A year ago ex-ambassador of the US to Ukraine William Taylor was appointed US Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions. His office is coordinating assistance to incipient democracies arising from popular revolts across the Middle East and North Africa region (Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia). In the exclusive interview to The Day he ponders over Washington’s policy concerning Kyiv after the presidential elections in the USA, draws comparison between the Orange Revolution and the democratic revolutions in the Middle East, and recalls his private talks with the former leader of the opposition Viktor Yanukovych.
A year ago you were personally selected by Secretary Clinton to establish a new office in the State Department to support transitions in the Arab Spring countries. This is an honorable and difficult job and with the current focus on the Middle East your office, no doubt, is one of the busiest at the State Department. In fact, the Middle East dominates America’s foreign policy discourse these days and for us in Eastern Europe this causes alarm. We all remember the great role played by previous US administrations in the democratization of Eastern Europe. Does this new focus on the Middle East signal a loss of interest in Ukraine?
“It is very a nice meeting for you and I to have this discussion on Ukraine and democratization of the Middle East. Our government indeed provided a lot of support in the 1990s and 2000s to newly-independent states of Central and Eastern Europe. There were lots of challenges and opportunities there and we wished to support their transition from communism to the market and democracy. These efforts brought great results. The Arab Spring revolutions also pose lots of challenges, and opportunities, which should not be lost. It is time to support the emerging democracies in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and not only for the benefit of the Arab world, but for the rest of the world too. But Ukraine will continue being in focus, we value your country and believe in its great potential.”
Despite the recent ouster of the USAID mission from Russia, President Obama presented his “reset” in relations with Russia as a key foreign policy success. Obama’s opponent in the race, Governor Romney, characterized the “reset” as a complete disaster and called Russia America’s “number-one geopolitical foe.” Paula Dobryansky, former Deputy Secretary of State for Human Rights Issues, known as the most senior Ukrainian American in the US government, has become a foreign policy advisor to Governor Romney. Do you think a change in foreign policy priorities with regard to Ukraine would occur were Romney to win the presidential race?
“I don’t think so. I have been studying US policies towards Ukraine since the early 1990s, when we established diplomatic relations with a newly independent Ukraine. What always surprised me was the continuity and predictability of our policies towards your country. We always supported a free and independent Ukraine and that is our major foreign policy goal. It is true that during the campaign Governor Romney expressed rather strong views about Russia, but his rhetoric is likely to become more moderate were he to be elected president. And thus I believe that the US government will not change its policies towards Ukraine much, no matter who wins the election in two weeks. In fact, those who watched the last presidential debate can agree how close both candidates are on foreign policy issues. There were not many questions on which they strongly disagreed.”
But would these policies change after Ukraine’s parliamentary elections? You observed the country’s 2006 parliamentary elections, based on which Ukraine was recognized by Freedom House as the only free country in the CIS (Georgia remained “partially free”). Some critics are afraid Ukraine will not pass the test for democracy this time.
“When I was in Ukraine as Ambassador, I had a Freedom House map on the wall in my office. And during all three years of my tenure Ukraine was colored ‘green,’ meaning ‘free.’ Now it has turned ‘yellow.’ Yes, there are concerns, but I remain optimistic. We have seen free and fair elections in Ukraine and I know that Ukrainians are capable to ensure their vote is not stolen from them.”
With so many things that went wrong in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, what, in your opinion, was the most significant thing that went wrong? When did it occur and why?
“I have been thinking a lot about this. And it seems to me that it was a personality issue. You have strong personalities in Ukraine and they got into conflict. Whereas for the future of your country it would have been better had those politicians learned how to make sacrifices and put their personality issues aside.”
In your current position you are directly responsible for coordinating US support to post-revolutionary Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Based on your first-hand experience both in Ukraine and in this part of the world, can you compare Eastern Europe’s color revolutions with Arab Spring revolutions? How uncertain is the political and economic transition in the Middle East and what kind of assistance does the US government provide to ensure success in this process?
“When you compare the Orange Revolution and revolutions in other East European countries with the revolutions that are taking place today in the Middle East, you realize that in the early 1990s those new democracies, those countries, independent states, they had a ‘home’ and a goal. And it was Europe. They had a common history and common values and EU and NATO membership represented something that was possible if they made some changes to the economic side, but also on the political side.
“The Arabs don’t have that. There is no similar organization, no similar goal, end point, ‘home’ that can motivate economic reforms and, more importantly, political reforms, where there is a lot to be done. So, I find the difference very interesting.
“Some of the Arab nations, of course, have resources. Libyans have oil and gas; Egyptians have 85 million people; Tunisians have a liberal, moderate and educated society that is closely linked with the rest of the Mediterranean. So, they have their own sets of advantages and disadvantages and I am sure that they will come through as well. I have been very impressed with the drive, the dedication, the intensity and the passion of the Egyptians, the Tunisians and the Libyans about making changes.
“You ask about what we, the US government, are doing to support them. We have provided a good amount of economic support. I was in Cairo recently, working out arrangements for a 450-million-dollar cash transfer to the Egyptians to help them get to a package that will enable them to attain financial assistance from the IMF. Egypt is facing real economic strains as it tries to adapt to this new world. We also provided some political support, and we continued to do what we’ve done to support free and fair elections in all three countries. We also supported NGOs, the free press, and independent media trainings. So, in many ways this assistance was similar to what we’ve done in Ukraine. I remember that a lot of free media outlets were supported by our government in Ukraine and I hope that they will remain independent. And the assistance to free media can be a real benefit for these emerging democracies too.”
How strong is civil society in the Middle East? We remember that civil society played a vital role in the color revolutions of Georgia and Ukraine, exemplified by the activism of the youth groups like Kmara and Pora. After the revolutions, however, these groups have found themselves increasingly marginalized. It appears that in some instances NGOs no longer seek an active role in the political process and fail to institutionalize their best practices. What, in your opinion, has caused this – a weak civil society, leading to the re-emergence of authoritarian practices, or a strong authoritarian regime, hindering civil society’s attempts to restore the democratization process?
“It is a hard question, but I fully agree that civil society is crucial in any democracy. I mentioned our support of civil society in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya for exactly this reason. What I found amazing is how fast people were able to organize themselves into civic organizations in these countries, which had known so many decades of suppression and authoritarianism. But once the lid came off and the dictators were out, the people of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya got together to start so many different things – journalists, doctors, women’s groups, youth, local governments, environmental organizations. It is, of course, more difficult with the political NGOs, which have had a harder time. We now see in Egypt that NGO activists supported by the IRI and NDI were attacked and arrested under Mubarak, their files confiscated, their employees put on trial. So, under the previous government it was difficult for political NGOs to operate. But even then they remained strong and refocused on other forms of activism, like service delivery for example. There was a non-registered NGO “Muslim Brotherhood” that was suppressed for a long time under Mubarak, but remained active and established one of the best food delivery mechanism that Egypt had. Now they are back as a political organization. I hope the same things will happen in Ukraine, that people will organize themselves to do something good for their communities and will find ways to express themselves.”
Some observers criticize the West for being hypocritical in its relations with the Middle East. Moroccan political philosopher Tahar Ben Jelloun writes that the West, fearful of Islamization and interested in profitable oil businesses in the Middle East, closed its eyes for many years to human rights violations. The West also supported Arab “presidents for life,” like Mubarak, who were able to keep the Fundamentalists and Islamic extremists under control, or, like Kaddafi, who could share licenses in profitable oil businesses. It is exactly this appeal that Yulia Tymoshenko made in her open letter to Western governments, urging them to stop any business activities with corrupt members of Yanukovych’s government, as economic relations with them have impact on Ukraine’s political situation. Knowing how closely business interests are intertwined with political ones, do you think it is indeed feasible to separate the two?
“They are intertwined and sometimes it is difficult to separate them. Yet, one has to be careful about using sanctions in an indiscriminate way. Economic sanctions, like those of not dealing with Iranian firms, for example, were broadly recognized by the international community because the Iranian government is standing outside of acceptable norms as it, apparently, is prepared to develop a nuclear weapon. And that threat to the international community merits these kinds of economic sanctions. Similarly, when sanctions were imposed against the South African apartheid regime, human rights violations there had been so blatant that there was a multinational consensus on sanctions. But there were cases when sanctions did not work well. So, history shows that application of sanctions should be well-substantiated and be adopted on the basis of a broad international consensus.
“I know that the Ukrainian opposition and civil society leaders believe in the effectiveness of such measures as freezing bank accounts and other assets of state officials, who failed to observe human rights. Indeed they might have an effect, but only a partial one. The future of Ukraine is in the hands of Ukrainians, not foreign bankers controlling somebody’s bank accounts. Ukrainians alone can make the final verdict on your country’s political and economic developments, sanctions alone will never help restore a democratic regime, it should come from the inside, not the outside.”
Our last questions will bring us back to The Days when you served as the US Ambassador to Ukraine. The cables published by WikiLeaks suggest you established a rather open communication with the then opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych. You cite “very relaxed and confident tennis games,” followed up by lunches with his son Oleksandr. In your communication with the State Department you also wrote that Mr. Yanukovych tried to convey the sense that he was “a man of principle” who could be trusted to “deliver on his word,” “a good partner,” one who “fulfils promises made.” Since Mr. Yanukovych became president, which promises, in your opinion, were fulfilled or broken?
“I don’t remember putting that in cables (laughter), but it is true that we had those encounters. It is also true that various presidents of Ukraine, Mr. Yanukovych included, have made commitments and promises to pursue policies that the international community, and, in particular, the Europeans and Americans, would strongly support. And those commitments were both on the political side, in the domain of foreign policy, and of economic and business nature, etc. There were also commitments to hold free and fair elections, to ensure that the media remains free and open, that the rights of the opposition are observed. I continue to expect that those commitments – commitments to ensure Ukraine’s democratic development – will be adhered to by the current administration.
“You know better than I do that everyone in Ukraine has a history. And some histories are good, some histories are bad. But what mattered was that some people with bad histories were able to turn the page and were able to move forward and do good things for the future of Ukrainians. I think it is this type of leadership which is required now. You need leadership that will demonstrate that no matter where you came from – either good or bad – you will be able to move forward to a new democracy and a new arrangement that is respectful of the people’s rights and opinions. I fully expect that this president will continue go in this direction.”
