Not a Breakthrough

“Ukraine has once again reaffirmed its ultimate objective of Euro-Atlantic integration. We wish to see Ukraine integrated into both the European Union and the North Atlantic alliance,” President Viktor Yushchenko declared on February 22, after a top-level meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission in Brussels.

This visit to Brussels was long- awaited. Off the record, NATO official admitted that they cannot say anything about future relations with Ukraine before hearing the Ukrainian government’s stand. The commission traditionally meets behind closed doors, so there is little information on what was actually discussed. However, the main achievement is clear: Ukraine and NATO are prepared to deepen their relations. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said: “NATO is adhering to its open-door policy, and European countries that comply with the membership criteria can enter. Countries seeking membership should simply honor their obligations.” Kyiv was thus led to believe in no uncertain words that Ukraine should work hard and that the results of that work will permit discussions of a new level of relations with the alliance. Did the meeting in Brussels mark a breakthrough in Ukrainian-NATO relationships? Not at this stage. NATO officials have made similar declarations in the past. Hopes for expanding the format of cooperation have not been justified. The NATO Secretary General said that Kyiv and Brussels could start by upholding the current cooperation level — i.e., in keeping with the Action Plan adopted three years ago. This actually means maintaining relations the way they are now; they can be upgraded by definition, but no institutional changes are envisaged.

Has the new Ukrainian president measured up to expectations? In many respects, Viktor Yushchenko’s speech in Brussels may be regarded as revolutionary. There was no mention of NATO integration in his inaugural address and some cabinet members appeared to harbor different views on future Ukraine-NATO relations. The defense minister started by saying that discussions of Ukraine’s membership were premature; the foreign minister said integration in both NATO and EU was necessary, and the prime minister declared that Ukraine should join the alliance together with Russia. Thus, the signals that NATO is receiving from Ukraine still have to be read between the lines. Viktor Yushchenko never got around to making a public statement to the effect that Ukraine wants to be a member of NATO.

According to Anton Buteiko, a politician and diplomat, the Ukrainian government has not been able to banish euphemisms from its rhetoric. Such euphemisms can be interpreted in a variety of ways, although there is little doubt about what Viktor Yushchenko meant when he said, “We have accepted the need to raise the Ukrainian-NATO relationship to a qualitatively new level. Ukraine has made it clear that it is prepared to join the Membership Action Plan.” This document is accepted by countries that eventually want to become NATO members. What remains to be explained is the Ukrainian president’s definition of the MAP accession timeframe as “several years.”

The Balkan countries have long been operating in the MAP format, although the level of their preparedness gives way to as many questions as that of Ukraine (Macedonia being a good example). Bulgaria and Romania are NATO members, although both countries still have to complete military reform (not to mention problems in numerous other spheres). In fact, Ukraine’s being prepared to join MAP should no longer be on the agenda — and this is what President Yushchenko should have emphasized. Implementing this instrument will show exactly how well Ukraine is prepared for that membership. Delaying MAP accession would also mean delaying Ukraine’s membership in the alliance. Implementing the required procedures takes an average of 5 years, time enough to meet the necessary criteria, all the more so as the new administration intends to do this in 3 years, before the EU membership talks. (It should be noted that the EU membership criteria are far more exacting than those of NATO, as they require tougher economic reforms).

The issue of extending the cooperation format is very likely to be put off to a later date, owing to the possibility of Russia’s negative response. Russian officials on various levels have made clear their rejection of Ukraine’s NATO membership. But is anyone trying to convince Moscow that Kyiv’s integration with the alliance would serve its interests as well? Ex-premier Yevhen Marchuk, an expert on Euro-Atlantic issues, said in an interview with the BBC’s Ukrainian Service: “It doesn’t take a farsighted [politician] to note Russia’s active cooperation with NATO, compared to what we have and will have in the nearest future. Russia opposes NATO’s expansion. Without a doubt, this must be taken into account. Yet questions about the method Russia will apply in opposing this should be addressed to the Ukrainian political leadership and to Viktor Yushchenko personally.”

COMMENTARIES

Enough of Euphemisms

Anton BUTEIKO, former First Deputy Foreign Minister, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine (ex-Ambassador to the US and Romania):

The Day: What are Ukraine’s prospects for expanding its relation with NATO? What should official Kyiv be doing to take advantage of the current foreign political opportunities?

Buteiko: These opportunities are exceptionally favorable. The Orange Revolution forced Brussels to revise its attitude to the Ukrainian people and demarcate its confidence in this nation’s aspirations. President Viktor Yushchenko is a very trusted politician in the West. The important thing now is for the new government machine being shaped to demonstrate that Ukraine wants to meet NATO and EU standards. To this end, we must comply with the bilateral instruments and supplement declarations with specific achievements.

I’m personally surprised by the absence of a Ukraine-NATO Membership Action Plan. It’s time to stop using euphemisms like Ukraine’s ‘desire to achieve European and Euro-Atlantic integration.’ It’s time to issue clear statements as to whether Ukraine wants to join the EU and NATO, because this is in Ukraine’s national interests and because this is required by a normative act that was duly approved by the Verkhovna Rada back in 1993.

Ukraine must do a few simple political things; in the first place, it must turn itself into a democracy. Also, it’s very important to promote NATO in Ukraine, because those who oppose NATO in Ukraine and abroad have succeeded in distorting the very concept beyond recognition. Remember the man who held the prime minister’s post for two years, then became a presidential candidate, but couldn’t rid himself of anti-NATO stereotypes, declaring that Ukraine’s NATO membership would damage the national military-industrial complex (MIC). Apparently, the ex-prime minister failed to obtain adequate data from his advisors; otherwise he would have never made such statements.

The fact remains that Ukraine at one time worked to take part in a tender for the manufacture and sales of its tanks to Turkey, a NATO member. He should also have been informed that Ukraine’s MIC had sold materiel to another NATO member, Greece. That’s why it is very important to provide Ukrainian society with unbiased information about NATO’s true face and role in the present situation. Without a doubt, it is necessary to proceed from the assumption that Ukraine’s NATO membership is not an end in itself; that it is currently the most favorable and effective instrument that will provide for Ukraine’s national security and uphold its democracy, freedom, rule of law, and a higher living standard. Therefore, by putting off the declaration of Ukraine’s intention to join NATO and submitting an appropriate application even for a day means delaying the Ukrainian nation’s opportunity to rise to a higher civilized level.

You said it was time for the new government in Ukraine to stop using euphemisms. Why does the new government keep using them, especially with regard to NATO membership?

Buteiko: I believe that some people haven’t figured out the situation; they’re probably still paying too much attention to Russia, afraid of its negative response. These people appear to overlook the fact that, according to the OSCE instruments, every country must build its national security in a manner it deems most expedient, whether single-handedly or as a member of a bloc. Russia signed these instruments, too. Therefore, no one can deny Ukraine’s right to act accordingly. I believe that the Ukrainian political leadership is aware of NATO’s important role, but they are still mindful of public opinion whereby the alliance is still regarded through Soviet “sunglasses,” hence their overcautious attitude to the whole idea. I also think it’s necessary to place a greater emphasis on public explanations; people in Ukraine must know exactly what NATO is all about and how Ukraine can benefit from NATO membership — rather than stick to the cautious approach, lest our Russian neighbor become irritated. This “great neighbor” of ours should realize that a democratic Ukraine, as a member of NATO and EU, would be a far better asset for Russia’s future and for Ukrainian- Russian cooperation, compared to the totalitarian period.

This pragmatic concept must gradually dawn on those who occupy high-ranking posts in the Kremlin. Ukraine’s membership in NATO would be the best guarantee of NATO refraining from any unfriendly acts toward Russia. The Ukrainian-Russian relationship remains a very close one, meaning that Ukraine would never embark on an adventure against Russia — and NATO would never allow this anyway.

What do you think this cautious stand may lead to?

Buteiko: It can slow down Ukraine’s progress on the road to a better future. Ambiguous political declarations will inspire fresh hopes in Russia’s influential circles. Accordingly, certain vehicles will be activated to exert influence on Ukraine. If the Russians are led to clearly understand Ukraine’s position — as they did that for the Baltic states — their attitude will be perfectly pragmatic and normal. Russia showed such an attitude to Poland, concerning its NATO membership. Boris Yeltsin was forced to recognize Warsaw’s right to do just that. From what I know — and I tend to believe my information — Boris Yeltsin at the time acquiesced to Poland’s membership in NATO after the then President Lech Walesa challenged the Kremlin with the Polish- Ukrainian-bloc-or-Polish-NATO-membership options. Yeltsin thought it best to let Poland join NATO rather than have a Polish-Ukrainian alliance. This is another example of the old mentality. At present, this mentality must be rooted in cooperation rather than confrontation. Ukraine, Russia, and NATO must build their relationships proceeding from the concept of cooperation.

Do you think that the cautious stand of the new Ukrainian administration is determined more by the coming election campaign of 2006 rather than the Russian factor? There is no proof that Viktor Yushchenko has been paying much attention to what Russia thinks; at any rate, no such evidence was present when he formed the new cabinet.

Buteiko: There is a complex of existing factors. I’m not saying that the Russian one is predominant. However, appointing a prime minister isn’t as important as the question of the future security design in this region. Therefore, I think that this aspect is more important than the campaign factor. Yet it is present in this context, of course. By appointing the new prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko made it clear that the old approaches of assigning such important posts from the outside are history. For example, Russia is in no position to determine the next president of France. The same is now true of Ukraine. There is a normal process underway to establish pragmatic, constructive relations between Ukraine and Russia. That’s a guideline all of us should comply with. We must forget about Russia being the only one to influence Ukraine. We must remember that Ukraine is a powerful country that exerts a great deal of influence on Russia. Ukrainian democracy may well turn out to be the strongest factor of democratic transformations within Russian society, so that it will go toward democracy and not totalitarianism. Europe — and particularly Brussels — is becoming increasingly aware of this. We must also understand this.

When do you think Ukraine will join NATO?

Buteiko: I believe that Ukraine is more prepared to do so now than Romania was when it came time to decide about its membership. In other words, we could apply for NATO membership even now. This application wouldn’t be an instrument with any negative strings attached. It would be an instrument speeding Ukraine on its way to democracy and a higher living standard, rather than making it part of a European scarecrow.

“We’re not to Blame for Being Rejected”

Oleksandr CHALY, former Foreign Ministry’s State Secretary for European Integration:

President Yushchenko came up with what I believe are rather strong and unexpected statements concerning the Ukrainian-NATO relationship. Regrettably, the NATO countries are divided on Ukraine’s status as a prospective member. This is explained by objective factors, including Ukraine’s geopolitical position, which places it between NATO and the other collective security bloc, I mean the Treaty of Tashkent under Russia’s auspices. Considering that the NATO countries, primarily France and Germany, regard Russia as a key player in the European security game, they tend to be very cautious about any actions that, in their opinion, could upset the European security balance.

It is true that Russia’s other neighbors, Poland and the Baltic states, have become NATO members, but we can’t compare them to Ukraine because its size, geographical position, and potential warrant a special place for our country in the context of European security. I believe that the Ukrainian government should seriously consider a national security formula. We must realize that Ukraine remains an unaligned and neutral country, and that its government must work on alternatives. We must have effective cooperation with Russia, France, and Germany, with the aid of the United States as our strategic partner, so we can convince them that Ukraine’s possible NATO membership won’t hurt the Russian Federation’s national security in any way. In this context, I would like to refer to [Russian Foreign Minister] Sergey Lavrov’s recent statement to the effect that Georgia and Ukraine are no longer within Russia’s sphere of influence. I believe that this should be put on record as Russia’s new doctrine, which probably offers Ukraine a chance.

Viktor Yushchenko, just like his predecessor Leonid Kuchma, did not receive an answer to his question in Brussels. It’s time we stopped trying to find out the reasons for the negative responses to our faulty policies. We should instead realize that the reason is not so much what we have to offer or what problems we have to cope with as it is our need to look for different ways, rather than knocking on closed doors; we have received negative responses from the EU and NATO, despite our revolution and serious statements made by the new administration.

It is now time for a very serious intellectual discussion of what steps Ukraine should take, with an eye to its national interests. It is time to determine the ways and means of upholding Ukrainian national security, if we have no prospects for membership in NATO, and if we don’t want to return to the Russian collective security system. In this respect, I believe that ideas promoting non-alignment status — which we already have — are becoming popular. In 1995, in connection with the fact that we got rid of our nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers that signed the Budapest memorandum undertook to safeguard Ukraine’s territorial integrity and national security; among the guarantors are Russia and the NATO countries. So we have to think of ways to enhance this formula. What happened in Brussels is proof that the original, simplified formula, to the effect that all those negative responses received by the previous Ukrainian administration were due to that administration’s inadequate performance, is no longer valid. Viktor Yushchenko’s team is praised in the West, but when it comes to deeds rather than words, geopolitical interests prove uppermost in the minds of the key international power players. We must understand them and offer a new formula, rather than revise the existing one, whereby we could become players rather than objects of this game.

A Difficult Task for the Ukrainian Leadership

Yevhen MARCHUK, leader of the Party of Freedom:

Judging by the statements of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko and NATO officials, the latest Ukraine-NATO summit produced no surprises whatsoever. Most likely, both sides were not prepared to take any practical steps to further cooperation and ended up exchanging symbolic signals and encouraging declarations.

Was it because Yushchenko’s team failed to prepare for the summit on such short notice or because it failed to bilaterally negotiate the possibility of Ukraine being transferred to the Membership/Action Plan format? Another possibility is that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, when he was visiting Kyiv, told President Yushchenko something that made the Ukrainian leader hold back the long-awaited initiative.

It is also possible that experienced bureaucrats in NATO headquarters, along with the experienced leaders of the NATO countries, prevented the alliance from supporting Ukraine’s switch to a higher level of cooperation. It is also possible that their embassies in Ukraine are advising their respective governments of the absence of any convincing proof that the Yushchenko team can push a number of especially sensitive bills through the Ukrainian parliament.

On the other hand, they cannot help appreciating the Yushchenko team’s efficiency in the executive domain. Restricting themselves to the niceties of protocol, both sides essentially stated the results of the previous Ukrainian government. A point in case is Secretary — General Scheffer’s reference to the existence of a reliable basis for active Ukraine-NATO cooperation. At the same time he mentioned the special partnership charter, the Action and Target (annual) Plans that had been worked out and adopted under President Leonid Kuchma. The fact that there is now a new strategy for cooperation between Ukraine and NATO elicits some amazement, although it was actually approved by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine back in 2002. It is this new Ukraine-NATO strategy that envisages Ukraine’s eventual membership in this effective system of collective defense and security.

Also, one ought to remember that over the past couple of years Ukraine signed and ratified a protocol on the host country’s assistance to NATO operations, as well as an agreement to provide strategic transport aviation for moving NATO cargo and personnel. Ukraine initiated its participation in the NATO program of operations “Active Efforts” in the Mediterranean Sea region, and also planned and submitted the Strategic Defense Bulletin, which was approved by its NATO partners. Hence the question: What is actually new about the initiatives of Yushchenko team’s — if any — during the last NATO summit?

This, of course, can be explained by tactical interests and the domestic political market juncture. However, from a strategic point of view, the situation looks as though the Ukrainian leadership failed to provide any expert initiatives. Naturally, forming a new government, being pressed for time, facing such complex problems, could not have allowed the Yushchenko team to elaborate on this extremely sophisticated issue on a par with the NATO capitals.

It is merely surprising that the idea of the so-called Trust Fund headed by the US in order to finance the destruction of a large quantity of obsolete weapons in Ukraine is being presented as something new. Ukraine suggested it to the NATO countries and submitted it to the Defense Department last year. The NATO leadership, of course, was determined to slow down this Ukrainian initiative because of political considerations, mostly stemming from their attitude to President Leonid Kuchma, and they kept it as a “present” for the new Ukrainian administration.

Without a doubt, Euro-Atlantic integration is a complex and inwardly contradictory process in Ukraine, linked to the Russian factor. In the last while the Russian media have been carrying articles that for the first time are saying that Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO, even in the future, is a threat to Russia’s national security. To illustrate this point the authors supplied credible situational diagrams showing the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea, meant for the most part for ordinary people who are still influenced by old anti-NATO stereotypes.

In reality, the Ukraine-NATO-Russia triangle is very hard to implement. NATO — meaning Europe and the United States — will never allow any serious tensions in their relations with Russia, Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration notwithstanding.

The fact that Ukraine is being supported by the leaders of NATO countries is a very important and welcome factor. It will most likely help the process of Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukraine. It inspires hope that this process will be sped up. However, in terms of practical significance, everything boils down to good signals and beautiful symbols, nothing more.

The hard daily routine facing the new Ukrainian administration in this direction may prove not as effective as its declared intentions. Most likely, NATO leaders and those in Brussels are also asking themselves the same question. They need time to make sure that President Yushchenko’s team is actually as efficient as it claims to be. Besides, during the presidential campaign and the formation of the new government, Ukraine substantially reduced the tempo of its progress in the Euro-Atlantic direction. Most importantly, government agencies and local authorities have practically halted all efforts to explain what NATO is all about to the Ukrainian population.

All things considered, the current Ukrainian political leadership lacks a clear idea of how to go about balancing Euro-Atlantic integration with expanding and deepening cooperation with Russia.

It is safe to assume that at the last Ukraine-NATO summit the Ukrainian leadership was assigned some serious homework. The NATO leaders will trust Ukraine and its intentions to the degree that the Ukrainian administration will cope with this assignment. It is also possible that NATO is testing Yushchenko’s team on its effectiveness, just like it tested Kuchma’s team on its sincerity.