Both Ukrainian and foreign analysts agree that the political situation in Ukraine is stabilizing with the new premier, and that the political crisis, provoked, among other things, by the cassette scandal, is waning. In particular, such is the opinion of The Financial Times and New York Times, along with a number of Russian and Polish periodicals. Thus an analysis of the Ukrainian situation before, during, and after the cassette scandal seems in order.
In the period from the 1999 presidential campaign until the outburst of the cassette scandal, the Presidential Administration leaned heavily on the notorious “administrative resource.” The process of initiation, preparation, and holding of the 2000 referendum showed that the PA could push through practically whatever decisions it wanted, relying on the so-called people’s initiative. This was really nothing new. Suffice it to recall what happened in 1991 when most citizens opted for the USSR’s revival during the March referendum and then gave even more votes against the idea in December that same year.
In 2000, the situation was nonetheless predictable. The opposition was cornered and disoriented. It did not have any sufficient administrative resource nor did it have control over the media, television in the first place, so the cassette affair was a desperate riposte.
Political forces referring to themselves as opposition succeeded in partially neutralizing the administrative resource at one point. More precisely, they incapacitated it in several cases and outsmarted the government-controlled or pro-presidential media. And this was not all that difficult; the cassette scandal was going full blast and any clear instructions from above concerning the administrative resource were unthinkable, even in theory. Meanwhile, the opposition was improvising as best it could. As a result, the powers that be could not respond quickly enough and showed poor performance. With the media, it was even simpler. They were objectively placed in a situation such that they could not stop information from becoming public knowledge; there was no chance to figure it out first, and no coherent instructions from on high. Aside from all this, the very disappearance of a noted Kyiv journalist made headlines everywhere. Had Gongadze been, say, a coal miner or farmer, the media would have hardly responded, even if the news had come from an official podium, along with accusations against the regime. At the time, the journalists were driven not so much by professional solidarity as by fear. In addition, the scandal increased the importance of journalism in general and those working in the field in particular. So many hurried to take advantage of the situation to make a career. All this did not prevent the media from enjoying the privileges given them by the regime throughout the crisis.
In any case, the crisis began to deadlock as soon as the information current changed the vein, also due to objective reasons, for another premier saga had begun.
SPECIFICS OF THE PREMIER SAGA
Under the circumstances, the cabinet seemed to exist in a parallel world. Viktor Yushchenko looked like a man flirting with two women at the same time. On the one hand, he swore allegiance to the president and even signed the Message of the Three. On the other, he was making advances on the opposition, among other things promising to uphold contacts with Yuliya Tymoshenko. He turned into a multipurpose premier no one needed any longer, not the regime, not the opposition being just as multipurpose, and even less so parliament, the latter being multipurpose to an even greater degree. And so his replacement was inevitable. The question is who stood to win or lose more by it.
The opposition wanted Yushchenko out, so his advances could grow into something more tangible and, most importantly legalized. As it is, no one seems in a hurry to legalize anything.
Viktor Yushchenko succeeded in using the cassette scandal in his own way, making it a publicity backdrop against which his own image grew on a scale never dreamed of by any preceding premier. In normal conditions such a publicity campaign would have never passed unnoticed. As it was, with every effort being made at the top to combat the opposition, Yushchenko got away with his obvious narcissism, leaving behind an image of a reformer and anti-oligarchic champion. In fact, the opposition seems determined to capitalize on the latter aspect, believing with reason that they could not get anywhere without Yushchenko.
Parliament as a whole needed Yushchenko’s replacement, because the premier made no secret of liking some and disliking other factions. His preferences were likely to have their impact on the 2002 elections. At the same time there was a degree of risk involved; if the premier saga were drawn out any longer, it would have grown into a parliament-president confrontation, which would have made all the pro-presidential factions suffer.
In the end, parliament adopted Anatoly Kinakh as not only the president’s man, but also to some extent parliament’s. In this sense he became a more agreeable figure than Yushchenko in the eyes of very many lawmakers, primarily because the people’s deputies expected the new premier to show a more balanced attitude toward all factions, meaning the elections would be on a fairer basis.
As for the president, he would benefit whether parliament approved or turned Kinakh down. In the latter case parliament would be completely to blame . In the former case, a degree of order would be restored, and this is precisely what appears to have happened.
Following the political battles, the media quietly turned away from the cassette scandal, as all political passions were now in a different venue. True, the premier saga looked drawn-out, lacking dynamism and gradually ceasing to be news.
NEGATIVE ASPECTS: NO GOOD IN PARLIAMENT
The cassette scandal laid bare the shortcomings of both the regime and opposition. The latter could offer nothing fundamentally different from the course the president proposed. All calls for straightening things out, forbidding this and allowing that, were mostly by way of cosmetic repair. Even if the most daring such projects were implemented, the result would not be likely to alter the general national political course, let alone relationships within society and the power structures. The Communists are the only exception, but they played the least significant role in the cassette scandal. In addition, the Kinakh vote showed that the hammer-and-sickle Parteigenossen were perfectly content with their orthodox stand and that they were not going to actually influence any of the processes. Building up negative images (Kuchma, Potebenko, Kravchenko) pays off but briefly, and the opposition appears to have learned no lessons from the 1999 elections. Capitalizing on negative aspects also tends to backfire, having nothing to do with state building. The people are instinctively aware of this and cast their votes as told by that same administrative resource. In the highly unlikely case of Tymoshenko becoming the next president and proceeding with her “struggle against the oligarchs,” a host of small fry would suffer, with part of the oligarchs peacefully joining the powers that be. Such negative aspects are primarily bought by intellectuals (not peasants or philistines) that eventually play the part of that long-suffering small fry (remember what the Bolsheviks did?).
Whether he liked it or not, Yushchenko found himself in a situation such that the opposition depended on his name; for his part he can afford to keep clear of any opposition. Simultaneously, the opposition has no time to create and promote a “new” Yushchenko before the elections.
The regime’s shortcomings are just as obvious. First, the cassette scandal made it clear that paying the media and keeping the information space under control are different things. No committees, militia, or local authorities are of any help. The regime must learn to deal with the media, and not only by using the carrot and stick; those in power must learn to build a professional information environment jointly with the media, one in which a wealth of negatively and positively charged fields could release their energy precisely because both sides would be equally represented in the media. Unless they can build this environment, the cassette scandal will prove just one of a series. Second, using the administrative resource has its limits, so that its excessive application could well have a boomerang effect. Third, events must be responded to appropriately, because denying information can only deepen the crisis.
These shortcomings have largely remained unchanged with regard to both the regime and opposition; they have not disappeared along with the cassette scandal but just hidden somewhere within. They are bound to surface again in current events.
The Presidential Administration remains the information leader at this stage by introducing the institution of state secretaries.
VIRGIN SOIL FOR FRESH SENSATIONS
The institution of state secretaries or basically similar institutions exist in a number of countries, primarily in the presidential republics or constitutional monarchies of Europe — Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic, to mention but a few. This kind of executive branch divides the bureaucracy into political forces. On the one hand, the functioning bureaucratic model becomes more sophisticated; on the other, now party functionaries can come to power with any more or less conspicuous notice. Under the circumstances, the party of power does not act as friends of officials but gives them orders.
However, if we assume this concept of executive structure as a basis, the next question is the presence of independent and strong parties in a given country. Otherwise the head of government and his ministers will have nothing to counterpoise to the bureaucratic machine, for the latter is self- contained. The prime minister must have a clear action plan, worked out and supported by the political forces winning the elections, lest he find himself taking orders from his own apparatus. In other words, the institution of professional administrators requires an institution of professional politicians; the latter, in turn, requires a well developed party network. Sooner or later, the proportional electoral system must become the principal one. A politician’s personal charms must combine with ideas addressed to society and mechanisms turning these ideas into social processes.
Given a weak political system and inconsistent party traditions, the bureaucratic machine will expand, become more expensive, and take over all executive power regardless of any political battles.
Thus far it is hard to predict which scenario will be acted out on the Ukrainian political construction site. But one thing is certain: the site will see more than one conflict.
