On January 30, Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz stated in a special inquiry addressed to Ukraine’s political leadership that some 300 ranking officials were members of a Masonic lodge. He asked rhetorically what these people would abide by in their activities: the interests of the state or those of their order. Oleksandr Moroz was seconded by Yuliya Tymoshenko, Petro Symonenko, and Viktor Yushchenko. Thus began a new round of marginalization in the Ukrainian opposition.
Shortly after exposing the “freemasons,” Mrs. Tymoshenko visited Germany and made some impression with her ambitious approach. The press wrote, in part: “Analysts believe that during her visit Frau Tymoshenko proved the first member of the Ukrainian establishment to try to take advantage of the current US-German divergences relating to the Iraqi war.” (www.context.com) “A Radio Liberty correspondent reminds us that this is not Tymoshenko’s first visit to Berlin... While previously she lashed out at the idea of a Ukrainian-Russian-German consortium, this time she made no mention of it” and focused on the coming presidential campaign in Ukraine. “Yuliya Tymoshenko declared that Viktor Yushchenko’s bloc is actively supporting Washington... Radio Liberty correspondent believes that Tymoshenko, hinting at the Berlin- Washington rift over Iraq, called on Germany to make its stand on the issue clear...” (Ukrayinska pravda) “The logical chain is as follows: Washington is actively lobbying for Yushchenko... In Ukraine he is backed by 27% of the electorate, which is not bad at all, compared to 20-25% support enjoyed by the current powers that be, armed with the administrative resource and media support. However, there is a third force in Ukraine (Tymoshenko says Germany should pay special attention to Ukraine), whose support she estimates at 40%: the opposition coalition made up of the Tymoshenko bloc, Communists, and Socialists. It is precisely this coalition, Mrs. Tymoshenko said in Berlin, which is “prepared to become a true partner of Germany and EU,” writes ProUa. True, 40% causes raised eyebrows, for such a figure has never before been mentioned. It appears that Mrs. Tymoshenko took the liberty of adding to the election turnout (Communist 20% + Tymoshenko bloc’s 8% + Socialist party’s 7% + 5% out of nowhere, perhaps due for the year’s opposition efforts). More likely, Viktor Yushchenko was the target of her verbal attack and her Berlin rhetoric was aimed at encouraging this changeable politician to reciprocate. There was nothing coincidental about Yuliya Tymoshenko saying in Berlin once again that she would be prepared to suppress her presidential ambitions for the sake of a single presidential candidate (actually meaning that she would want a good job guarantee in Ukraine under President Yushchenko). She stressed that “Viktor Yushchenko has the initiative in his hands.” (www.proua.com)
Before the freemason witch hunt, it was possible to discuss individually the marginalist pie-in-the-sky features in the performance and membership of the Batkivshchyna, Socialist, and Communist Parties — and especially Our Ukraine — as well as their street strategies and techniques. All told, the opposition could still be regarded as rather strong. In fact, even the regime takes pride in it. The president said there was active political life in Ukraine, that Ukrainian democracy was not under anybody’s control, and that Ukraine was the most democratic of all the CIS countries.
Now it is finally clear that the very nature of these political formations and above all their leaders are marginal.
The reasons are discussed in Ukrainian kitchens. Why kitchens? Because the Ukrainian media do not dare seriously broach the subject of the freemason witch hunt. Mrs. Tymoshenko likewise made no mention of it in Berlin. In contrast, the Russian media proved more outspoken. Prestigious Russian newspapers demonstrated their attitude with headlines like “Freemasons Found in Ukraine” (Vremia novostei), “Freemasons Ruling Ukraine” (Kommersant). This, however, was nothing out of the ordinary, considering the Russian media’s general attitude toward Ukraine that can be summed up as follows: that country and its “independence” are marginal.
The first, subjective reason for the marginalization of the Ukrainian opposition leaders is obvious: people lacking education but brimming with the gambling spirit, lacking civilized political experience; profound provincialism, and inherent amateurishness.
As for the objective reasons, the following phenomenon should perhaps be noted in the first place: the critical cadre shortages affecting both those in power and their opponents, the poor and the rich. No one has cultivated the habit of making correct generalizations. Instead, eyewash spreads into every nook and cranny. And, of course, there is the innate Ukrainian unflappability verging on thickheadedness. No one seems alarmed by what is happening. This has to be a textbook case of authoritarianism and fear of the great unwashed. No one bothers to remind anybody of where the crusade to expose the freemason (more commonly, Jewish-freemason) conspiracy comes from.
Well, that sets out the background. The main thing is that the opposition enthusiasm of our witch hunters is based not on political principles but on the electorate’s rebellious mood. It is probably only now that Ukraine’s man in the street is beginning to figure out what is being said by politicians such as Lytvyn and other members of the party of power, including the head of state. What they are saying is that the opposition is made up of people who were in power but then stepped down for various reasons other than principled, political, and ideological ones.
Politicians in opposition lacking a genuine political platform, party support, a party capable of keeping them disciplined and making them say certain things and nothing off the top of their heads, politicians voicing their disappointment with the regime and nothing else get “soft” and “spoiled.” They do not bother to guard their tongues, knowing that no one is listening anyway. Both your exponents and opponents are satisfied that you, together with the mob, are displeased with how you live, and keep shouting something against those in power.
Such politicians are leaders of the crowd; as such, they could not help but become marginalized.
What makes this process of marginalizing the opposition before our very eyes so dangerous? It could be the fact that it now ceases to be politics. This kind of opposition places itself over and above the laws of everyday political life. In other words, it forces, albeit inadvertently, the regime to resort to ruthless methods in fighting it; it gives the regime carte blanche. Under the circumstances, the regime needs very little to be silently understood in the country and out: make the domestic and world public opinion, leaders of all the interested countries fully aware of what Oleksandr Moroz, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and their allies have to say. Viktor Yushchenko is a different story. One is reminded of what his opponents used to say, focusing on the membership of his bloc, factions, his team, all those strange and loud-mouthed individuals, obvious and potential marginals. A democratic politician, a modern leader of a democratic opposition would instantly and resolutely distance himself from any freemason or Yankee witch hunt. He would say then and there that any such thing was disgraceful in Ukraine, and that he considered it his duty to save his country’s reputation. He would remind his audience of who came up with the idea of a Masonic conspiracy, where, and why, of how an innocent adult game played by decent, often truly pious men is somehow transformed into an evil force spreading worldwide, threatening things hitherto held sacred. This would be a natural response from a learned and responsible democratic politician. Instead, we heard vague assurances about his wishing to enhance accord with those witch hunters and consider the possibility of a single candidate.
Maybe he is listening to his intuition, which is not a bad thing. Maybe he is subconsciously aware of what has been mentioned above, that the population could not care less about his response and about himself; that those supporting him do not address him, a living being, but the Yushchenko myth, a myth that lives a life of its own, in contrast to Yushchenko who walks among the living, determined not to interfere with the life of that myth... If that be the case, the situation is even worse, even more dangerous.
Returning back to the regime and what provokes it, under the circumstances the regime is increasingly aware that the myth must not be allowed to get the upper hand, that this would be irresponsible. A sense of responsibility is present, to some degree at least, in any government simply because government enforces actions that cannot be considered quite adequate in a democratic society. The key presidential candidate myth is an extraordinary situation, so any regime would respond to it by taking extraordinary measures.
Just as Mr. Yushchenko acts in accordance with his subconscious, so, in all likelihood, do his former colleagues and patrons. There is obviously much that is spontaneous and primitive in Ukraine’s political life... Those in power realize that, should they make a clear statement on what happened this winter, they would then have to do something about it. But what? Naturally, something out of the ordinary and unwelcome. The regime probably does not want (nor is it in a position to do so after all is said and done) to wage an extra-parliamentary struggle. Leonid Kuchma is perhaps more frank than believed even by his closest associates when he says he favors the idea of Ukrainian democracy remaining uncontrolled or less under control than, say, in Russia; that he wants events to take their course, and let the best man win the presidential race. Volodymyr Lytvyn, when asked about the possibility of the Ukrainian version of the Yeltsin-Putin scenario, replied in what a keen analyst would describe as a remarkable lapse of frankness: Ukraine and Russia “have politically outgrown such schemes.”
The people wielding power in Ukraine are eager to belong to an ordinary, preferably democratic establishment. Like everybody else, they would also like to live in a normal country. So they stick their heads in the sand. By calling a spade a spade, Leonid Kuchma ought to have told himself, his staff, and finally his fellow Ukrainians that, yes, I am for events taking their course, but this course must not lead to marginals coming to power. Yet this is something the head of state is loath to say.
There is another explanation of the regime being slow to respond to the situation. If one were to describe it for what it really is, one would have to admit that, assuming the existence of a democratic opposition previously, it is no longer there. This means that the gap must be filled, that a democratic opposition must be formed. How can a modern European country exist with a democratic constitution but without a democratic opposition? But how can it be formed, from among what people? How can one continue to create something without producing anything, something that formed elsewhere naturally, even if it took centuries? How long can one keep creating artifacts? Or are we building a controllable democracy in the Russian fashion?
One is reminded of the situation in Russia in 1995-96. At the time there was the clear and present danger of Stalinist (not just Communist but also marginal) Ziuganov & Co. coming to power. As a marginal, Ziuganov was more dangerous than Zhirinovsky; there was no acting, that man meant business. Anatoly Strelianny said on Radio Liberty that Ziuganov’s victory would be terribly disgusting but not terrible. The phrase was coined by Nemtsov. Ukraine is faced with a similar situation: something terribly disgusting but not terrible could happen.
The possibility looks all the more real in that the marginal venom is carried by the air of the times. Essays are written and reports delivered, stressing marginalization as a post-Soviet trend, as an exceptionally serious challenge to the regime’s democratic intentions and instincts...
In view of the actual possibility of marginals coming to power, those in power must unite and make every effort to prevent them doing so. Strange as it may seem, the opposition will be responsible for making such efforts.
