The battles over approving the Cabinet’s action program pushed into the background the signing of the Cabinet-Parliament agreement on joint responsibility. According to the scenario, it had to be signed on the same date as the program’s adoption. However, the scenario proved faulty: no one could sanction the two joint projects of the government and Verkhovna Rada on the same date.
The sad lot of the Cabinet-Parliament second child was apparent to many in government and Parliament, including the factions that tried up to the last minute to sink the Cabinet program, those backing the program and memorandum. And it was no secret to Viktor Yushchenko. After the program had been passed he said in a lobby conversation that the hardest stage in preparing the memorandum was past and that it could be signed the very next day, as planned. Then, after a whispered exchange with his Press Secretary, the Premier corrected himself, declaring the document would be signed three hours later. Nothing happened after three hours and the reason, most likely, is not the Premier’s absent-mindedness, for he could well have made the wrong statement without knowing what was actually supposed to happen.
The formal reason for not signing the memorandum was the absence of the signatures of the fractions, Rebirth of the Regions, Yabluko, and SDPU(o). According to Interfax Ukraine, their signatures were recalled. Simultaneously, SDPU(o) People’s Deputy Viktor Suslov said the signatures had never been affixed to the memorandum. In any case, the Cabinet killed but one bird with two stones. One of the interested parties declared that birds were now out of season and that the memorandum issue could be broached again sometime this summer. United Social Democratic leader Oleksandr Zinchenko stated that his party would not return to the issue earlier than July 6 when the Cabinet would have to appear with its quarterly progress report in Parliament. “When the program shows some practical results, then we can return to the question of joint responsibility,” he said.
The argument about the vagueness of the program was not the only reason referred to by those refusing to sign on (in fact, this argument was also cited by the Solidarity and Labor Ukraine factions, which support it. The other had to do with the memorandum’s legal status. Under the Constitution, the government is accountable to Verkhovna Rada (Articles 85, 87, and 113). And or this reason many lawmakers rejected the very idea of signing the memorandum as an instrument where one of the parties was actually accountable to them. They argued that the existing hierarchy cannot be replaced with a memorandum. Specifically, Oleksandr Volkov declared that the Constitution of Ukraine delineates the functions of both the government Verkhovna Rada: “Let them carry out the Constitution.”
In this case a logical question arises: If the memorandum violates the Constitution, why were so many discussions held, documents prepared, and consultations carried out?
Suppose we try to sort this out. The Cabinet needs the memorandum to secure the more or less trouble-free passage through Parliament of the bills it needs. Without the referendum the Cabinet’s action program would actually amount to very little: good intentions [and we all know where they pave the road to]. It is difficult to predict where this road will take the Cabinet unless supported by Verkhovna Rada. For as long as the Solons feel that their hands are not tied by such a solidarity agreement, they might well adopt a highly selective approach to Cabinet bills. “The bills will be passed when the Deputies consider them properly justified; if they are unjustified no one will vote for them,” points out Viktor Suslov. In other words, Cabinet bills found unacceptable by certain factions will be killed.
Actually, the memorandum issue made it clear that the existing parliamentary majority is pro-presidential, rather than pro-Cabinet, meaning specifically that it can back the Cabinet only if the President approves. When the Cabinet’s action program was deliberated the President obviously approved. The memorandum issue remains open. Apparently, some of the legislators wish to keep their hands untied when dealing with the Cabinet and have acted as they planned. Their hands are free. The parliamentary majority has split, albeit informally, with some backing the Cabinet’s memorandum idea (one could describe these lawmakers as pro-Cabinet, with certain reservations) and the others opposing it while remaining loyal to the President and coordinating most of their efforts with the Chief Executive (suppose we call them pro-presidential). The latter might even vote to support Cabinet steps they would have otherwise found totally unacceptable, as was the case with the government’s action program. Still, everything points to the “critically-thinking” part of Verkhovna Rada being resolutely against replaying a love scene with the Cabinet. And they could be inspired by the President’s example who did not sign the solidarity agreement, regarding it as a breach of the existing hierarchy. “But the President could change his mind and Deputies could also reconsider their attitude toward the memorandum,” muses Viktor Suslov.
For the time being, Regional Rebirth and the United Social Democrats, after failing with their Cabinet action program projects, seem content playing the role of onlookers. “Let the government work and keep their promises; we won’t stand in their way,” says Mr. Zinchenko.
Oleksandr Volkov declares, “We have come to the final conclusion that we won’t sign the memorandum.” The government, he believes, must show what it can really accomplish unaided. Thus it is allowed to float free until July. The remaining legislators, while regretting certain things they could use in the past, hope for a better future while calmly looking on.
It is also true that the Premier, should he resume talks on cooperation, could be met halfway by Parliament. Mr. Zinchenko makes it clear that, “Combined efforts dealing with practical top priorities could be a possibility. But only if we are offered something other than government decisions made in advance.” He further points out that the United Social Democrats forfeited any claims to Cabinet portfolios. Mr. Zinchenko emphasized the point on several occasions last week, even though Vice Premier Yuliya Tymoshenko, after the Premier met with the faction leader, stated that Viktor Yushchenko had rejected the SDPU(o) and Rebirth proposals to dismiss her from her post (courtesy Interfax-Ukraine). On the other hand, The Day knows from one of its parliamentary majority sources that Viktor Yushchenko did agree to the proposal “in principle” and that analysts are now divided over who will be the first to blink. There is also the possibility that the memorandum will be signed if all such cadre issues are settled in a way that makes everybody happy.
Thus far, the impression is that signing the document in the foreseeable future is highly questionable. Also, the action program victory scored by Viktor Yushchenko, without having a definite mechanism of cooperation with Parliament, stipulating the parties’ rights and obligations, could well prove Pyrrhic. And hence the memorandum issue could reappear on the agenda, perhaps even before July.
COMMENTARY
Oleksandr LAVRYNOVYCH, People’s Deputy:
Signing memorandums, agreements or communiqu О s by bodies of state authority, each having its constitutionally established place and functions, is not serious. Such documents have purely political significance, so reaching such an agreement between the Verkhovna Rada and Cabinet would be totally irrelevant and immaterial. Naturally, the government and Parliament should coordinate their stands. Parliament with a political majority means that the majority has everything to do with what kind of Cabinet this country will have and what action program it will work out. The legal aspect determining the same direction in which the government and Parliament are working is the approval of the Cabinet’s program by Parliament. After passing the bill, all the Deputies who voted aye will be politically responsible for providing legislative support for whatever the Cabinet does next; in this sense, they will have assumed joint responsibility. Yet each will be responsible in its own domain, for there can be adequate legislative support and inadequate executive performance — or vice versa. Such problems can be solved when using vehicles provided by the laws in force: mutual consultations, coordination on the level of the Cabinet and Parliament, and arrangements made among the ministries and parliamentary committees.
