“ The position of individuals in this country is being determined by the struggle among the oligarchs.” Naturally, voicing this idea in the parliamentary cloakroom during a break between the debates on the Prosecutor General’s request to bring to justice People’s Deputy Ahafonov and on the privatization of Ukrtelekom, People’s Deputy Viktor Suslov did not mean everybody in general. He, no doubt, only meant those who, trying to do their job in line with their persuasions and conscience, are forced to wind their way between the warring groupings. He thinks he is one of them, for he joined, in the heat of the campaign to bash the National Bank, the anti- Yushchenko SDPU(o) faction thought to be the political wing of one of this country’s most powerful financial- political groupings. Yet, Mr. Suslov is also not far from the truth in a broader sense, for in a country of warring oligarchs nobody is insured against finding himself one fine day without gas, electricity, work, and bread. But the position of individual oligarchs is also being determined by something in this country. For this reason, it is only natural that they strive to create stable conditions for their existence and coexistence. On the other hand, competition always does them good, too. Of course, if fair competition is in question.
Against the backdrop of a pompous SDPU(o) forum, demonstrating its unerring growth of ranks and increased influence in all spheres, another event that occurred on the same day — the founding congress of the all-Ukrainian non-governmental association Center with Working Ukraine headed by People’s Deputy Andriy Derkach — looked fairly subdued. There seemed nothing special in this. While there are about a hundred political parties in Ukraine, our non- governmental organizations are countless. One can understand loyalty of the center’s initiators to the idea of carrying out effective reforms by means of “strong legitimate presidential power” and the ardent desire “to serve the people and, hence, the President.” The piquancy lies in that the association was touted as not simply “pro-presidential” but so “pro-presidential” that it can only be headed by Leonid Kuchma personally. Mr. Derkach himself assumed the modest office of chairman of the center’s board, but with all powers that this office implies.
What first catches the eye is that this idea is far from original. Earlier, in the 1998 parliamentary election campaign, the NDP and then SDPU(o) passionately wanted to see the President in their ranks. Mr. Kuchma must have been quite grateful for both offers, but he equally spurned both of them. A president who came to power as a political independent should remain above politics. But a non-governmental association is an altogether different thing. Another feature is its clearly pronounced pro-Russian vector under the slogan “Toward Great Europe Together with Great Russia.” Suffice it to recall performance of the famous song “Mother Ukraine, Mother Russia...” by Iosif Kobzon. The position is clear with due account of close business ties between Russian capital and the most influential center supporters. On the other hand, experts think, the association’s principal ideological foundations clearly reflect the public sentiments which even elementary sociological research can reveal: loss of confidence in political parties and preservation of confidence in non- governmental organizations, support for centrist ideology (what can be “more centrist” than the center itself?), and traditional orientation of most common people toward ties with Russia. The president also holds similar sentiments. As Yabluko Deputy Yuri Sakhno noted, “Leonid Kuchma does not trust parties but likes public movements. Our President is a convinced centrist. At the congress of New Ukraine, once the prototype to the current bloc of centrist forces, he was the first to proclaim the ideology of Centrism which is to become the cementing force of society.”
Let us flesh out the general picture with details. The congress presidium mostly comprises nonessential people, now on the fringe of big politics, which can testify both to the insufficiently high prestige of the center founders and the extraordinary haste in the selection of delegates. At least, what struck most the Reforms-Congress People’s Deputy Volodymyr Filenko was the “speed and magnitude,” including financial, with which the congress was convened.
Many are inclined to believe that the new formation was catalyzed by the President’s personal go-ahead. Political scientist Mykola Tomenko is convinced “this step was undoubtedly coordinated with Leonid Kuchma” and what worked here was “a higher level of trust between the negotiating parties than it was in the case of SDPU(o).” But it remains to be seen if Mr. Kuchma will want to link his destiny with a specific organization. Almost all are very doubtful about this. What can be expected at best is: “Let’s go, guys, then we shall see.” However, Mr. Tomenko thinks, this shows, by all accounts, “competition among ‘the correct blocs’ before the future parliamentary elections.” The question is who will be able to make full use of the administrative resources of authorities during the election campaign and, naturally, who will be appointed as the “center” to unite the “correct” political forces. Having an edge in outer trappings, the center so far clearly loses out in terms of inner essence: in contrast to the SDPU(o), it lacks well-developed regional structures, and, in contrast to the Democratic Union, it does not have a bottomless social security system of its own. However, with elections almost two years away, there is still time to get going. Yet, there is a problem. Under the law, only political parties can take part in the elections. Non-governmental organizations were once intentionally barred from them. This will not much matter if the center is later transformed into a bloc of parties, but another option is also possible: the interests of public movements could be taken into account in a new wording of the election law. In theory, such “anti-party” changes can also be supported by Regional Revival.
Thus the emergence of a new star on the political horizon is bound to irk other potential “centers” which have long been playing their own game, first of all, the quite stable, albeit by no means cloudless, SDPU(o) — Democratic Union alliance. They, too, claim full support of the President’s course but do not always manage to follow this line to the end. Too obvious is the desire to have a coalition government, which might in turn lead to the curtailment of presidential powers. Until now, the growing influence of both groupings has only been offset to some extent by Vice Premier Yuliya Tymoshenko and her energy reforms. The face-off climaxed when the resignation of Ihor Bakai, chairman of the Naftohaz Ukrayiny board of directors, was followed by that of the acting chairman Ihor Dydenko, whom Ms. Tymoshenko considered as one of her three main enemies in the government. But, unlike Mr. Bakai who stepped down voluntarily, Mr. Dydenko seems ready to fight to the end. His allies insist that the dismissal resolution signed by First Vice Premier Yuri Yekhanurov is illegitimate. The Prime Minister is playing his customary role: stating the fact, he expresses neither his approval nor disapproval of what took place in his absence. Perhaps he did not have enough time to look into the matter, or maybe he is waiting for the head of state’s verdict. The president clearly follows a line of noninterference in the conflict, although very much could change if Dydenko could discuss the situation with him personally. In any case, it is not the premier who will have the final say. As to Ms. Tymoshenko, she will in this case either take her first power punch in her energy bout or, having finally cleared the table, she will no longer be able to excuse herself with resistance to reforms inside the government. This will not resolve but put into a new phase the public conflict between the energy vice premier and the parliamentary groupings.
What evokes interest is the behavior of Serhiy Tyhypko who, to quote Communist sage Heorhy Kriuchkov, “was the first to abandon this sinking ship.” Deputy-elect Tyhypko had already said at least three times (before his victory at the June 25 parliamentary by-elections) that he would not return to the Yushchenko government irrespective of the results of Verkhovna Rada by-elections and that the premier should sell the soon to be vacated ministerial portfolio to the parliamentary majority in exchange for approving some top-priority economic bills.
Roman Bezsmertny, the President’s representative in Parliament, does not rule out this succession of developments: “Such debates will probably continue. This is an absolutely acceptable, from the viewpoint of politics, approach: to exchange decisions the government needs for a certain candidate in the Cabinet of Ministers.”
Simultaneously, the government assures us that Mr. Tyhypko’s statement should only be regarded in the context of his election campaign. “The premier does not want a coalition government, while Tyhypko has long nurtured this idea,” Yushchenko advisor Serhiy Soboliev stresses. “He is just toughening his stand.” The potential buyers themselves have not yet shown any special interest in the object of trade.
Parliamentary majority coordinator Leonid Kravchuk is sure no deal will be made. Governmental appointments are in the President’s competence, so “a ministry can only be bought from the President, but the President won’t sell.”
Mr. Sakhno, defending the right of Yabluko to take part in civilized lobbying, thinks this office is “so little influential that it costs 10 hryvnias.”
According to Mr. Suslov, the post is now of little interest, for “very many factions are set not to delegate their members to the Yushchenko government because they expect it to fall one of these days.” “Then there will be a war,” he concluded.
This means Mr. Tyhypko’s statement can be regarded either as kind of a signal to influential factions or as a certain prop for the presidential team. It is not ruled out that this will cause certain friction within the parliamentary majority, and, as leader of the Fatherland faction Oleksandr Turchynov noted, “the strengthening of one group will inevitably cause others to weaken,” this is why the majority will be unable to make an agreed decision on this matter. The main thing is to be able to strike a reasonable balance among the groups.
The majority has many more contradictions than it may seem at first glance. These have been caused not only by, as Mr. Suslov put it, “the struggle of oligarchs for redistributing what has remained of the financial and material resources,” and not only by the approaching parliamentary elections. People who think strategically also keep in mind the more distant future, i.e., the presidential elections. Some are seriously sizing up the chances of Mr. Kuchma’s winning yet another term. In spite of his blunt warnings, farsighted politicians are already pondering who may become his successor. The latest elections clearly showed the opposition was in disarray, and the successfully implemented Russian scenario also inspires sweet dreams. Yet, to make such far- reaching plans is not so rewarding a thing for potential Putins, with the victorious fanfares of the last elections are still ringing in their ears. In such a long time, an absolutely unexpected and totally unforeseen option could come up somewhere from the provinces. And potential candidates cannot help fear that new up and coming rivals might really emerge and gain ground on our narrow political market. This means there will be more frequent and acute conflicts between the oligarchs, the conflicts manipulated by a deft hand.
INCIDENTALLY
On June 22 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved the Cabinet-proposed law On Introducing Changes to the Law On Electrical Energy, which concerns the purchase and sales of, and payments for, electricity. It is noteworthy that the Communist faction, which had been keeping a low legislative profile in the past few months, in fact unanimously supported the bill introduced by their alleged class enemies: Mr. Yushchenko, whose name had been a red flag for the Left since he was the National Bank governor, and Ms. Tymoshenko who once headed the “capitalist” United Energy Systems of Ukraine closely linked with the name of Pavlo Lazarenko. (By the way, the KPU displayed wonderful flexibility: its faction as actively backed up Ms. Tymoshenko, as it voted for the arrest of another, so to speak, Lazarenko’s man: Ahafonov).
Interesting in this respect is a quip Oleksandr Volkov made in an interview with magazine Komp&nioN : “I would like to say that Ukraine is unaware of the true state of affairs in Parliament because now there are political upheavals occurring outside Parliament’s walls... For example, the Fatherland faction’s stance depends on the position of Yuliya Tymoshenko in the government. The vice premier’s position has been seriously shaken lately, so she tries to reinforce her standing by using the Fatherland’s position on one issue or another discussed by Verkhovna Rada. As a result, Parliament begins political horse trading.”
