Who branded my shackled ancestors!”
Yevhen Malaniuk
The orange revolution, as a spontaneous movement of the middle class and bourgeoisie, is drawing to a close. Elements of political technologies are increasingly evident in what is happening in Kyiv. Students and businessmen are gradually being replaced by somber-faced men between the ages of 30 and 50. The expressions on people’s faces are changing. This is a good sign, all things considered, as the sociopolitical process is gradually returning to normal and the civic movement is reverting to the political format. All this does not rule out the possibility of the situation becoming further aggravated, but it has become clear that we are now living in a totally different country. This new Ukraine will be studied [by historians and politicians] and now is the time to realize that the Ukrainian nation is emerging not on an ethnic but primarily on a civic basis. Much has been said and written (and will be) about the beginning of an extensive public discussion, about the unblocking of media channels, about the broadening of the public sphere, about the formation of a new European political culture. However, considerably less attention is being paid to things that are less apparent but even more topical, namely the sociocultural foundations of the political system. An analysis of this aspect allows one to arrive at rather unexpected conclusions and offer forecasts of practical significance.
It is generally known that the Battle of Ukraine, started by the Kremlin, was meant to protect the post-Soviet space as a separate geopolitical reality. At present, Russian experts are writing with increasing frequency about a struggle to preserve the Russian space; there is growing awareness that what is happening on the Maidan will determine the destiny of the Russian Federation. Yet all this is not that important against the backdrop of thoughts of the possible decay of the grand Russian idea of the Third Rome and the restoration of unity in the Christian world, albeit a post-Christian one.
There is an interesting phenomenon taking place. A series of successful and not-so-successful velvet (floral) revolutions have taken place in 1997-2004 in Eastern and Southern Europe. Democracies have reigned triumphant in Bulgaria, Serbia, Georgia, and most likely in Ukraine, and have failed completely in Belarus and only partially in Armenia. These countries differ in terms of their geopolitical status, historical destinies and political systems, but have the same predominant Orthodox — and closely related Armenian — traditions. Also, they generally belong to the so-called post-Byzantine cultural circles. Envoys of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople converted their peoples to Christianity. The Basileus and the Eastern Roman Empire generally formed political traditions and brought political ideas and categories to Ukraine. More than 650 years have elapsed since the fall of Constantinople, but its eagles are still soaring in our skies, as a colleague of mine recently put it. Paradoxically, the wave of floral revolutions has allowed us to see the ghosts of these peculiar birds and hear their faint screech from high above.
These revolutions, with their similar objectives and motivating forces, even scenarios, took place simultaneously, but only in some of the post-Byzantine countries. This destiny did not befall Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey, and the Russian Federation. Whereas the first four countries have long become part and parcel of Europe (which is precisely the main objective of all such fateful political carnivals, one of which we have just experienced), in Russia the question remains open.
The 2004 presidential campaign attracted the closest attention of the Russian political leadership and numerous representatives of Russian “civil society.” Russian spin doctors became almost folk heroes in Ukraine; they practically dominated the campaign headquarters of all presidential candidates, which makes one wonder whether the Ukrainians have anything to do with electing the next head of their Ukrainian state. Thousands of pages have been written about the political exploits of Vladimir Putin, who until recently was the most popular politician in Ukraine. Countless other examples could be cited. These and many other [campaign] efforts actually proved very effective, as the 20% gap between the leading candidates was almost bridged, which all experts noted in February 2004. However, one little thing passed unnoticed, which would eventually reduce to nil all these more than tangible achievements. For a number of reasons, primarily hypertrophied rationality and pragmatism, cultural distance from broad social strata, etc., the Russian campaign architects ignored the masses’ cravings for justice as the basis of the political mentality in a post-Byzantine society.
People in Belgrade, Sofia, Tbilisi, and Kyiv revolted because they yearned for truth and the restoration of justice. Now it doesn’t matter whether all those transgressions did take place or were imbedded in public opinion by modern communications technology, especially considering that there is no hiding the fact that justice continues to be abused in the postsocialist countries. Under the circumstances the bourgeois democratic movement for human rights interacted with archetypes in mass consciousness and detonated, albeit on a small scale. After that all hell broke loose.
This factor should be considered when analyzing the situation and predicting its evolution. The events of November were determined by the activation of old and profound mental strata and by a powerful spontaneous civic movement, which leads to several important conclusions.
First, the powerful impact of the bourgeois democratic movement on the transformation of Ukrainian society and the state should not be overstated. Without a doubt a breakthrough was made in the protection of human rights and freedoms, but the process of asserting a civil society will shortly face a very important challenge, the need to establish relations with the “socially nearby” regime. Failure to find effective responses will radically strengthen inevitable authoritarian trends in social development.
Second, the protective mechanisms in social consciousness are tangibly weakened and this considerably heightens its sensitivity to the slightest irritant. In the next couple of months the value of every word will be cardinally higher than before November 22. Under these conditions the responsibility of those who work with words will be greater. Current problems will look like child’s play compared to what may happen as a result of criminal propaganda or even careless treatment of media capacities. Without exaggeration, the future of this country for decades ahead will depend on what will be spoken and written during these months. In particular, national interests, as the very foundation of politics in any country, are now being formed.
Third, there is a unique opportunity for Ukraine’s further cultural consolidation. It is precisely now that a complex of measures must be worked out and implemented before long in order to form a new Ukrainian identity that will integrate with and remove such sensitive problems of regional linguistic, religious, and other distinctions. With separatist moods becoming increasingly more active, this problem has acquired special significance. Rather artificial declarations must not be allowed to receive mass public support in the first place in such problem regions of Ukraine as the Donbas and Halychyna.
Fourth, a unique range of opportunities is emerging in Ukraine, in the face of social depression that will certainly occur in about a year. It is in the nearest future that acute and very socially tangible reforms must be carried out: above all, pension, land, and housing management reforms, along with targeted social aid, insurance medicine, etc. This also addresses the question of administrative and political division reforms. Implementing such painful transformations in the shortest possible time will help considerably to expedite the overall modernization of Ukraine, while reducing negative social effects to a minimum.
Fifth, when determining the guidelines and priorities of a new national policy, it is necessary to make a thorough study of the peculiarities of the period following the floral revolution, as in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Georgia. Given all the understandable distinctions, studying this experience may help to avoid a number of unnecessary mistakes.
Sixth, cardinal changes must be made in Ukraine’s foreign policy so as to give it a fresh impetus in the post-Soviet space, especially with regard to Belarus and the countries of the Southern Caucasus. On the crest of the wave of postrevolutionary euphoria we stand a chance of turning Ukraine into a regional leader and formulating priority national interests in the strategic perspective.
Seventh, orange revolutionary ideas will be exported to Russia whether we like it or not; indeed, there is no way to control this process. Our societies are too closely integrated, there are too many aspects uniting them, and Russia is too much involved in Ukrainian affairs. Under the circumstances it is necessary at this stage to work out a new Ukrainian-Russian policy. The latter must, among other things, take into account the psychological specifics of the current Russian leadership’s perception of Ukraine. This question primarily addresses possible images, phobias, etc. Our restraint and wisdom will play a crucial role in the next couple of years, not only in Ukrainian-Russian relations but also in the development of northern Eurasia as a whole.
