It is too early to say that the chance to sign the Association Agreement has been lost. Unfortunately, judging by the latest face-offs and lack of compromise in Kyiv, more and more experts are inclined to believe there will be a failure. The main problem will be tackled in these last days before the summit. The European Parliament has extended the Cox-Kwasniewski mission until November 28-29. The plenary session of Ukraine’s parliament this week is the last opportunity to reach a compromise and meet at last the European Union’s demands. This means passing three laws: on the prosecution service, on elections, and on “the Tymoshenko problem.”
Is there still a chance? A Parry of Regions MP, Volodymyr Makeienko, in fact hinted the other day that there was one. “There will be working groups and negotiations. People are coming and going. There will be luncheons, dinners, and further talks. Effectiveness depends now on three cities: Kyiv, Berlin, and Washington,” he said.
As we can see, he did not mention Moscow, even though the latter goes on making intimidating statements to Kyiv. Russia’s Vice-Premier Dmitry Rogozin thinks that Ukraine will not join the European Union and the EU Association Agreement will have an adverse effect on Kyiv’s cooperation with Russia, Interfax-Ukraine reports. “We are warning our Ukrainian partners directly and openly that they should take this step in their right mind and explain to their industrial class what it will come across immediately after the Vilnius Summit,” Rogozin says. “We are calling on the EU not to prod our partners into taking rash actions.”
The well-known human rights champion Valeria Novodvorskaya gave a very original answer to the Russian authorities: “We have opened a ‘disservice bureau’: we are spoiling the life of our former colonies. For instance, we are not letting Ukraine into the European Union. But if I were Yanukovych, I wouldn’t even hesitate. Russia lacks money even for itself and will not feed Ukraine. Ukraine was once cheated with gas prices and will be cheated again. Unfortunately, our sinking ship is so far totally helpless, and not only rats, but also bona fide passengers must urgently evacuate, heading for Europe” (www.echo.mskru).
We are discussing with experts what consultations could be held in the abovementioned capitals and what prospects are there for signing the agreement.
“WASHINGTON IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT, FOR UKRAINE IS AN IMPORTANT GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR IN EUROPE”
Alexander MOTYL, historian, professor of political science at Rutgers University, US
The Tymoshenko problem is undoubtedly important, but the impression is that both Ukraine and the EU have fallen hostage to it.
“Unfortunately, they have. The EU should have taken a more flexible approach, all the more so that Tymoshenko is prepared for various options. On the other hand, Yanukovych has fallen hostage to not so much the Tymoshenko question as his own morbid fear of a woman. After all, he must know that, when Tymoshenko comes to the West, she will soon cease to be interesting to the Western media and politicians and, after some time, will turn into a diaspora politician without any major clout in Ukraine. So it would be logical to dispatch her to Germany as soon as possible. But Tymoshenko is obviously a psychological, rather than political, problem for Yanukovych.”
TIRED OF WAITING / Photo by Ruslan KANIUKA, The Day
To what extent is Washington interested now in a successful outcome of the Eastern Partnership Summit for Ukraine? What steps is the US taking for this now?
“Washington is keenly interested, for Ukraine still remains an important geopolitical factor in Europe, all the more so that Russia has openly embarked on an authoritarian and anti-Western path. But the US has other important problems, such as Syria, Iran, the National Security Agency scandal, the economy, etc., and the [association] agreement is, above all, an EU problem.”
What do you think about the political game around Ukraine in the context of the Vilnius Summit? What consequences can this have for the “players” and Ukraine?
“The game is quite clear. Ukraine may opt for the West or for Russia, and each player is aware of this. Both the West and Russia are offering something to Ukraine. It is about Ukraine and its future development – either towards a democratic, highly-developed, and globally-integrated state or towards a permanent supplier of raw materials and low technology to a big, closed and authoritarian Russia. In this game, Yanukovych could bargain for enormous advantages from the West if he could only understand that his psychological discomfort is less important than his country’s interests.”
What do you think of the chances for Ukraine and the EU to sign the Agreement on Association and a Free Trade Area?
“In this minute, as almost a zero...”
“NO MATTER HOW THINGS MAY GO AFTER VILNIUS, IT IS QUITE CLEAR EVEN NOW THAT THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS HAVE CHANGED IRREVERSIBLY”
Viktor MIRONENKO, historian; senior research associate, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences:
“From the very beginning, the Eastern Partnership’s format for Ukraine justly triggered a negative reaction in the latter. It was too small for her. With all due respect for the other member states (Moldova and Georgia), I will say that Ukraine is obviously out of this line in terms of her size and parameters. The EU-proposed palliative gave no hopes for solving even one of the Ukrainian problems. Only Russia’s strange, to put it mildly, policy towards Ukraine during Yushchenko’s and even Yanukovych’s presidency helped the EU persuade Ukraine to accept the Eastern Partnership project.
“Russia is rife with skeptical and negative opinions.
“A number of Russian experts are saying that the EU intends to finally disintegrate the post-Soviet space by means of the Eastern Partnership and take the CIS countries out of the influence of Russia. There are also more exotic or, on the contrary, traditional views.
“Vladimir Chizhov, Russia’s permanent representative at the EU, has formulated the official attitude to the Eastern Partnership as follows: ‘It is not our policy to resist the Eastern Partnership. Like any other regional initiative, it has the right to exist. It is only important to us that what is going on as part of this initiative should not be aimed against Russian interests or at artificially withdrawing these countries from cooperation with Russia… Above all, this must not draw new dividing lines in Europe.’
“I would fully solidarize with Mr. Chizhov in the last part of his statement. But, as for ‘artificially withdrawing these countries from cooperation with Russia,’ I would let myself make just one reservation: it is sometimes we ourselves who create this ‘artificial withdrawal.’ And Ukraine is a very illustrative example of this.”
What can be expected from the EU Vilnius Summit?
“In theory, I think there may be three variants of developments in Eastern Europe, depending on the results of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius.
“The first: everything remains as it is now. Russia and Ukraine will be shaping their policies, as before, a) in joint leadership (as they did in 1922-91), and b) in a rivalry for leadership (as they did after 1991).
“The second: Ukraine finally comes off the political orbit of Russia, which brings about a new dividing line in Europe (this time in its eastern part) and ‘Eastern Europe minus’ (minus the European part of Russia, Belarus, and, in all probability, Armenia). In this case, what awaits the EU and Ukraine is ‘cold peace’ with Russia at best or a new edition of ‘cold war’ at worst.
“The third: the awareness of an impasse will expand the context within the OSCE framework or by means of some new format. The opposing sides will begin to consider and design, together with the US and Canada, if not the configuration of a Greater Europe then at least the rules of behavior, which will ensure – in the short term – a minimal standard of security and cooperation in Europe.
“I think the third variant would be the best, but, with due account of all the participating sides’ positions, the first two are the most likely.
“No matter how things may go after Vilnius, it is quite clear even now that the Russian-Ukrainian relations have changed irreversibly.
“It is quite clear that relations with Ukraine will no longer be able to be described by Kuchma’s phrase: ‘I said, you did.’ We must reject once and for all, in our, Russian, interests, the strange confidence in that a country like Ukraine will always follow in the footsteps of our country for some objective physical and, moreover, metaphysical reasons and due to teleological circumstances.
“It is impossible to solve the problem of Russian-Ukrainian relations in the existing format. The context should be expanded to the format of the strategic national interests of both countries and the so-called Greater Europe.
“It is impossible to merge the European and post-Soviet processes, including those initiated by the Russian leadership, into a whole not because of difficulties in coordinating technical details and ways to protect the national producer and, moreover, due to the ‘bad behavior’ of Ukrainians or someone else, but because of fundamental differences which need to be taken into account.”
(From the speech at the Institute of Europe on November 13, 2013; an abridged version)
“UKRAINE IS A MORSEL THAT THE KREMLIN WON’T CHEW”
Lilia SHEVTSOVA, senior research associate, Moscow Carnegie Center:
“It can be surely assumed that Berlin is a key capital where the Vilnius Summit and signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine is being discussed actively and energetically. It is not ruled out that, in addition to the formation of a new Cabinet, the Vilnius Summit is a crucial item on Berlin’s international agenda. It is clear from news bulletins that Berlin continues to firmly stand its ground: Tymoshenko’s release and pardoning is the main condition still to be met before a decision is made in favor of Ukraine.
“Some other countries, such as Poland and Lithuania, are no longer so keen on the Tymoshenko factor. As for Washington, I personally have no information on how deeply it is involved in this matter. We know that the US has now lost interest, to some extent, not only in foreign policy, but also in the ongoing events in Europe and Eurasia. It is a distinguishing feature of President Obama’s isolationism and concern about domestic problems. But we also know that representatives of the US State Department have visited Kyiv to show Washington’s interest in Ukraine signing the Association Agreement. I think it is Berlin that will be providing the main stimulus now. But if Washington had taken a more active and firm stand in this question, I do not rule out that this would have broken Yanukovych’s hesitations which increased after he had met Putin and spoken with him until 5 a.m.”
And what do you think about the fact that Moscow was not on the abovementioned list of capitals?
“It is quite clear that an extremely important visit of Yanukovych to Moscow and his talks with Putin were perhaps the decisive factor that allows Yanukovych to continue the game.
“Vilnius could be an important symbolic point, a watershed of sorts, but even if there were no Vilnius, it is doubtful that Russia will manage to hold Ukraine in her embrace.”
Can we say that Ukraine and the EU have fallen hostage to the Tymoshenko problem?
“On the one hand, yes: if the Tymoshenko factor is pivotal for signing the agreement, it is natural that both Ukraine and the European Union are hostages to the Tymoshenko case. But, on the other hand, if Berlin and the EU forget about the Tymoshenko factor and their own demands to Ukraine, they will thus water down the criteria and drop the requirement that Ukraine revise selective justice. This will mean for Berlin and Brussels that next time Yanukovych and the Ukrainian elite will also flout other EU demands. It seems to me that the Tymoshenko factor is no longer personalized in this case. It is not about Tymoshenko as a personality, it is (in the EU’s view) about Yanukovych’s preparedness and ability to meet the EU demands and criteria. I think Brussels remembers ‘the Yeltsin factor.’ Thanks to Yeltsin, Russia entered the Council of Europe, but it still fails to meet the CE demands and standards. Then, under Putin, Russia was admitted to the World Trade Organization but is still flouting its principles. I don’t think Europe wants Ukraine to pursue the same policy – to enter an association and then flout its fundamental principles.”
What kind of a political game do you think is being played with respect to Ukraine in the context of the Vilnius Summit?
“Ukraine is not just a most important point of geopolitical setup in Europe and Eurasia now. Ukraine has become sort of a civilization criterion that shows the extent to which Putin can apply his new foreign policy doctrine. The latter is essentially as follows: we have come back, we want to be a worldwide influence center and a unique civilization, and we want to have satellite countries orbiting us. Should Ukraine conclude the Association Agreement, this will deal a most powerful blow to Putin’s concept of foreign policy. At the same time, if the EU succeeds in persuading and pressuring Ukraine to take the first step towards Europe, this will be a sign that Europe is catching its second wind and coming out of lethargic sleep and paralysis. This would show that Europe has some common policy or at least preparedness for a certain mission. Ukraine is supposed to show whether or not Europe has woken up and can wield clout.”
What consequences do you think this geopolitical game can have for its players?
“Vilnius is not the end of all this. This will in fact be just the beginning of a long process if Ukraine signs the Association Agreement. But even if it does not, the Kremlin will continue to pursue a tough policy of pressing, ‘embraces’ and trade wars, taking into account that Yanukovych is mindful of the 2015 elections. Therefore, even if Ukraine succeeds in being associated with Europe, it must pass – before those elections – rather a painful and rough road of meeting EU standards by carrying out reforms. It is not ruled out that Ukraine’s economic plight worsens so much that it will have to turn to Russia for help. So Moscow will not yet lose Ukraine. As for the other player, the European Union, it will also be quite a difficult period, when Europe will have to gather and decide to what extent it is interested in having favorable surroundings. Europe must decide to what extent it regards Ukraine – a major European state – as a European nation. Europe can overcome its inner crisis and regain the reference point. Naturally, Vilnius can also ‘shake,’ to some extent, the US which has lost interest in global developments.”
What do you personally think of the chances to sign the agreement?
“Before Yanukovych’s visit [to Moscow], I would be guessing and even betting that there are more chances to sign than not to sign. But now that Yanukovych has paid a flying visit to Moscow, I’d rather not be guessing. Moreover, Kwasniewski has reportedly said that the moment of signing may be postponed by about two years. Therefore, even the chief mediators in this process are not sure at all. But one thing I am sure of is this: if Ukraine fails to sign this agreement, this will be an immense loss for Ukraine, a grave blunder for Yanukovych himself who will thus narrow the field of his maneuver and survival inside the country. Ukraine is a morsel that the Kremlin won’t chew.”
