Regardless of official statements from Moscow, the Kremlin appears to have learned its lesson from the last presidential campaign in Ukraine. Moreover, the recent leadership crisis in our country has provided Russia with much room to maneuver. Conspicuously, possibilities for external influence on the situation in Ukraine are being created mainly in Kyiv, not Moscow. The more professional the new cabinet and presidential team become, the sooner they will have to cope with looming economic stagnation and an energy crisis, thereby providing fewer opportunities for outside forces to exploit problems and conflicts within Ukraine.
Serhiy TOLSTOV, director of the Institute for Political Analysis and International Studies:
“Russia is now exerting its political influence on Ukraine in three main directions. The first, and perhaps least important, is the official dialog between the Kremlin and the Ukrainian authorities. The second, major, direction involves energy supplies, including volume of shipments, oil and natural gas prices, and transit charges. The third one involves the use of Yulia Tymoshenko as a factor of constant pressure on Viktor Yushchenko and Yuriy Yekhanurov, and the threat that the situation in the country will become absolutely destabilized.
“Yekhanurov’s trip to Moscow was his first official visit as prime minister. Apparently, his top priority was to try and soften Russia’s position on questions relating to the energy talks and, if possible, to try to undo the damage caused by [Naftohaz Ukrayiny chairman Oleksiy] Ivchenko, [former Minister of the Economy Serhiy] Teriokhin, and other “stars” of the previous cabinet. Nine months after the presidential elections, and the Ukrainian authorities have finally realized that neither the US nor the EU will pay for the costs resulting from tensions in the relationship between Kyiv and Moscow, and that they would never even think of financially supporting this country of 47 million in the same way that the US supports Israel. So, now Yekhanurov will meet no resistance. How successful his attempts will be is anyone’s guess. Obviously, the Kremlin has not decided on the kind of relationship it wants to have with the Yekhanurov government, and it might temporize until the cold season sets in.
“After Vladimir Putin was blatantly fooled and betrayed by Leonid Kuchma in the fall of 2004, he does not trust anyone in the Ukrainian political elite. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko’s increasingly stronger position has given the Kremlin the leverage it never had. The Putin administration is in fact becoming a full-fledged arbiter in Ukraine’s internal politics with the ability to force any political group (the current government, former government, or the opposition) to turn to Moscow for support or at least assistance in neutralizing the actions of their rivals and competitors.
“We are witnessing the formation of a complex system of counterbalances, tactical unions, and exploitation of conflicts. This is happening in the spirit of postmodernism: contrary to all established canons and traditions. Moscow is not looking for friends or political darlings, but is ready to exploit any groups politically, even those who not so long ago were screaming their heads off about the imperial threat from Russia, condemning Putin as a dictator and oppressor of freedom.
“Perhaps the radicals in Yushchenko’s entourage would even choose to continue the confrontation with Moscow at the cost of the total annihilation of Ukraine’s heavy industry sectors that work for export. As we know, the major enterprises in this sector do not belong to “orange” politicians, and somebody else’s property is apparently not their concern. But Yushchenko cannot afford such a luxury. On the one hand, the country’s unsuccessful development after the revolution is discrediting the Western concept of globalizing democracy. Who will believe that a color revolution is a good thing, if the government has managed to destroy a country that only last year showed record economic growth? On the other hand, the destruction of the economy is utterly discrediting not only to Ukraine’s EU membership prospects but also to the ideals of democracy and liberal standards.
“This year Ukrainian politicians did everything possible to undermine the contractual and legal basis of relations with Russia in the energy sector. The government turned out to be so incompetent and opportunistic that in taking certain steps, it never bothered to calculate the costs of such actions. Whoever talked the Ukrainian government into denouncing the quite acceptable agreements on natural gas shipments and payments with Russia? What was their principle motive? The need for transparency or a desire to take over control of cash flows? But what transparency or honesty can one speak of when, as it turns out, after Yekhanurov’s appointment as prime minister no one has paid for natural gas shipments from Turkmenistan in the first half of 2005? That is, everything was done the way it was done in the days of Ihor Bakai or even worse.
“The Russian leadership has proclaimed a new, rational model of relations with the post-Soviet republics, which boils down to facing up to the realities of globalization. Since the whole world has lost its mind and joined the ruthless struggle for resources, Russia will also be adopting new standards with respect to its former relations. Moscow does not believe in tears or words and will not try to persuade anybody. The markedly friendly way in which Vladimir Putin addressed our nation on three Ukrainian television channels last year now seems like a figment of a sick imagination.
“Russia’s position is as simple as it gets. Europe needs natural gas and so does Ukraine. Yet Europe is willing to pay hard cash and, regardless of the dreams of Ukrainian national patriots and for the sake of its own interests, it will force any transit country to honor the terms of international agreements. If Ukraine also needs natural gas but cannot afford to pay European prices, Kyiv will be asked to fulfill a number of demands as a condition for returning to constructive negotiations.
“The recent change of accents in the Ukrainian officials’ rhetoric with respect to Russia is no longer reason enough for Vladimir Putin to restore the system of subsidizing Ukraine with cheap energy resources. Russia’s main demands include the preservation of Ukraine’s neutral status (i.e., abandoning plans to join NATO) and full membership in the Single Economic Space (including the creation of multilateral coordinating bodies and the signing of at least a framework agreement on a customs union). If Kyiv considers this impossible, it will risk finding a different solution. If it succeeds, that’s good; if not, with time the demands that Moscow will make at the start of future negotiations might be even greater.
“The Ukrainian crisis has taught the Russian elite many lessons. First, Moscow will no longer pity Ukraine or feel nostalgic for it. Second, the positions of the Russian business elite in Ukraine have not weakened; they have become significantly stronger. (Reprivatization has backfired in an outpouring of Western capital from Ukraine, accompanied by the reorganization of a large part of Ukrainian owners’ assets into Russian companies). Moscow may just as well abandon the practice of mutual concessions and persuasions in favor of naked pragmatism, which will cost us dearly. If the Kremlin chooses to provoke a deeper crisis in Ukraine, it will do so with the hands of its Ukrainian clients and partners. In this situation the role of an outside arbiter would suit Moscow very well.”
Nikolai PETROV, Carnegie Center, Moscow:
“Russia has undoubtedly changed its tactic. Whereas during the presidential elections it could bet on a single nominee, doing this during the parliamentary elections would make no sense. Obviously, Russia is maintaining relations with all influential forces in Ukraine. In this sense Moscow is pursuing a more flexible policy than during the presidential elections last year.
“As for the possibilities for exerting influence, they are rather limited. It is safe to assume that no one in Ukraine needs Russian spin doctors any more; their presence would only tarnish the image of the political force ready to use them. Ukraine should not expect any of the special economic privileges that it received last year. As a result, the only way for Ukrainian political forces to play the “Russian card” again will be to demonstrate their ties with Russia at the highest level.
“Perhaps the Kremlin would like to exert some influence in order to undermine the current Ukrainian leadership. It is unclear, however, what form this influence should take. In my view Moscow will pursue a pragmatic policy in order to secure the cooperation of all influential political forces in Ukraine and win, regardless of the outcome. In this sense it is not in the Kremlin’s interests to take an open stand against any political forces.
“I believe that the list of political forces whose cooperation the Kremlin will be seeking includes the pro-presidential Our Ukraine People’s Union. This conclusion follows from Vladimir Putin’s statement that in all elections the Russian leadership always supported the current leadership of neighboring countries. Moscow is without a doubt interested in establishing good relations with the Ukrainian leadership, which is why, in my view, it will seek positive contacts with the Our Ukraine People’s Union.
“Could active cooperation with Yushchenko be interpreted as a kind of legitimization of the Orange Revolution on the part of Russia, which frowned on last year’s events in Ukraine? I didn’t see any major ideological differences between the Kremlin and Yushchenko during last year’s elections. The Kremlin simply misplaced its bet. Now it is betting differently, because there is a real force with real power that can negotiate cooperation with the Russian leadership. There can be no ideological idiosyncrasy in this case.
“At the same time, the Ukrainian leadership should not sacrifice any of its state interests, such as membership in NATO or the EU, for the sake of some other interests. It only needs to find equilibrium.”
Andriy YERMOLAYEV, director of the Sofia Social Studies Center:
“If you compare the 2006 parliamentary election campaign and the last presidential campaign, the main difference is, in my view, that Russia will not repeat its past mistakes and will not directly interfere in the election process. Interference cost the political leadership dearly and had controversial repercussions for Russian politics in general. Therefore, I believe that they will use the traditional leverage of influence, which would be less dangerous for Russia’s domestic politics, such as informational, economic (including pressure or playing out a crisis), and political influence. The latter will involve the positioning of Russia’s political leadership with respect to Ukraine’s official authorities and participants of the pre-election political lineup.
“How will this happen? Speaking of the technology of political influence, Russia will not be placing any definitive bets on a particular force. It will most probably try to exert its influence through networking and cooperating with those political forces that will adopt the most complimentary stance toward Russia. As far as the so-called “Russian question” or the question of a Russo-Ukrainian rapprochement are concerned, we can already speak of the possibility of a pro-Russian coalition forming in the future parliament against the backdrop of another temporary crisis in Ukraine’s progress toward the EU. It will most likely mean a revival of the Russian question in the form of new proposals concerning the SES and propaganda about the significance and strategic importance of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship. One of the elements of Russia’s influence may be the formation of a pro-Russian coalition during the election campaign and after the elections. If you consider the political forces that might join this coalition, opinion polls already give them at least 40% of the popular vote: the Party of Regions, the Communists and Socialists, Kravchuk’s bloc, and the Tymoshenko bloc. The latter will undoubtedly make advances to Russia. If this project proves successful, Russia can expect the next parliament to have a number of political forces united by the Russian question despite their ideological differences. And these forces will be in a position to try to put together a parliamentary coalition.
“As for informational influence, there is no doubt that attempts to sway public opinion in Ukraine in the direction of the need for special relations with Russia and to revive the very term “special relations” may become a recurring motif in the election campaign. Russia can use its informational influence as a powerful tool to divide the main political players into good guys and bad guys. It will also be a powerful weapon in the mudslinging war that will no doubt take place.
“There is also economic influence. A Russian expert once said: nothing brings home the need to maintain a friendship with Russia as effectively as natural gas prices. I believe this is the cold truth of Russia’s economic policy toward Ukraine. Russia’s corporate and political communities and the Kremlin will no doubt do their utmost to use the complex situation with energy prices to their advantage. I don’t mean to say that they will push Ukraine toward the brink of a crisis. A crisis like that would create negative consequences for Russia as well. However, lengthy bargaining, ultimatums concerning higher oil prices, and demands for special conditions for Russian investors will be present in the negotiations. All of this will be broadcast to voters, who will be waiting in tense anticipation, trying to guess whether the Ukrainian leaders will return from Moscow with or without higher prices. This will be one of the qualitative characteristics of the new leadership’s efficiency. I think that in this case Russia is interested in showing Ukrainian voters that the new leadership is neither very effective nor successful. To do so, it does not have to dish out any criticisms. It only has to spin out the negotiations for as long as possible.
“These are the methods of influence that just might work. The purpose of such influence would be to bring to power a Ukrainian parliament that would be more complimentary to Russia, and therefore a future coalition government that would be more flexible and convenient for Russia to work with.”
Ihor LOSIEV, assistant professor at the Studies Department, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy:
“First, Russia will use economic levers in the form of prices for energy resources. This pressure factor depends on how far Yekhanurov and the president will go to offer strategic concessions to Russia. If they go far enough, natural gas price hikes might be avoided. To put it plainly, this is all about manipulating the supply of hydrocarbons. In addition, customs barriers will be erected along the Russian border to keep out Ukrainian goods. We should not rule out the orchestration of mass protests or disturbances mainly in southern Ukraine and the Crimea, which could be done to spite the new Ukrainian leadership. Of course, mass propaganda will be unleashed on Ukraine.
“One aspect of this type of influence will involve financial, media, and political support of certain political parties. Russia is now generally expected to throw most of its support behind the parties of Oleksandr Moroz and Volodymyr Lytvyn because many Russian political analysts believe that they are the biggest players in the Ukrainian political arena, who can counterbalance the teams of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, as well as the team of Yanukovych whose political shares have rapidly depreciated in the eyes of his political allies in Russia. However, the Russians will not act as primitively as they did before. There will be pervasive interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs, but this will be done behind the cover of official statements to the effect that Russia is honoring Ukraine’s sovereignty, is not interfering, and is ready to cooperate with any parliament elected by the Ukrainian nation.
“Unfortunately, throughout Ukrainian history, and to this very day, our politicians have been repeating the same tragic mistake: their tendency to involve foreign countries (not just Russia) in order to resolve Ukraine’s domestic problems, which is something that no self-respecting country should ever do. It is manifested in the statement Yekhanurov made in Moscow, when he called Russia our chief partner. What about our Euro- Atlantic integration? Tymoshenko also traveled to Moscow to resolve her private issues. Presidential chief of staff Oleh Rybachuk also paid an “unofficial visit,” even though no such notion is used in diplomacy with respect to officials. Ukrainian diplomacy has notions like “working visit,” “state visit,” and “official visit.” When I look at all these trips, I don’t even know how we can accuse Russia of interference, when our very own politicians are literally yanking Moscow by the hand to interfere. That is how it all begins.”
