its forging ties with Euro-Atlantic structures. There is also a word about Russia, that is, Poland is interested in promoting an open policy, democracy, and reforms in Russia, and the positive evolution of Russia-NATO relations. (However, this aspiration now looks a bit rosy, for Moscow and Warsaw seem to be treating each other more suspiciously than ever before. The open door policy continues: spies seem to be deported by the busload).
The more difficult Poland finds it to deal with Russia, the more important for Warsaw are firm contacts with Kyiv. Poland is ready not only to assume the role of spokesman of Ukrainian interests within NATO but also draw Kyiv to the Weimar Group. In other words, to bring us closer to Germany and France, the two important centers of European gravity. And, of course, the Visegrad Group has not been forgotten. But why does Poland itself not join and reinforce the processes Ukraine has initiated? For example, to infuse fresh blood into GUUAM, the parties to which always fearfully look back at Moscow. The more so that this option is being discussed behind the scenes, with due account of Warsaw’s interest in the Caspian oil and, still more, in Caspian hydrocarbons being transported along the Odesa- Brody-Gdansk line further to Europe.
“We are interested in GUUAM but not to the extent that we should join it. What the GUUAM members should do is to meet more often and choose one specific project to implement together. Only then will you see results,” the Polish representative in NATO said. These words reflect, in a way, the alliance’s general attitude toward GUUAM. “The NATO position somewhat differs from the one we expected. The alliance is very cautious about such groupings as, for example 19 plus GUUAM. They, of course, do not decline this proposal which we have repeatedly put forward. But they equally do not want to create a precedent by watering down, to some extent, their relationship with the Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership members. For this organization proceeds from the equality of all members in their dialogue with NATO. The alliance believes that the issues being dealt with in the GUUAM format can be represented by one state, Ukraine, for example, either in a 19 + 1 format or in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Among other NATO member-states, Turkey supports GUUAM and can represent, whenever necessary, the interests of Ukraine if NATO should hold consultations in the context of objectives set by a GUUAM forum,” Kostiantyn Morozov, deputy chief of the Ukrainian mission to NATO, told me.
In Poland itself, indifference toward GUUAM is characterized quite vividly by the results of a poll conducted by the Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Research among influential Polish analysts and experts. 63% of those polled simply failed to assess the state of relations between Ukraine and GUUAM. The situation is clearer about contacts with Russia: 59% of those polled think that “Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia” is a negative factor in Ukrainian-Polish relations. We can expect that if the military contacts of Moscow and Kyiv were more active, precisely this factor would overpower the negative attitude toward economic dependence in the eyes of Warsaw which is now closely watching Russian- Belarus military fraternization.
“We are worried over the disproportionate accumulation of troops and possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of countries bordering on Poland,” the Polish Defense Minister said during parliamentary debates on the new National Security Strategy. That was nothing but a reaction to the statement of Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka about the formation of a joint Belarusian-Russian grouping of troops and the return of nuclear weapons to Belarus, at which Russian experts had already hinted.
“As to Ukraine’s attitude toward the possible deployment of Russian troops on the territory of Belarus, this is not envisioned in peacetime. But, in general, Ukraine’s attitude is the same as toward the countries that recently joined NATO. It is the sovereign right of a sovereign state to have what it wants to have for its security. We treat this with respect and understanding,” Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksandr Kuzmuk, affirmed in his turn, perhaps bearing in mind that, in contrast to Poland, no NATO umbrella has been put up over Ukraine.
But if a cold wind should again blow, increasing tension between Russia and NATO, will nuclear weapons appear soon in the Polish arsenals after the same kind of weapons are deployed in Belarus? “So far there are no grounds to speak about the necessity of taking any adequate retaliatory steps,” the Department of Strategic Studies stated cautiously. Politicians, unlike defense strategists, spoke more categorically.
“The alliance of Russia and Poland sounds like the word zbir in Polish. But this word also has another meaning, gangster. However, if Lukashenka hoped to become deputy of Russian Tsar Boris Yeltsin, now the prospects of such a union are not so promising for him. Now Lukashenka looks West more and more often. Poland will do its best to prevent the further isolation of Belarus,” Czeslaw Bilecki, representative of the international relations commission, pointed out.
The Polish politicians gave Ukraine the following advice in this context: “You should not worry about Russian protests. Moscow always raises hell before something happens. The same was with the first wave of NATO expansion. But when this happened de facto, Russia had nothing to say. Should Ukraine be admitted to Euro-Atlantic security structures, it would mean the end to Russia’s neoimperialist aspirations. If Kyiv does not decide on such a step, this situation will constant stir up in a certain part of Russian politicians the intention to swallow Ukraine. Neoimperialist tendencies can only exist where they can arise. But now it is not clear what kind of benefit Ukraine itself wants to have from relations with NATO.” A good question, isn’t it?
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