“Once a place of political battles and a generator of instability impulses, Verkhovna Rada has now made a notable progress in its resolutions and actions toward becoming constructive, predictable, and responsible. The speeding up and qualitative improvement of the legislative process, closer coordination of efforts and cooperation between Verkhovna Rada, the cabinet, and president have borne weighty and tangible political fruits.” This is the high appraisal of parliament’s performance over the past year the president of Ukraine announced in the presence of representatives of the diplomatic corps. Indeed, he chose extremely diplomatic expressions. Under other circumstances and in front of other audiences, especially when visiting the regions, Mr. Kuchma usually assesses parliament in somewhat harsher and blunter terms. In truth, the head of state added that “this transformation of the political situation” did not occur on its own or, the less so, by the goodwill of those who inhabit the building on Hrushevsky Street, but “it was made possible above all thanks to the results of the presidential elections and the popularly-initiated referendum.” In other words, what really occurred was the “stimulation” of the deputies’ corps, a common thing in critical situations. But, on the whole, parliament should be pleasantly surprised with the presidential grade of A- instead of F, for conduct. For the latest developments could trigger an entirely different reaction. Accusations of “destructiveness and unpredictability” are just on the tip of the tongue, following the constant anti-presidential fever stirred by the opposition literally. The lawmaking process deserves harsh presidential criticism, because deputies have been spending more time recently on political debates than, say, on passing a number of long-promised codes. As to the coordination of efforts between the branches of power, this is a sore point: the parliamentary majority regularly divides into unequal parts on the basis of attitudes either toward the cabinet or the president. So, of all things, “the impulses of instability” are without number.
The president thinks the main task of this year is to keep the parliamentary majority intact and “to fortify the constructive spirit, which pervaded the relations between the president, cabinet, and parliament practically throughout last year.” But the question is what, in essence, should be kept intact? What does this majority, which will be a year old this week, mean? If we put aside the formal list of 275 deputies, who in fact have nothing in common, it becomes problematic to trace its existence and performance, especially if you are guided by the products of its performance. Yes, laws are indeed being passed. But formerly, too, they were passed in the same fits and starts. Suppose they voted for a bill initiated by the executive: here is majority! Suppose they did not: again majority, but only in opposition. The process goes on: when the pro-government factions needed to pass a law on electricity, they won over the Communists and thus got a pro-cabinet majority, but when they decided to “kick out” the police and security ministers, they in fact created an anti-presidential majority. What remains unchanged are eternal and personal interests. The further we go, the more personal interests prevail over the feeling of Bolshevik collectivism. Even the majority’s coordination board, conceived for working out coordinated decisions, has become a debate club for faction leaders. You can just talk and ascertain the standpoints of your colleagues pending the vote. A special point is implementation of the referendum results: some people clearly overdid it not long ago. Now it is an uphill job to undo this knot. The premier’s advisor Serhiy Soboliev even suggests that, in case implementation is frustrated, the deputies put on the agenda the responsibility of those who initiated the referendum. He must be alluding to the famed Zhytomyr initiative, which formally set the ball rolling a year ago.
In essence, all participants in the implementation process had no alternative but to drag their feet as long as possible. It was obviously unrealistic to muster 300 votes for the presidential bill on Constitutional amendments, approved during the previous session. As we know, the bill suggested that the Constitution be complemented with three out of four popularly-approved innovations: abolishing the very idea of parliamentary immunity, investing the president with additional rights to dissolve parliament, and cutting the deputies’ overall number by a third. The “impassability” of this draft law was a foregone conclusion. Moreover, the majority leaders were afraid to put the matter to a vote even if they could strike a deal with the Left (on which they once pinned their hopes). What if somebody changes his mind or just pretends to come to agreement? Failure to muster 300 votes automatically withdraws the bill from the agenda. Moreover, one can only revert to the same item a year later. But the next year will bring a new election, which means the new parliament will still be living by the old laws and in a well-known relationship with the president. In a word, the referendum was in vain. It is no accident that Oleksandr Yeliashkevych, addressing the faction leaders’ conciliation board, so actively insisted on immediately putting the presidential bill to a vote. Of all people, he can hardly be suspected of sharing the idea of strengthened presidential authority. The most interesting thing is that at first all agreed with him hotheadedly and decided to recommend Verkhovna Rada put the item on last Thursday’s agenda, only to cool down in time.
Thus the agenda happened to feature two new implementation documents. The first is a modified or, to be more exact, reduced version of the presidential bill. The Havrysh commission left only one item in it: on additional powers of the president to dissolve parliament in case the latter fails to pass the budget or form a standing parliamentary majority on time. The same at first glance, this is a new document from a juridical point of view, for the procedure calls for it to be first approved by the Constitutional Court and then passed by 300 votes at the next session. The second one is the bill On the Parliamentary Majority and Parliamentary Opposition supposed to recover a balance between the branches of power, upset in favor of the president by the referendum. Apart from explaining the vague idea of a standing majority, it gives the latter the right to take part in the formation of the cabinet. Yet, this document is too weak to really offset president’s clout. Indeed, the president has to consult the majority about the candidacy of a premier a month before the latter is appointed, and a month before the appointment of ministers, the premier must also seek the majority’s advice. But neither the president nor the premier bear any responsibility to the majority. They can either heed or ignore the advice. Ministers, too, can work either according to the advisors’ wishes or as they please, for the majority can only recommend resignation. Conversely, the majority must “act continuously,” whether its members want to or not, because this is a constitutional norm. Otherwise, the end, dissolution. Although this produces ample illusion of influencing the executive power, the real boss is not so much the one who controls but the one who fires. And it is the president who can personally fire anybody.
Hence parliament in fact receives no advantages, following the adoption of this supposedly compensatory law. This was vividly shown last Wednesday by Viktor Yushchenko when he met the majority faction leaders. It is not known what he told them exactly. Everybody understood it in his own way. The bottom line is that the premier asked the people’s deputies to pass the laws on implementing the referendum results, which is in principle not typical of the traditionally apolitical head of the cabinet. The premier’s spokesperson Natalia Zarudna interpreted his words as follows: this week Mr. Yushchenko is also prepared to begin consultations with parliament about the formation of a coalition government, and “to develop the mechanism of its functioning, procedures, and regulations, because this is a new and practically untested thing in Ukraine.” Speaker Ivan Pliushch specified that “Mr. Yushchenko has never refused to hold such consultations and is prepared to hear at the beginning of the seventh session the proposals of parliamentary groups and factions about their vision of the governmental structure.” The prime minister’s advisor Mr. Soboliev added that this might boil down to consultations over some candidates for certain government posts. And this requires no laws on majority: you might as well consult each other day after day. What then? With whom and what about is Mr. Yushchenko to agree, if nobody ever agreed with anybody about him? Which faction proposals will he consider constructive and which ones will he reject out of hand? Will the majority be able afterwards to assume responsibility for governmental performance? Maybe it will — for some time, until the next confrontation between parliament and the cabinet. As it has always been.
It would have always been the case, for that matter, had there been a law.
It is difficult to say if precisely this logic took the upper hand in parliament on January 18, but the law on the majority still failed to be put on the agenda, as did the law on constitutional amendments. As political scientists had forecast earlier, the Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) faction, hurt by the top authorities, and Reform- Congress (not Rukh!) managed to muster enough votes to create a critical anti-implementation mass. No compromise was found, and the majority again showed its inadequacy. Even Oleksandr Volkov, formerly 1000% certain of implementation, began to speak about the dissolution of parliament. No doubt, the president will hardly opt for any strong-arm disbanding of parliament in the current political situation. It is no longer possible to justify such a step in the eyes of the world public, claiming that the deputies disregard the people’s will. Suffice it o recall the words of Mr. Pliushch who promised to waive his parliamentary membership should the majority disintegrate. In legal terms, there is no majority; what we see is just a self-proclaimed formation, and this is why whatever you want can be considered a formal sign of its disintegration. Also quite realistic is the scenario now under discussion: the speaker goes, his deputies don’t turn up for sessions, parliament is paralyzed by the abortive attempts to elect a new leadership, no sessions have been held for a month, so the President officially and quite constitutionally calls early elections of people’s deputies. Yet, self-dissolution is also possible. In all probability, the Communists will not object, because on the same day parliament passed, to be on the safe side, a new election law on exclusively proportional representation, which fully suits the former. But the President has one more loophole not to sign it. He can now choose on his own between two election systems, the existing mixed and new proportional ones, by vetoing or signing the bill. Making this choice, he will take into account the opinion of far from all parties and politicians. It is not ruled out that the pro-presidential camp will also see a heated debate over parliament’s further destiny. While Mr. Volkov is already prepared, in an emotional brainstorm, for early election battles, Viktor Medvedchuk still hopes to sit quietly in his vice speaker’s chair until 2002. There are also doubts about the ability of some other centers of influence to make a strong showing in the inter-party rivalry. All this shows that parliament still preserves certain resources for its own self-preservation.
This is the “strengthened political stability” we have. All things considered, the majority has done its work and now can go. It keeps generating the pulses of instability at an increasing frequency soon to be measured in kilohertzes. In politics, unlike in the energy sector, an excessive frequency runs the danger of bringing down everything.
