Freedom of speech, proximity to Europe, escape from political persecutions. These are only a few items in the mile-long list of reasons why Russian oppositionists pull up stakes and move to Ukraine. Our country must lend a helping hand, but… There are a few crucial moments, which are hardly ever voiced.
For instance, Russian historian Pavel Shekhtman, who settled in Kyiv due to criminal proceedings, initiated against him in Russia, triggered with one Facebook post a seething discussion of the etymological value of the name Ukraine. “The problem with Ukrainians is not that their country’s name etymologically derives from a word meaning ‘outlands,’ but that they have developed a terrible inferiority complex and come up with fantastical etymologies,” wrote Shekhtman. He did not let the indignant comments pass by unnoticed: “I have noticed that vyshyvatnyks [a derogatory term for Ukrainian ultra-patriots. – Ed.], excited by a post which counters their ideas of their own history, appeal to the guest’s moral duty: a stranger must respect various funny customs, including the one to consider Ukraine the ancient great Rus’, while Russia is the land of Finnish tribes with an artificially created language…”
Recently Russian journalist Dmitry Shipilov highlighted one problem, rather unexpectedly, in the domestic media. He said that political emigrants from the Russian Federation will not behave as guests would have to. Truth be told, Shipilov himself was granted political asylum in Ukraine quite recently. The Day interviewed the Russian journalist on the themes of Russian political emigrants, continuing it with Ukrainian political scientist Mykhailo Besarab. So, what should Ukraine do with Russian political emigrants?
“UKRAINE WOULD BEST REACT BY TREATING US LIKE RANK-AND-FILE ALIENS”
Dmitry SHIPILOV, Russian journalist and political refugee:
“I observed those Russian oppositionists, who are now settled in Ukraine, back at home, in Russia. It has been always an enigma to me that the values they stand up for, and the rights they have usurped, have never been registered in international law. These people have invented for themselves a certain myth about Russia as it must be, and now they have brought those delusions to Kyiv. Some are trying to obtain political asylum, others opt for other ways to legalize their stay. One way or another, here we see an attempt to affect the course of events in Ukraine, even if by creating a very unwholesome information atmosphere. Following this category on Facebook, one might think that their agenda is the only important one, and Ukraine has no other problems. There are only Russian political emigrants, and they are all so miserable, and Ukraine is obliged to make them happy.
“In my opinion, Ukraine would best react by treating us like rank-and-file aliens. It must not give Russian nationals any preferential treatments on the legislative or everyday levels, as it already has the necessary legislative framework. Yes, Russia has problems with civil liberties and basic rights, yet it does not mean that Ukraine must treat loyal Russian to the detriment of its own citizens. It has its hands full with refugees from the ATO zone and Crimea, and they are its top priority.
“This is an absolutely artificially created media situation. However, they keep this nerve bare, and it is possible to understand Russian oppositionists: they have no prospects in their fatherland, and often they are at the risk of criminal persecution for abusing civil rights. Yet I do not think that the problem of Ukraine refusing asylum is deeply rooted in politics: today Russian asylum-seekers get refusals all over the world, more or less on the same basis, and there is no point in singling Ukraine out of the general list of countries.”
“I HAVE AN IMPRESSION THAT MOST RUSSIAN POLITICAL EMIGRANTS ARE ONLY CONVENTIONAL OPPOSITIONISTS TO THE KREMLIN’S POLICY”
Mykhailo BASARAB, political scientist:
“The expert and media environment has not agreed on this point. There are two antagonistic positions. According to one, Ukraine must offer all imaginable help to the Russian opposition: we must pamper it here, let it grow and mature, develop its political discourse, and thus prepare its future crusade against the Putin regime. From the formal viewpoint, the arguments underlying this thesis sound right. However, we must be aware that even if the present conflict between Russia and Ukraine is solved in our favor (i.e., we will resume our territorial integrity), we will remain in jeopardy all the same. As long as the Russian political regime exists in the format of a modern empire, Ukraine will continuously face the threat of aggression. Of course, every Ukrainian patriot wishes to see the end of the Russian authoritarian regime. But it is not quite smart to turn Ukraine into an incubator, a springboard for the eventual offensive of the Russian opposition against the Kremlin. Let us leave the cause of toppling the Putin regime to Russians: they need to sort out their own problems on their own grounds. Ukraine must first of all consolidate its own state, and own security must be its top concern.
“And here we approach the contrary position: Russian political migrants need not be Putin’s sworn antagonists. The current state of the Russian opposition is in fact pathetic. Putin’s regime has so neutered the opposition that personally I have trouble believing that unendorsed oppositionists can freely operate in Russia. Here I mean people who can engage in extended public debate with the Kremlin, oppose its domestic policy inside Russia, and yet remain miraculously unhurt. I am convinced that all the shoots of opposition on Russian soil are in some way or another endorsed by the Kremlin. I would only single out a handful of celebrities, such as Makarevich, Basilashvili, Akhedzhakova, or a number of likely-minded people who enjoy popular love. Here the Kremlin makes an exception, because they are a separate caste whose dissidence has to be put up with. After all, they do not claim political leadership and limit their activities to sporadic statements.
“I have an impression that most Russian political emigrants who come to Ukraine are only conventional oppositionists to the Kremlin’s policy. They do not necessarily are loyal to Ukraine. Not all of them will make good Ukrainian citizens, while enjoying all the rights. I am convinced that mentally those political emigrants will remain Russian, and that they will hardly ever turn into people who are really cut to the quick when it comes to Ukraine’s troubles. It can quite happen that the Russian opposition movement might become a cover for infiltration of individuals who could later spread harmful slogans and calls, and initiate ideas detrimental to Ukraine. For this they have a solid operating base and certain credibility. Aren’t we loyal to people opposed to the Putin regime? Consequently, there are the interests of the media via which political emigrants could shape public opinion. I see a certain threat here.
“Political migration to Ukraine is taking on certain systemic forms. It is not a matter of individual cases: an umpteenth alien (in particular, Russian national), was recently granted political asylum in Ukraine, with prospects to obtain a Ukrainian passport. We should also mention the numerous Georgian immigration. Ukraine’s political world even knows a separate cluster: Georgian public servants, politicians, and public activists. So far, much cry and little wool. I believe that by far not all political migrants play a positive role for Ukraine. I reckon that political asylum must only be granted as an exception: to people who otherwise have nowhere else to turn to, or whose lives really must be saved. I would not recommend Ukraine’s leadership to make a wholesale import business of it.”
