Leonid Kuchma’s initiatives set forth in his Independence Day message of August 24 have dramatically altered the national political landscape. Primarily, it is shifting the main political confrontation effort from the personal realm (e.g., standing for or against the president) to the ideological one (e.g., supporting or opposing political reform).
Without doubt, those describing the presidential message as an interception of opposition slogans have a point; a transition to a parliamentary-presidential republic, redistributing the powers vested in authority structure to the parliament’s and premier’s benefit, government to be formed by a parliamentary majority, and proportional representation elections were the crux of the election programs of the principal opposition forces. This political technique cannot be often applied, but when aptly used, it can produce an excellent result. Suffice it to recall Leonid Kravchuk’s taking over Rukh slogans in 1991, thus ideologically bleeding the opposition.
IMMEDIATE RESULT
The response of the principal political forces to the president’s initiative turned out quite predictable: SDPU(O) and For a United Ukraine factions wholeheartedly supported them, while the opposition Four came out with their traditional sour notes. The Socialists, Tymoshenko people, even some of Our Ukraine merely stated that the head of state had borrowed clauses from opposition programs. The Communists once again opened their dusty files and proclaimed that Ukrainian presidency must be outlawed. Viktor Yushchenko suddenly was not sure Ukraine needed the political reform. Everything considered, it is clear that submitting a package of pertinent bills to the parliament will certainly draw the opposition (at least most of it) into debating amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution and other laws currently in force. Another strong likelihood is the formation of a situational constitutional majority (300 deputies) to serve President Kuchma’s political transformations.
Simultaneously, apart from Verkhovna Rada, expected to become a “venue of understanding and cooperation” between the regime and opposition, the president opened yet another bargaining venue by bringing forth his idea of a coalition government. The point is that, in the absence of the relevant legislation, practically any government, even one emerging on the basis of a situational majority, could be considered as belonging to the coalition — it would suffice to have two or three representatives of the coalition. But then one can only imagine the severe competition among all those members of the “constructive opposition” even with minimum quotas. Such an opposition would find itself between the Scylla of a transparent parliamentary process (it would be hard to take any motivated stand against the president-proposed political reforms) and the Charybdis of coalition backstage wheeling and dealing (that could only cause a breakup, dividing the opposition into those supporting a consistent and a collaborationist approach, never winning Viktor Yushchenko the premiership or securing the other opposition leaders any key posts).
And so all the opposition leaders (specially the inveterate ones) responded to the new political situation quite typically, stepping up efforts to arrange for a public protest campaign scheduled for September 16. At present, however, the opposition demands are losing a specific ideological component: slogans about a parliamentary-presidential republic, premiership to be appointed by Verkhovna Rada, a proportional representation election law, etc., are no longer relevant, turning abstract (e.g., freedom of expression, democracy in danger, and stop the regime’s arbitrary rule) or personal (like down with Kuchma).
The fact remains that the opposition Four cannot offer specific answers to the obvious question, If not Kuchma, then who? (Actually, they do have four different answers). Previously the absence of a single leader could be hidden behind musing initial political reforms, including such-and-such clauses, already voiced by the president, but now...
In conclusion of this subheading, it should be stressed that the current situation is in many respects crystal clear for the presidential forces; for the first time, rather than a personal argument (remaining loyal to the head of state), they can use an expressed ideological component, the proposed political reform, and expect tangible rewards: posts in the future coalition government where the ministers will be actual political figures depending primarily on their respective support groups in parliament, and less so on the premier, with the president’s influence being reduced to almost nothing.
OPPOSITION FORECAST
Deprived of its cementing foundation of demands for political reform, the Four is not likely to adopt another common political platform, in view of the apparent ideological and personal differences between its members and leaders. In addition, the burned bridge situation is perhaps most characteristic of the Tymoshenko Bloc. Communist Party, a considerable part of Our Ukraine, and some among the Socialist Party regard the street actions in September as a way to pressure the regime on the eve of complicated talks concerning both the legislative effort to carry out the political reform and formation of a coalition government.
Thus the opposition Four can hardly be considered as a force prepared for any political blitzkrieg this fall. In the event of a drawn-out confrontation with the regime, the Four will surely break apart by November 7, when the Ukrainian opposition will definitely come with polarized views. On that date those in power will gloat at street conflicts between their yesterday’s allies.
REMOTE PROSPECTS
Apart from purely tactical gains the regime (i.e., the head of state and the pro- presidential political forces) can achieve owing to the stated political reform, the expected changes may play in the opposition’s hand, in the long run. Even if due to the fact the lion’s share of all those opposition members got their seats in parliament using party rosters, with those from winner-take-all seats constituting a modest share (e.g., approximately sixty out of 225 constituencies). At present, the parties and blocks of the opposition Four, also SDPU(U) seem best equipped to adjust to a purely proportional electoral system — the more so that United Socialist leaders took their time to ideologize the party, securing a small yet stable electorate. In other words, if the 2006 elections are held in keeping with a new proportional representation law, the turnout will most likely provide the next president with an opposition majority. In view of today’s political dynamics, opposition leaders are likely to lose or retain their presidential popularity (contrary to all the arrangements already made). In fact, there has been no such positive dynamism registered for more than a year and their concerted effort is such that no such dynamism can be expected, at least not in the nearest future. Therefore, there is a strong likelihood of the 2004 presidential campaign being won by a candidate representing those actually in power. Given a new system, the opposition majority will produce an opposition, at best rather independent premier. The latter will be immediately viewed as the president’s chief contender in the 2009 elections. Also, given the expected realignment of political forces, it seems more proper to discuss an opposition president, rather than parliament in that status (in case the mentioned election scenario is played out). Another possibility is that President Kuchma may retain a degree of political influence (as a political patriarch) under the circumstances. Political forces stemming from the For a United Ukraine Bloc, mainly consisting of majority seats, are in for a difficult readjustment process (ranging from the formation of nationwide party structures to searching for an electorate “niche” to adjust their ideological tenets to the existing leaders).
FORECAST FOR THOSE BACKING PRESIDENT
Today’s presidential forces may avoid many of the problems mentioned only if they regard the future coalition government (in the absence of a pertinent law) not as yet another division of political power but as an opportunity to embark on a civilized dialog (even if within their own circles at first), so as to work out a single political strategy in the aftermath of the 2004 presidential race — also as a chance to have some practice in assuming political responsibility for their alumni now operating within executive structures. The main problem to be solved by the president and loyal lawmakers within the next several weeks boils down to whether the future coalition government will be temporary (until carrying out the political reform) or whether it will have to live through the constitutional changes to become real coalition, relying on a stable majority. Solving this problem will have a major impact on cabinet composition, for the newly appointed premier will automatically become the number one contender in the 2004 presidential marathon.
