The Party of Regions (PoR) is yielding key posts in the social sector to communists, though not for the sake of their deep love of the Bolshevik system. There is no ideological basis behind this, just flirting with the sentiments of voters. It is useless to appeal to the authorities’ patriotic feelings in this case. Nor is this based on the effectiveness and qualifications of the new appointees. The point is to make them wind up any national-patriotic activities altogether — as this is extremely annoying to the electorate of the “Donetsk guys.”
WAITING FOR THE REVISION
On July 20, at the height of the summer vacation season, yet another significant infringement on the nation’s historical memory passed unnoticed. Ihor Yukhnovsky, 84, scholar and director of the Institute of National Memory, was dismissed from office. But the true essence of this event became clear when his successor’s name was announced: it was a member of the communist party, former CPSU historian, Valerii Soldatenko. Now, with communist Olha Hinzburg (a civil engineer by profession) as the head of the State Committee for Archives, the new regime’s attitude towards the objective truth of our history is quite obvious. (Although it is worth remembering, for the sake of fairness, that Yukhnovsky, too, is a physicist and not a historian).
Now we are in for stagnation and sabotage of disclosing of the crimes committed in the Soviet time, in the best case; in the worst case, there will be attempts at a revision of the communist past. In all probability, the first road will be preferred: an open defense of the USSR will hardly find a lot of supporters in Ukraine. But in making those appointments, the Party of Regions again showed that it has no ideological program of its own; historical memory is but a commodity for them.
THE FEAR OF SHOWING THEIR FACE
The regionals’ problem is that despite being a classical liberal-central party of big capital, they do not profess the ideology of liberalism in public. There exists an almost schizophrenical split in the perception of the PoR by its voters. The party, uniting a large proportion of the country’s wealthiest people, is positioned as a champion of the interests of the poor. This perception of the party is promoted by the image of its leader, as well as by the territorial and mental peculiarities of the PoR’s nuclear electorate. The nucleus of Yanukovych voters was made of proletarian masses employed at the huge industrial enterprises in southern and eastern Ukraine, who are virtually the “subjects” of the regional “dons” [a nickname for PoR-affiliated tycoons in the “Donetsk group” of business owners, often with a criminal past. – Ed.]
A considerable proportion of the incumbent president’s loyal supporters is made up of individuals over 50. Another numerous group within his electorate are the employees of state institutions and organizations of the “blue-and-white belt,” whose standpoint cannot be considered as defined, as they depend on the mercy of the authorities. In the post-Soviet space, these categories have always been living waiting for a kind and socially just ruler who would share the same culture, language, and their idea of self-identity with them.
For the supporters of the Party of Regions, self-identification is centered on the notion “Russia-USSR” rather than “Europe-West;” “order” rather than “freedom;” “intercession” rather than “cooperation;” “stability” rather than “mobility.” The complex of concepts impersonated by the triade “Russian-Soviet-Orthodox” virtually coincides with Moscow’s mainstream ideology.
However, in Russia there has always existed a clear-cut foundation underlying any ideology (tsarist, Bolshevist, or Putin’s), namely, its imperial character and power-state chauvinism, which caused and justified this set of values.
As to our citizens, the profession of such principles looks like a protest against the very existence of the Ukrainian state, as conscious inferiority, emphasized “anti-nationality,” a desire to cling to certain positive aspects of the “good old past” instead of the desire to try and understand the ways to adapt to the present-day reality.
That is why the PoR’s voters expect that it should identify with the “Soviet” interests of the proletariat and the budget-dependent strata of the population, rather than with big capital. This refers to the social aspect. As far as the national and ideological aspects go, there the PoR remains a political force based in the regions with a minimum or understated Ukrainian self-identification. The regime strives to meet the expectations of its voters at least in this, national and ideological, sector of problems and demands, if it has neither possibility nor desire to feed their social delusions. Thus, being a party without its own ideological face, the PoR exploits a fetishist set of symbols and concepts which, in its opinion, can serve a long while to please both its voters and its friends and its “guardian friends” from Moscow.
The Party of Regions (PoR) is yielding key posts in the social sector to communists, though not for the sake of their deep love of the Bolshevik system. There is no ideological basis behind this, just flirting with the sentiments of voters. It is useless to appeal to the authorities’ patriotic feelings in this case. Nor is this based on the effectiveness and qualifications of the new appointees. The point is to make them wind up any national-patriotic activities altogether — as this is extremely annoying to the electorate of the “Donetsk guys.”
WAITING FOR THE REVISION
On July 20, at the height of the summer vacation season, yet another significant infringement on the nation’s historical memory passed unnoticed. Ihor Yukhnovsky, 84, scholar and director of the Institute of National Memory, was dismissed from office. But the true essence of this event became clear when his successor’s name was announced: it was a member of the communist party, former CPSU historian, Valerii Soldatenko. Now, with communist Olha Hinzburg (a civil engineer by profession) as the head of the State Committee for Archives, the new regime’s attitude towards the objective truth of our history is quite obvious. (Although it is worth remembering, for the sake of fairness, that Yukhnovsky, too, is a physicist and not a historian).
Now we are in for stagnation and sabotage of disclosing of the crimes committed in the Soviet time, in the best case; in the worst case, there will be attempts at a revision of the communist past. In all probability, the first road will be preferred: an open defense of the USSR will hardly find a lot of supporters in Ukraine. But in making those appointments, the Party of Regions again showed that it has no ideological program of its own; historical memory is but a commodity for them.
THE FEAR OF SHOWING THEIR FACE
The regionals’ problem is that despite being a classical liberal-central party of big capital, they do not profess the ideology of liberalism in public. There exists an almost schizophrenical split in the perception of the PoR by its voters. The party, uniting a large proportion of the country’s wealthiest people, is positioned as a champion of the interests of the poor. This perception of the party is promoted by the image of its leader, as well as by the territorial and mental peculiarities of the PoR’s nuclear electorate. The nucleus of Yanukovych voters was made of proletarian masses employed at the huge industrial enterprises in southern and eastern Ukraine, who are virtually the “subjects” of the regional “dons” [a nickname for PoR-affiliated tycoons in the “Donetsk group” of business owners, often with a criminal past. – Ed.]
A considerable proportion of the incumbent president’s loyal supporters is made up of individuals over 50. Another numerous group within his electorate are the employees of state institutions and organizations of the “blue-and-white belt,” whose standpoint cannot be considered as defined, as they depend on the mercy of the authorities. In the post-Soviet space, these categories have always been living waiting for a kind and socially just ruler who would share the same culture, language, and their idea of self-identity with them.
For the supporters of the Party of Regions, self-identification is centered on the notion “Russia-USSR” rather than “Europe-West;” “order” rather than “freedom;” “intercession” rather than “cooperation;” “stability” rather than “mobility.” The complex of concepts impersonated by the triade “Russian-Soviet-Orthodox” virtually coincides with Moscow’s mainstream ideology.
However, in Russia there has always existed a clear-cut foundation underlying any ideology (tsarist, Bolshevist, or Putin’s), namely, its imperial character and power-state chauvinism, which caused and justified this set of values.
As to our citizens, the profession of such principles looks like a protest against the very existence of the Ukrainian state, as conscious inferiority, emphasized “anti-nationality,” a desire to cling to certain positive aspects of the “good old past” instead of the desire to try and understand the ways to adapt to the present-day reality.
That is why the PoR’s voters expect that it should identify with the “Soviet” interests of the proletariat and the budget-dependent strata of the population, rather than with big capital. This refers to the social aspect. As far as the national and ideological aspects go, there the PoR remains a political force based in the regions with a minimum or understated Ukrainian self-identification. The regime strives to meet the expectations of its voters at least in this, national and ideological, sector of problems and demands, if it has neither possibility nor desire to feed their social delusions. Thus, being a party without its own ideological face, the PoR exploits a fetishist set of symbols and concepts which, in its opinion, can serve a long while to please both its voters and its friends and its “guardian friends” from Moscow.
The revision of the country’s historical past (and formally, the return to numerous Soviet schemes and cliches) is demonstrated on all the fronts, affecting the events and persons of various epochs, from Hetman Mazepa to our contemporaries. But the main battle will be waged for the Soviet period. The latent rehabilitation of communism which may be launched in this country, proves that the PoR is trying to get rid of ideology, yielding it to the partners in the coalition, as it itself is incapable of anything like an honest dialog with its voters.
“Regionals,” being true sharks of monopolized capitalism, have nothing to do with communism or socialism. They only need the communist party to do the “dirty work,” and they will renege them when this is in their interests. However, even in doing so, they still can leave the representatives of the “reds” at the head of the Institute of National Memory and the Committee of the archives. Otherwise, the regime will be accused of “nationalism,” and this is the last, and so far the strongest, barrier which helps the PoR efficiently hide its true face.
LATENT SABOTAGE AND CREEPING “SOVIETIZATION”
After Soldatenko’s appointment the victory of a cynical and pragmatic approach to the national memory has become obvious. This approach is based on the exploitation of the “homo sovieticus” sentiments of the bulk of the supporters of the ruling party. Yet I will risk a forecast: neither Soldatenko nor Hinzburg will go in for an independent and active public struggle against the ideologues of Yushchenko’s times. They are nothing but puppets and will only implement the decisions taken at the highest levels of authority.
Thus, if the present or next Verkhovna Rada disavows the decision on acknowledging the Holodomor as an act of genocide, both communists will readily mastermind two or three exhibits and write a couple of articles to support the opinion of the “highest spheres.” The obedient appointees, trained in the party discipline to become mere “cogs in the machine,” will wait for orders from the top.
And the orders will come, as long as the Russian influence on our foreign and domestic policy grows. These can be orders to re-classify some materials, curtail the research on the victims of communism, find the “correct” documents proving that a large proportion of crimes in western Ukraine were committed by Banderites rather than the NKVD, and so on, and so forth.
However, we can also assume that with the newly appointed leadership, the Institute of National Memory will turn into a faceless institution whose activity will not be marked by any statements and actions whatsoever.
In the present situation, Hinzburg and Soldatenko’s proper party membership plays a role as nominal and insignificant as Dmytro Tabachnyk’s figure. They are only landmarks which indicate the degree of the incumbent regime’s anti-Ukrainian nature, and its dependence on both pro-Russian and “homo sovieticus” voters.
However, Tabachnyk is in the front line of the fight against all that is Ukrainian, against the national spirit and identity, while Hinzburg and Soldatenko are in the background, at the rears. They exert no special power and influence over the production of the regime’s ideological policy. They are just the PoR’s service staff in the third, if not the fourth, echelon of its functionaries.
Their activities can certainly potentially hinder the work of the researchers dealing with 20th century Ukrainian history. But they have no powers to do anything to the already published amount of information, which obviously limits possible attempts at the revision of the Soviet crimes. Such a revision can hardly change anything in the interpretation of our history by unbiased researchers. The awkward attempts at the presentation of the totalitarian epoch in the “right light” will only find a response in those who have always believed in it. It will be no more than another demonstration of petty communist tyranny.
The wheel of history cannot be turned back. Nothing will essentially change after the appointment of Soldatenko and Hinzburg as watchdogs of our history. Each citizen of Ukraine will believe in their own version and vision of the past, present, and future — although it is quite obvious that not only such appointments obstruct the national consensus on our much-beleaguered history, but they also deliberately aggravate the split in society. This, in fact, is yet another proof of the debility and opportunism of the incumbent regime’s social policy. Incapable of an honest dialog with its voters, it engages in window dressing, using the hackneyed set of Soviet products, hoping that with such primitive (but, unfortunately, still effective) ways they will stay at the helm of the state as long as possible.
