Participants in the Den Summer School of Journalism have every reason to draw up a list of top interviewees. Ambassadors Toichi Sakata of Japan and Wolf Dietrich Heim of Austria, UDAR Member of Parliament Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova, economist Oleksandr Paskhaver, Ukraine’s first president Leonid Kravchuk, sociologist Yevhen Holovakha… Next on the list will be Jan Tombinski, head of the EU delegation to Ukraine. No previous Den schools had ever had such a heavy schedule of meetings.
We offer now an interview with a person who has, without an exaggeration, colossal theoretical and practical experience in Ukrainian politics.
What does the aggravation of the Volyn tragedy issue mean? How should the Ukrainian police be reformed? Can the 1999 election techniques be applied in 2015? Who is the best Euro integrator? The answers to these questions are in the interview with Yevhen MARCHUK.
“FOR THE INTELLECTUAL PART OF SOCIETY THERE ARE NO TOPICS THAT DISUNITE”
Maria YUZYCH, National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv: A total of 148 MPs have requested the Sejm of Poland to recognize the Volyn tragedy as “genocide of the Polish people.” Oddly enough, this position is even harsher than the Polish parliament’s resolution which calls the tragic events of 1943 “ethnic cleansing with signs of genocide.” This problem is being raised again in spite of numerous apologies from both sides. Why? How would you comment on this action of Ukrainian parliamentarians?
Yevhen MARCHUK: “The Poles raised this problem as long ago as 2003, when I was secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. The Volyn tragedy was then quite a sore point in Ukrainian-Polish relations. The Polish side was being rather aggressive. Its position did not differ from the one taken today by our parliament’s ‘Group 148.’ President Kwasniewski, who, incidentally, was taking a moderate stand because he had to maneuver in the domestic political situation, came under serious pressure. On the other hand, some political forces in Ukraine were also trying to persuade President Kuchma that Ukraine must apologize.
“A number of Ukrainian historians, international law experts, and political scientists were involved in shaping Ukraine’s position. There were some negotiations with the Polish side at various governmental levels as well as meetings between the Ukrainian and Polish researchers of the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations. The debates were bitter. The point is that the Volyn tragedy, which really took place, did not occur just by itself. It was deep-rooted into history. The longtime oppression of Ukrainians by Poles on Ukrainian lands had left a lot of traces of bloody reprisals against the Ukrainian population, not to mention the forced Polonization and Catholization. Both Ukrainian and Polish historians know this very well. Naturally, knowing this cannot possibly justify the cruelness of the Volyn tragedy. No one in Ukraine justified it in 2003 or is doing so now. But this did and still does raise the following question: what about Operation Vistula, the so-called pacification of some Ukrainian towns and villages, and other actions taken by the then Polish government against the Ukrainian population? And, in general, what periods in a very bitter and often bloody Ukrainian-Polish history are we going to expose? From the Bohdan Khmelnytsky era onwards? And demand every time that we apologize to each other?
“Common sense prevailed in 2003. For this reason, we offered the well-known formula: ‘We forgive you and ask your forgiveness.’ This was meant to refer to the Volyn tragedy, Operation Vistula, and many other violent actions from both sides in the past. The two presidents, Kwasniewski and Kuchma, visited the tragic places, where they forgave and asked forgiveness on behalf of their peoples. This put an end to the Volyn tragedy in the political sense.
“The address of Ukrainian MPs to the Polish Sejm is a shameful step on the part of all the signers. I wish they had read the speech of Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski in the Sejm on this occasion. In general, it is at least indecent to urge a foreign parliament or government to do harm to your country. In my view, taking into account all the components of this problem and the current political situation inside Poland, this step was provoked by a third party. I think some Russian structures were involved.”
Tetiana AVDASHKOVA, Taurida National Volodymyr Vernadsky University: The Volyn tragedy is not the only subject that disunites Ukrainian society. What do you think Ukraine should do to focus on the historical facts that unite and thus reduce the impact of the facts that disunite society?
Ye.M.: “In reality, disunity is seriously fomented by the politicians who do not want Ukraine to show renewed interest in its historical past. Who are being disunited? Normal sound-minded people with common sense? For the intellectual part of society there are no topics that disunite. Even in Russia there are people, such as Lilia Shevtsova, Yury Afanasiev, et al, who are not disunited from us, as far as the historical past is concerned. They professionally analyze the Stalin period as a sentiment for stability as well as the Brezhnev period of the so-called real stability. It is clear to them and to us that this kind of assessment is a lie. For this reason, I think people should know their history better and more profoundly, while it would be a good idea for propagandist-type politicians to taboo these topics. There was recently a good headline in Den about the Polish events – ‘When the Word of a Prayer Is Being Said, Politics Must Keep Silent.’
“The governmental policy should encourage not only scientific research into difficult episodes of Ukrainian history, but also the creation of interesting films and other high-quality artworks in this field. Powerful states do precisely this. Are there any historical events that disunite Poland or the multiethnic Russia? No, they do not allow this. Therefore, in my opinion, we should not confine ourselves, intellectually and politically, to studying and understanding the difficult events of the past. We should focus on what can unite us. For example, is the official Ukrainian language uniting or disuniting Ukraine? Can anybody, say, in France, Germany, or Russia get a civil service job without knowing the French, German, or Russian language, respectively? Any knowledge, if it is serious, profound and based on good material, will only be of benefit for an individual and help him or her deepen and expand comprehension of the difficult things of life.
“We are sometimes told that there are states with several official languages. Gentlemen, you won’t become Swiss Parliament members unless you have command of the four parliamentary languages.”
“THE POLICE NEEDS TO BE REFORMED COMPREHENSIVELY”
Olena ZASHKO, Donetsk National University: There was recently another high-profile crime committed by policemen – a rape and a savage beating in the village of Vradiivka, Mykolaiv oblast, which showed again the true quality of our police and the law-enforcement system as a whole. At the same time, we must emphasize that the police we have is not a product of today, for it has been formed in all the years of independence. We can recall here “Kravchenko’s eagles” and “uniformed turncoats.” How can this vicious circle be broken? What is your vision of police reformation?
Ye.M.: “The police rating today is the lowest throughout the history of independence. There are a lot of causes. Indeed, the problem did not emerge today – Vradiivka is just a place where there was a new explosion. Let us recall those who killed Heorhii Gongadze and beat up, under a similar scenario, Oleksii Podolsky who survived by chance, or the gang led by the policeman Honcharov. Did those high-profile crimes become a reason for purging the police? By purging I mean a radical change of the system rather than dismissal of all the officers (the new ones may do the same).
“It takes effort and expense to do this. If policemen earn 2,000 hryvnias a month and have to risk their life in some cases, many of them will hardly do their duty conscientiously. There are a sufficient number of legislative and standard-setting acts that regulate the performance of Interior Ministry-subordinated units, such as the Law on Police, the Law on Investigation and Search Operations, and the Criminal Procedure Code.
“The problem needs to be addressed comprehensively. There is a rich world experience here. There are a lot of role models. What subjects, in addition to majors, are taught today at police academies and colleges? Apart from knowing the law, specialists should also have a good spiritual, historical, and social background – in other words, they should know their country. There is a good American way – electiveness of sheriffs (law-enforcement officers in counties and other civil subdivisions). We are naturally aware that the election of policemen to this kind of office may be subject to influence on the part of various, including political, forces. But civil society institutions are gradually strengthening in Ukraine, so we must go this way. Moreover, not only policemen, but also some of the judges should be elected. The very procedure of electiveness ties them up with the populace.
“The police rating today is the lowest throughout the history of independence. There are a lot of causes. Indeed, the problem did not emerge today – Vradiivka is just a place where there was a new explosion. Let us recall those who killed Heorhii Gongadze and beat up, under a similar scenario, Oleksii Podolsky who survived by chance, or the gang led by the policeman Honcharov. Did those high-profile crimes become a reason for purging the police? By purging I mean a radical change of the system rather than dismissal of all the officers.”
“Overseeing the law-enforcement system as a whole is a topical problem. There will be no effective supervision if the central government fails to show that it and its subordinated units are also subject to control. I can say from my own experience that the KGB of Ukraine (not exactly a sentimental organization) was subject to severe control – first of all, on the part of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and the USSR KGB. We were inspected at least 5 or 6 times a year in various aspects of activities. This does not mean that there was a good political system at the time, but what is known as uniformed services were under strict control of the authorities. Is it possible now to organize effective control over the police in Ukraine on the part of the public, parliament, presidential structures, and the media? It is difficult but possible to do so.
“Let me give you an example. It was in the Gorbachev era. The newspaper Pravda’s Dnipropetrovsk correspondent Cherkasov published a critical article on the first secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Communist Party Committee. The secretary summoned, without a second thought, the regional KGB chief and sternly told him to ‘take the journalist down a peg.’ The KGB began to tap Cherkasov’s phone and report the results to the party regional committee. The first secretary is brimming over: he summons Cherkasov and begins to intimidate him, making it clear to him that he knows about his phone calls. But the journalist goes further and writes a complaint to the USSR KGB and the CPSU Central Committee. As a result, a big USSR KGB inspection team comes over from Moscow and begins to check things. The result was that the regional party committee’s first secretary was fired with a bang (he no longer appeared on the political arena) and the regional KGB chief was also expelled from the KGB, even though he was a favorite of Ukraine’s top party leadership and the only Ph.D. in law among all the regional KGB bosses. A detailed order with the results of this inspection was sent to all the KGB territorial offices throughout the Soviet Union.
“Unfortunately, none of the presidents of independent Ukraine believed that somebody in this country should exercise regular, detailed and overall control over the Interior Ministry, the Security Service, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Tax Inspection. The point is they did not want other people to have access to these organizations (not to their secrets).”
Oleksii KOZIUK, National Mykhailo Drahomanov Pedagogical University: As is known, those who made short work of the journalist Gongadze were also policemen. The perpetrators of the crime, including their boss Oleksii Pukach, are serving a prison term. The question of those who ordered the crime still remains open today. The Prosecutor General’s Office is working to find evidence of the complicity of ex-president Leonid Kuchma. When do you think this case may come to a juridical end?
Ye.M.: “For the majority of society, who are taking interest in this matter, everything has been clear for a long time. But it will also take a long time to finish the procedural part of the case due to several factors. Firstly, there is no key witness Yurii Kravchenko who ‘shot himself twice in the head.’ I do not think Kravchenko shot himself. A great deal of evidence contradicts this. Secondly, there are no direct instructions to kill the journalist Gongadze on the Melnychenko tapes. The latter only show a violent verbal attack of ex-president Kuchma on his subordinates, including a demand to ‘put the journalist down a peg.’ But…
“I will remind you that when Kravchenko came under a threat, the then Prosecutor General Piskun announced through the mass media that the ex-minister of the interior had been summoned for interrogation, while the then President Kuchma was abroad. He was taking medical treatment in Germany. But as soon as Kravchenko died, he flew to Ukraine the next day. Why? It is only a matter of conjectures, but I believe that sound-minded people have enough grounds to draw a conclusion. Although Piskun was a contradictory personality, he pushed the ‘Gongadze case’ very far, and some got scared very much when Kravchenko was summoned for interrogation. No one knew what he would say and do. For Kravchenko as a police officer, what and about whom Gongadze wrote was on the 189th place on the list of his interests. Journalism did not interest him at all from the professional viewpoint. Therefore, saying that Kravchenko had a motive of his own (!) to order Pukach to ‘take Gongadze down a peg’ is pure fantasy.
“The Melnychenko tapes, which were posted in the Internet, clearly show that President Kuchma was in fact terrorizing the Interior Minister, the Security Service chief, and the Prosecutor General for almost a week – he would summon them only to ask if they had already ‘taken journalist Gongadze down a peg.’ In other words, the president of Ukraine spent almost every half-day for a week to speak about Gongadze with his subordinates in an aggressive tone. There is such thing in criminalistics as ‘psycholinguistic analysis.’ Psycholinguists know very well what a verbal aggression is and when it turns into a physical aggression – especially when a linguistic aggression goes from an official towards his or her subordinates who are fully dependent on their boss. Incidentally, this kind of analysis was carried out in Ukraine and figured in a court case. The court took the findings into account.
“Today, the Gongadze case has spurred the professional ambitions of not only the First Deputy Prosecutor General Renat Kuzmin, but also the investigators of this case. It is now a point of honor for the Prosecutor General’s Office (GPU). When I was testifying as witness, I psychologically felt how serious the investigators were. The newspaper Den once wrote that Ukraine’s contemporary history was in fact being studied and written at the GPU. The latter may be having an ambition to pursue this case to the end. But they will find it very difficult to do so because of wide-scale resistance based on money and impudence.”
“SPEAKING FIGURATIVELY, THE 1999 ELECTION WAS A WARM-UP OF PERMISSIVENESS”
Yaroslav NAZAR, Lviv National Ivan Franko University: You ran for the presidency in 1999. Why did you fail to win the presidential elections? What consequences did this have for this country?
Ye.M.: “The 1999 election was the beginning of President Kuchma’s second term. Speaking figuratively, it was sort of a warm-up before the Gongadze case on the part of the Presidential Administration, a warm-up of permissiveness. There were many actions, including those of a physical nature, taken against me as presidential candidate. For example, ‘hedgehogs’ had been put up on a provincial road where we were to ride – only the driver’s experience saved us from falling into the abyss. All kinds of schemes were devised against not only me, but also my team and relatives. A few months later, Interior Minister Kravchenko made a lot of confessions and in fact repented to me for the things they had been doing during the 1999 election campaign. I said this long ago in an interview.
“A special chapter of those elections was the ‘Kaniv Four.’ The point is that it was a coalition of different politicians. I belonged to no party. Oleksandr Tkachenko was Verkhovna Rada Speaker and leader of the Peasants’ Party, Oleksandr Moroz was leader of the Socialist Party and a member of parliament, and Volodymyr Oliinyk, Mayor of Cherkasy, belonged to no party. Tkachenko and Moroz were left-wingers. You know, there is such thing as synergism, i.e., interaction of elements that, when combined, produce a total effect that is greater than the sum of the individual elements. But Moroz failed to hold out. Although the lengthy and difficult talks resulted in the final decision to nominate Marchuk as a single candidate (which all the media reported), he in fact ruined the ‘Kaniv Four’ the next day. He unilaterally gathered a press conference and announced that he was continuing the presidential campaign.
“I had had considerable experience in politics by that time: minister of state for defense, national security, and emergencies; chairman of the Security Service; vice-prime minister; first vice-prime minister; prime minister. At the moment of the elections, I chaired the Verkhovna Rada Committee for Social Policies and Labor. I had drawn up serious program documents rather than just socio-speculative slogans. Incidentally, they are described in my two works: Five Years of the Ukrainian Tragedy and A New Paradigm of Ukraine’s Development. The projects failed to be carried out due to the breakup of the ‘Kaniv Four,’ on the one hand, and extremely aggressive resistance of the Presidential Administration, on the other. And, naturally, society was not prepared for radical steps.”
Ya.N.: There is so much talk today that the 1999 technique may be applied in the 2015 presidential elections: instead of Kuchma and Symonenko, the runoff may see Yanukovych and Tiahnybok. To what extent is this technique realistic in today’s conditions?
Ye.M.: “In 1999 Kuchma’s spin masters really worked out a concept that was eventually implemented. This required enormous resources. This technique presupposed that Symonenko would qualify for the runoff election and then Kuchma would easily win under the slogan ‘No to red danger!’ This technique was also applied in Russia – Yeltsin vs. Ziuganov. Surely, it is likely that this technology may be applied in 2015. The Yanukovych’s administration may be interested in making a bugbear out of Tiahnybok and thus splitting the opposition trio. But there is one thing: it will take a really superhuman effort to bring Tiahnybok into the second round to face Yanukovych.
“Will the current opposition trio devise something like the ‘Kaniv Four’? I doubt it. They don’t need this. Then why did we unite? One of the goals was to make an informational breakthrough, for the Kuchma administration was doing its best to deny us access to the media. Our merger made it possible to break through the informational blockade – it was a unique phenomenon which nobody could hush up. The current three opposition parties have no information problems. Of course, there are some hindrances, but it is difficult to hush something up in the Internet era. The main efforts will be aimed at breaking even the ostensible unity and discrediting the leaders. Unfortunately, there are grounds for this. In my view, the opposition begins to fizzle out as far as intellectual and informational content is concerned. The crisis of a genre. Besides, mutual confrontations of the opposition leaders are in the offing.”
“THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP HAS DONE MORE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THAN THE PREVIOUS ONE”
Anna STAVYTSKA, Zaporizhia National University: In your book Five Years of the Ukrainian Tragedy that came out in 1999, you note: “A complete political apathy, hopelessness, mistrust, a split among the people who have to make a major effort to maintain a minimal level of physical subsistence – this is the main political capital of the current leadership, which raises its hope for self-preservation.” And what is the political capital of today’s leadership?
Ye.M.: “It would be wrong to say there is no capital. I personally happened to deal – quite seriously and practically – with Euro-Atlantic integration. So I can say that the current leadership has done more for European integration than the previous one. The very next day after the inauguration, which is very important, Yushchenko flew not to Brussels but to Moscow to see Putin, a person who, according to the BBC film Putin, Russia and the West, ‘most of all wanted him to be defeated.’ Viktor Yushchenko himself and his secretariat would deliver very good and patriotic speeches about Ukrainian-Russian problems, but, as it turned out, no essential results followed up. This happened not because Russia is so bad. It is as it is. Let us take a look today. Even though the Russian partner created so many problems for us in the energy field and we made a big mistake by signing the Kharkiv Accords on the Black Sea Fleet, I have not seen the Ukrainian leadership make even a single mistake since then in the sphere of Ukrainian-Russian relations.
“The current leadership is taking much more steps to protect national interests in the relations with Russia – in deeds, not words. Russia has already felt this and changed its behavior towards Yanukovych. And if we also sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in Vilnius – and I think we will – this will undoubtedly be another serious credit to the current government. The latter will be actively exploiting both the Russian and the European vectors before the elections.
“Besides, the current leadership’s achievements also include the eastern breakthrough – towards Japan and China. It is an unprecedented breakthrough. This may even be the current leadership’s position: if Europe does not admit Ukraine, we will have Japan, China, and the Russian market. Yes, we will have to stay without Europe, but, instead, we will have half the world’s economic partners which will attach no special strings to us. On the other hand, our partners know that Ukraine has over 300 projects with Japan alone. And, as is known, the Japanese do not invest money if there are no guarantees to preserve it and earn more.
“The abovementioned and some other components constitute the current leadership’s political capital. In the course of political struggle, the opposition will find it hard or, to be more exact, impossible to neutralize it. Besides, if the government manages to seriously improve things in the Crimea, which is, as you know, a tasty morsel from the angle of long-term investments, this will be another success. The Russians seem to have consolidated their grip on the peninsula, but the Regionnaires keep Russian big business at bay, for it can buy everything up there in a matter of two months. Moreover, the Russian leadership is showing political support, and the Black Sea Fleet factor will also help. Yes, Ukrainian capital is not yet as powerful as its Russian counterpart, it is not rushing to buy up things in the Crimea, but it is present there in many spheres. This tendency is growing owing to a steadfast political presence of Kyiv.”
Yulia KOSTIUK, National University of Lviv Polytechnic: In another book of yours, Ukraine: a New Paradigm of Progress. An Analytical Study (2001), you offer a plan of Ukraine’s development. Which items of this plan are still relevant today?
Ye.M.: “It is the basic socioeconomic issues and the local government. If the government fails to put an end to hostile takeovers and to let medium and small business breathe freely, the latter will bury the former. This tendency became especially obvious after the tax system had been reformed. In reality, this reform resulted in reduced budget revenues, which means a hole in the pension fund and a lot of social problems. Another major problem of today is youth (education, employment, housing, social security, freedom of movement, etc.). There are no serious long-term programs in this field. International politics and security are, of course, important problem, but there is also an ocean of domestic problems, such as public behavior of the government, democratization of society, and corruption. Ignoring or tackling them shortsightedly will drastically reduce the number of the government’s followers. And what follows this is common knowledge.”
“THE BBC FILM PUTIN, RUSSIA AND THE WEST EXPOSES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, INTERFERENCE INTO UKRAINE’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS”
Dmytro PALCHYKOV, Lviv National Ivan Franko University: In the BBC film Putin. Russia and the West, Moscow spin masters openly say how they were promoting the pro-governmental candidate Viktor Yanukovych in the 2004 Ukraine elections. Would you comment on those events? How dangerous is this kind of interference?
Ye.M.: “From the angle of international and even national law, this is a demonstrative intrusion into the political life of another state. Can you imagine, say, Angela Merkel sending a German team to France to get ‘her’ president elected? Even speaking publicly about this in Germany or in France is out of the question. But here this can be said openly and without fear. ‘I was sent there for liaison and coordination,’ Gleb Pavlovsky says. ‘I stayed at a downtown Kyiv hotel and once even had to push my way through a crowd of Orangemen, donning their symbols.’ But who do you think you are, Mr. Pavlovsky? What is this called in the language of law? But the most serious thing is what the then President of Ukraine, Kuchma, says. At first a journalist says off screen: ‘Putin met the president of Ukraine seven times to help elect a president who would defend Russian interests in that country.’ Then Kuchma says: ‘Yes, I said at once that we wouldn’t do without Russia...’ But when problems came up, he immediately called Kwasniewski in panic. The Polish ex-president says in turn that ‘Kuchma called in the dead of night, he was very excited and asked me to come.’
“There are many interesting and noteworthy points in this film. In general, the film shows that a foreign state, Russia, in the person of its topmost leadership, was in fact openly taking part in the elections of a Ukrainian president. What is more, instead of saying something like ‘When they tried to influence the elections, I gave them a sharp rebuff,’ the president of Ukraine alleges that Yushchenko was linked with the Americans. What is the difference for the president of an independent state who – Russia or the US – interferes into the elections? There is no difference. The president should have publicly stated his position.
“Another important point. When, as a result of their ‘efforts,’ a civil war began to loom ahead, with security forces waiting to be ordered to march on Kyiv), US Secretary of State Colin Powell phoned Kuchma at 3 a.m. (the US ambassador had this information and informed him well in time). Naturally, Kuchma knew why the call was being made. Yet he says in the film: ‘I have absolutely no command of English.’ This sounds unserious for a president. It is clear that communication and a translator was not a problem. President Kuchma was simply unprepared to speak with Powell.
“In general, this film needs to be analyzed from a political and legal angle. It is very useful for journalists. In particular, the film exposes what is in fact interference into Ukraine’s internal affairs, influence on the presidential elections and, hence, on the country’s foreign political course. Still, I am convinced that Russia’s unwarranted interference into the 2004 presidential elections essentially helped Viktor Yushchenko.”
Oleksandra CHERNOVA, Donetsk National University: Politicians are often creating their accounts in social networking sites, but they do not usually keep their pages from the first person – they entrust this to spokespersons or other staff. In other words, it is a publicity stunt rather than a way to be in touch with people. What is your attitude to politics in social networking sites? Can the leadership establish a close link with its own people by means of cutting-edge technologies and thus reduce the “unsaidness” complex? For we know that you were the first politician to hold a chat conference.
Ye.M.: “Yes, this occurred in 1999. I was the first to open a personal website and hold the first chat conference in Ukraine. Before me, Boris Yeltsin held a similar conference in Russia. He answered 40 to 50 questions in two hours. I managed to answer more than 200 questions in the same time span. President Kuchma’s chat conference was also being prepared at the same period, but it was held only six months later.
“I take a positive attitude to social networking sites and, in general, to any online activity of politicians. Even if they do not keep their pages on their own, it is still possible to ask them questions. All we have to know is the goal of this activity – just to swagger or to allow free access to them.
“The only thing I am afraid of is that the expansion of the communication sphere may alarm the government. There are already some projects to regulate the Internet. Russia is a frontrunner in this field. But I do not think the leadership will risk taking this step because of the upcoming presidential elections.
“It was very difficult to force governmental offices to open their official websites ten years ago. I had to deal with this when I was secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. It took us quite a long time to study the question of information policy development and informatization of governmental offices. It may seem to you now that it was easy to enter any website, be it the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Security Service, or the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but in reality, 10 years ago, we had to literally coerce everybody. I think we are now on the threshold of a next breakthrough in the field of telecommunications.”
