We keep hearing campaign slogans. One is reminded of some dating back to the previous presidential election. One is strongly tempted to make comparisons. Below are two media-covered campaign scenarios.
Scenario number one. On Dec. 4, 2009, Den’ quoted a noted public figure as saying that we should vote against Yanukovych because the man was “worse than the devil.” He went on to say that, if Yanukovych became the next president of Ukraine, he would have to fear for his life, because he may be shot (figuratively speaking). This is a statement that likely to be made by an Orthodox priest who represents Kyiv Patriarchate or the Greek Catholic Church and fears Yanukovych’s coming to power as though he were the Devil, considering that Yanukovych respects Moscow Patriarch Kirill.
Scenario number two. The voters are urged to cast their ballots, making their conscious choice, abiding by their worldviews, while the media are asked to provide unbiased coverage of the presidential candidates. This is a formula that most likely belongs to an intellectual with a university degree in the humanities, a philosopher, sociologist, or a man of letters.
The reality is different. It isn’t a dissenting parish priest who fears for his life (figuratively speaking) if the terrifying Yanukovych is elected apresident of Ukraine, but the philosopher Myroslav Popovych, while the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches is urging the voters to cast their ballots abiding by their moral dictates and worldviews. I think that this is the right and wise approach.
Popovych held an important national democratic post when they urged the Ukrainian people to vote down Yanukovych — in other words, to vote for Yulia Tymoshenko — although the statement was about supporting a single democratic candidate in the runoff elections. It wasn’t hard to put two and two together. The statement issued by a group of Ukrainian intellectuals doesn’t offer any rational arguments to support their claim that there is no candidate worse than Yanukovych or that Tymoshenko is the lesser of the two evils. What we have instead is a number of campaign cliches. If we replace the name “Yanukovych” with “Tymoshenko,” the text can serve the interests of the Party of Regions and save its money.
The big question is why all those intellectuals are not using rational arguments but keep applying primitive irrational ones, aimed at instilling in the electorate this primitive fear of Yanukovych, who is portrayed as being worse than the Devil? Most likely because some of Tymoshenko’s spin doctors aim to receive personal benefits — or are propelled by personal sympathy — yet there is no in-depth analysis to back their strategies. Some still visualize Yulia Tymoshenko as an intrepid Maidan hero, despite hard facts that refute this legend about Tymoshenko as a fearless leader of an anti-corruption campaign in an independent Ukrainian nation-state, compared to Yanukovych as an evil force incarnate.
As a philosopher, Popovych is afraid he will be virtually murdered if Yanukovych is elected president of Ukraine. On the other hand, if this philosopher had happened to meet with Lozynsky (as Tymoshenko’s major Parteigenosse), with a couple of his comrades in a blue mood, somewhere in the woods, he could have been actually murdered. There is about an equal number of campaign donators like Lozynsky in Tymoshenko’s and Yanukovych’s camps. Should Yanukovych fail, his tough guys will quickly side with the winner. For them the main thing is having reliable protection. As for Tymoshenko, we all know that she requires no letters of reference to prove the moral qualities of her newly recruited financial donors and other supporters.
Any adequately informed supporter of Tymoshenko will recite everything bad in Yanukovych’s biography, including two prison terms, enough for a presidential candidate to be disqualified as the leader of a prestigious democratic party in any democratic country; his stand in regard to Russian; his being portrayed as Moscow’s protege, and so on. Tymoshenko’s supporters will recite a number a virtues of their political leader. Regrettably, she appears to have about as many dark pages in her biography as Yanukovych and other presidential candidates — something some of our intellectuals prefer to ignore.
To begin with, there was Tymoshenko’s sudden visit to Moscow and her meetings with the Russian leaders behind closed doors, whereupon she was acquitted of all charges by the Russian side. Previously Moscow officials swore they had every bit of incriminating evidence. In any democratic country this turn of events would signify an end to any political career, simply because no one would trust such a candidate.
Tymoshenko’s current support in Russia (ranging from Vladimir Putin and Nikolai Baskov) is noteworthy. Putin and his beloved regional gangsters have provided ample proof of their “love” for independent Ukraine. As for Baskov, from what I can recall, he was among the Russian guest stars during the previous presidential campaign and even sang Ukrainian songs. However, back then Moscow wanted to see Yanukovych as the next president of Ukraine, and so the Moscow guest pop stars were singing his glory.
Tymoshenko makes a very poor democrat. The status of her party is the best evidence. Will any of our esteemed Ukrainian intellectuals tell me about the last time Batkivshchyna held central party elections or those of the auditing commission? When was Tymoshenko elected as the party leader and by which body? How was the vote held? Were there any ballots cast against her? What about media coverage? Most of our political parties — particularly the BYuT — are based on what the Third Reich knew as Fuehrerprinzip, which Hitler considered the only acceptable one and highlighted in his Mein Kampf. The most absurd aspect is that there is a semblance of democracy only in our small-time political parties that don’t have sufficient electoral support. Paradoxically, this is also true of Ukrainian communists.
As the next president of Ukraine, Tymoshenko will be a loose cannon. Her policy is not controlled by a party program; nor does it rest on a more or less clearly formulated ideological platform. Everything depends on her own decisions — perhaps also on those prompted by her two or three closest associates. How some of our intellectuals saw her as a champion of democracy is anyone’s guess — maybe owing to her democratic rhetoric. But then we know of tyrannical regimes that needed democracy in order to come to power. After that they forgot all about it. The Bolsheviks identified themselves as social democrats before they came to power.
Tymoshenko’s desire to sell Ukrainian enterprises as soon as possible is extremely alarming. It is safe to assume that, under the guise of struggles against the Ukrainian oligarchs, most of them will be sold to Russia and businessmen who are loyal to Tymoshenko. Ukraine has no authority to monitor the outflow of national wealth and determine precisely who comes in possession of these assets, just as there is no authority to stand guard over the national economic interests. We have the Antimonopoly Committee, but it fails to carry out this task, and the same is true of the National Security and Defense Council (RNBO). We happen to learn the names of the actual proprietors in the aftermath of scandals (as in the case of the Premier Palace in Kyiv), and in most cases they prove to be Russian nationals. Under the circumstances, Tymoshenko’s privatization and re-privatization plans will only damage Ukraine.
Tymoshenko’s latest gas supply contract with Moscow is evidence that she is vague about the national interest, while she is loud and clear when it comes to defending the interests of her associates. After she made this gas contract, providing for large gas supplies, considering the ongoing financial crisis, she exposed Ukraine to heavy penalties for “bad conduct” from the Russian side. She may have done so to emerge as the only politician capable of defending Ukraine against such penalties and then justify her sales of Ukrainian enterprises to Russia by the need to please the Kremlin.
Tymoshenko is struggling to maintain her image as a champion of the Ukrainian national idea, yet her BYuT faction in the Verkhovna Rada discreetly voted for a bill that actually allowed all Ukrainian public servants to use Russian on a par with Ukrainian as the official language, and it took media intervention to thwart this attempt. The BYuT voted for this important bill without making it public knowledge.
Meanwhile, there seems to be no order in the language domain. The law on the official language is not observed in the regions, not even by the government-run railroad company, so one should know better than bring forth the language issue in one’s election campaign these days. Besides, after visiting Dnipropetrovsk with its 1.5 million residents, most of whom speak Russian, with an increasing number of ads, commercials, names of shopping malls being translated into Russian, one is not inclined to believe that Ukrainian holds the status of this country’s sole official language. One is increasingly likely to believe that this status is operetta-like, hence the public attitude. This allows certain Ukrainian politicians to capitalize on the language issue, although the truth is that few if any actually want to tackle this sophisticated, time-consuming, and ungratifying task.
Tymoshenko’s great advantage over Yushchenko, Yanukovych, Hrytsenko, Yatseniuk, and other presidential candidates is her talent as an actor and stage presence. When making a statement, her dramatic identification sets in; she believes every word she is saying. This has a captivating effect on her audience. One of the main reasons behind Tymoshenko’s political success is her brilliant actor’s talent, an ability to take part in any kind of masquerade, and the absence of system-stabilizing ideological principles. After selling another Ukrainian business to Russia or signing the notorious gas supply contract with Russia, she promptly made public appearances, sporting a Ukrainian hand-embroidered blouse, placing flowers at the foot of a monument to Lesia Ukrainka or one to UPA veterans, or making a threatening statement against all those who are trying to have Russian as Ukraine’s official statement. She appears to succeed in making up for her actions that are dubious or openly harmful to Ukraine by carrying out what can only be described as symbolically patriotic projects, ones that cause sentimental Ukrainians to cry as they watch them.
A transparent agreement between the Ukrainian elites — those representing the largest regions and the main industrial-financial clans and groups — is the most effective way to solve our problems, considering what happened in other European countries. These people have to come to an agreement, so we can live in accordance with civilized rather than underworld rules and compete by observing the rules of the game, so they can serve our national interests. Whoever breaches this agreement must be punished.
Tymoshenko will not become an authoritarian founder of law and order in independent Ukraine. This is understandable considering her current achievements. Therefore, totalitarian power is a contraindication in her case. Tymoshenko, however, does not like reaching agreement with her numerous opponents. Instead, she tends to make alliances with someone and against someone. This is the easiest way to achieve political success, but this means a dead end for Ukraine.
