Ukraine needs peace. Nobody can call this fact in question. But the ways to achieve this noble goal differ fundamentally. At this stage, obviously because of Russia’s direct aggression, a military settling of the conflict through a victory of Ukraine’s army and paramilitary forces is rather difficult. It would be possible to cope with terrorists and separatists, even with Russia supporting them. But things are different when it comes to Putin’s army.
An alternative emerges. If we cannot win on the battlefield, we need to either get a respite, or find a political and diplomatic solution to the conflict. Europe (Germany and the EU leadership in particular) insists on the latter option. It is supported by the list of another round of sanctions against Russia. They are grave enough, but designed for a long period of time. We do not have this time.
It is practically impossible to find a political solution to the conflict, since Russia does not want it. Instead, its goal is to keep the conflict permanent, thus devaluing Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic ambitions.
Nevertheless, Moscow cannot declare this openly. That is why it had to sign the Minsk protocol and formally agree to the special status of Donbas. It was mentioned earlier that the majority of the protocol clauses are worded vaguely and allow for the most ambiguous interpretations. But Kyiv undertook specific steps in its implementation. One of the clauses was to grant Donbas a special status. So, the Ukrainian parliament passed a corresponding law, proposed by the president.
If its implementation is started and all parties agree to it, which is highly doubted, three possible scenarios of further developments can be predicted.
♦ First. The conflict is frozen. Everyone stays in their place, with the occupied areas of Donbas turning into a kind of Transnistria with an own government, authorities, financial system, and other attributes of a quasi-state. To an external observer this option appears quite possible, which is proven by the latter-day DNR and LNR leaders’ statements. A common border with Russia serves as an additional guarantee of possibility of such a quasi-state’s existence.
However, with all seeming obviousness, this scenario appears to be unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, it is extremely costly for Moscow. An annexed and undestroyed Crimea already requires 500 billion rubles (190 billion dollars) for its upkeep in 2015. This was stated by Russia’s Deputy Finance Minister Aleksei Lavrov. And what about Donbas which lies in ruin? Like it or not, but the Crimean figures will have to be increased by three or four times. With sanctions, dollar deficit, and economic recession Russia’s budget does not have this money. In the winter, when cold and hunger come, Donbas residents will simply rush to Russia for salvation, and then Rostov-on-Don and Taganrog will regret it happened.
Secondly, the actual separation of Donbas, for example, in a form of another Transnistria, completely eliminates the purpose from the Kremlin’s whole Donbas affair. By separating Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, even in such a crippled version, Moscow loses leverage over Ukraine in restraining it from pursuing the Euro-Atlantic course in the first place. It is crucial for Putin to find a decision that would allow the two oblasts to block Ukraine’s possible joining NATO at a necessary moment. If it is not possible, what was the whole affair for?
That is why Minsk protocols have a clause on the special status of Donbas. According to Moscow’s views, the foundation of the necessary status is laid in it.
So, unlike in Moldova, Putin does not need the scenario of the second Transnistria in Ukraine. Moreover, it would be harmful for him.
♦ Second. A decision similar to the one in Ulster. The comparison is not quite correct. Ulster is a historical name of a province in Ireland, which consists of nine counties. Northern Ireland is an administrative and territorial unit of Great Britain, which includes only six out of nine Ulster’s counties. Nevertheless, let us use this term for conciseness in our consideration.
The region remains a part of Ukraine, which provides the financing, but it has to have sufficiently broad powers in economic activity, for example, including foreign trade, etc. It is clear that Russia will tie Donbas to conduct its policy there. Besides, Moscow will preserve an ability to stir up the flames of separatism in case Kyiv produces undesirable decisions.
This scenario also seems to be unlikely.
The terrorist Irish Republican Army (IRA) had a political wing Sinn Fein in Ulster, which, despite splits among terrorists, represented the organization at negotiations and had influence on the military organization. In other words, London knew who they could negotiate with. The political and business elite of Ulster was organized enough and could implement adopted agreements. The path was quite complicated, truces were made and broken, but the process ended rather successfully.
Who can the Ukrainian government negotiate with? The leaders of the so-called DNR and LNR do not control a lot of field commanders. There is information they are not controlled by Russian troops either. Unlike Ulster, there is no political process in Donbas and nobody intends to conduct it. It seems that the Ulster option is no more than a biting journalistic and political comparison.
♦ Third. The Kadyrov regime. An elite Donbas group emerges, which presents a leader from their ranks. He takes control of the region with Kyiv’s financial support, gets a free hand in the distribution of budget flows, and instead provides external loyalty to the Ukrainian government. Some people in Kyiv find this option suitable.
The problem is that such a leader is nowhere to be seen yet. Former masters of the region, such as Yefremov and the rest, have been discredited for good. Akhmetov and his ilk have been half-discredited. The latter group does not have an influential political organization on either local or nationwide scale. Former masters of Donbas are not in favor among militants, and Moscow treats them with suspicion, to put it mildly. Former Party of Regions members cannot do anything and do not control anything. Their actual political weight will be clear after the elections in October, but their prospects are not encouraging so far.
It seems that Kyiv wants to reveal such a leader in Donbas during the election in December, or it has found one but keeps his identity secret. But what secrets can there be? When the pre-election campaign starts, everything will become public.
In reality, this is not a solution to Donbas’ problem, but decorative painting over cracks on a house made of two oblasts, which is falling apart, let alone futile financial costs. As the saying goes, an overstrained horse, a broken bow, and a pacified friend are equally unreliable.
It looks that the special status of Donbas had a diplomatic orientation: to demonstrate Kyiv’s determination to implement the Minsk protocol to Europe. A special status was promised, so it was granted. The near future will show its viability, even though its implementation is highly doubtful.
The second goal relates to domestic policy. The president and the peace party around him demonstrate to the voters a desire to put an end of the bloodshed and portray Moscow with its separatist minions as the ones ruining all the peace initiatives and actions.
The Kremlin will not express its dissatisfaction with the adopted law directly. Instead, voices of careful approval will sound. Representatives of DNR and LNR will do all the dirty work. You won’t get anything out of them, they can say whatever their Moscow masterminds tell them to.
In such circumstances, an undeclared disruption of ceasefire should be expected. Separatists and Russia should hurry up. According to messages in the Russian press, shipments of weapons from some NATO countries to Ukraine have started. American senators Robert Menendez and Bob Corker submitted a draft law on new sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine to the Senate. According to it, the president will receive authority to supply Ukraine with offensive weapons, radars for identification and revelation of artillery batteries, drones, communication equipment, etc. If these weapons are really given to Ukrainian army and intelligence, the advantages of Russian troops will drop significantly by spring and the prospects of a prolonged war, which Moscow used to scare everyone, will turn against it.
Also, the Kremlin is anxious about a probability of further toughening of sanctions. Nobody believes Putin in Europe as it is, he does not perform his obligations under the Minsk protocol. Russia’s clients in Prague, Bratislava, and Budapest shout a lot about the unacceptance of the sanctions, but obediently vote for them. So, only one thing remains: to try to achieve some military victories before the cold sets in and push the Ukrainian army farther away, at least somehow. This will allow to hold another round of negotiations from a more advantageous position and demand to review the special status of Donbas on Russia’s conditions.
Besides, Putin hopes for escalation of the domestic political situation in Ukraine because of a complicated state of the energy sector and problems in economic and financial areas. The special status of Donbas will add spice to the pre-election campaign. What if President Poroshenko’s position weakens?
At this stage, the adopted law on the special status of Donbas is very far from implementation. The military, strategic, and diplomatic situation can change significantly before December. Then conditions will arise for discussing this issue in detail.
