Serhiy TELESHUN,
Doctor of Political Sciences;
President, Commonwealth Foundation:
“Proceeding from the Ukrainian proverb ‘You don’t change horses when you cross the river,’ the year 2002 can be called hypothetically a ‘river-crossing.’ The crossing to a new political five- year period, I would say. For what we have seen is, firstly, the parliamentary election; secondly, the formation of the legislative branch on new principles; and, thirdly, new forms in the relationship between the government and the opposition.
“The outgoing political year was very important. Various politico-economic forces in Ukraine are finally realizing their interests. Besides, both Eastern and Western partners have assumed, to a large extent, a clear-cut attitude to this country. Whether we will manage to have this attitude changed remains a moot point. Today’s politicians seem to be mainly guided by tactical goals or strategic desires without combining the tactical and strategic objectives as a means for realizing their political interests. Too many emotions, Machiavellian under-the-rug games, overweening ambitions, and too little knowledge of crucial problems. It is difficult to say what Ukrainian political forces managed to ‘win an honors degree’ in 2002. As a result, Ukrainian politicians can be said to have done a ‘pass- degree job’ in the past political year. As to my outlooks, the new year will see the final formation of really influential political and economic pressure groups in Ukraine. Concurrently, Ukraine’s strategic partners (first of all, the US, Russia, and the European Union) will finally take a clearly-defined attitude to this country. At the same time, the year will see the presidential election campaign getting off to a flying start.”
THE CONFLICT OF OPPOSITIONS
Oleksandr DERHACHOV,
editor,
Political Thought journal:
“The year 2002 abounded in political events. I mean not only the parliamentary elections but also contradictory processes both in this country’s highest legislative body and in the whole system of executive power. Ukraine undoubtedly has a very serious choice to make: what is now on the agenda is changing the paradigm of political development. It became obvious that the now-dominating tendencies bring about not only the situation of discontent, instability, and permanent crisis but also inefficient management and acute social problems. Unfortunately, the political system failed to adequately react to these circumstances. On the contrary, we see the government trying to preserve itself in its current shape at any cost. So it is clear that the prospects of its evolution toward further democratization are limited. As we remember, there have already been several attempts to carry out the political reform — now we see another failed attempt. It is also obvious that the latter is not aimed at improving the quality of and democratizing this country. This resembles more a certain compromise between powerful groupings.
“In my opinion, the state will have no future unless it upgrades the political elite and revives trust in the government. The past year gave very many examples of the conflict of oppositions in Ukrainian society. In all probability, these processes will continue — after a short ‘Christmas pause’ — in the ranks of both the government and the opposition. Ukraine has a real alternative: either the European model or a downgraded Russian option (given the absence of resources, including petro- and gas dollars). At the same time, the alternative is, to my mind, in resuming democratic transformations. This primarily calls for building the governmental mechanism in compliance with the will of voters.
“It should be noted, for fairness’ sake, that 2002 showed a hint for a more democratic election. So this tendency should be reinforced in the future.
“To sum it up, 2002 was a year of clarification — the clarification of today’s policies and alternatives to them.”
A “CATWALK” FOR LEADERS
Viktoriya PIDHORNA,
Center for Socio-Political Projects:
“Of great importance in 2002 were the March parliamentary elections. It is for the first time that a more or less democratically- minded opposition was formed. I think this was possible because of changes in the public mood. Society in fact voted for an updated system of government. At the same time, the March elections showed that Ukrainian society differs from its post-Soviet neighbors in many respects. Yes, Ukrainian voters proved to be more rational than the Russians or Belorussians who readily fall for crowd-pleasing slogans and the demagogic rhetoric of their leaders. They voted quite pragmatically, to which the electoral fiasco of outright PR projects (the Winter Generation Team, the Green Party, etc.) is ample proof.
“Besides, the parliamentary elections came as a prologue to the presidential election campaign. Actually, the new parliament consists of the parties and blocs centered around a leader, the latter being a potential candidate for presidency. In other words, society can be said to have tentatively assessed the candidates’ capacities.
“However, as it became clear later, opposition figures never managed to make a deal. They failed to do so because, among other things, they lacked strong teams and a clear-cut parliamentary strategy. In other words, the opposition displays no strategic thinking in order to translate its electoral result into control over the institutions of government.
“What can also be classified as obvious results of the year is lack of attention from both the majority and the opposition to voters and their wishes. Although all allegedly tried to appeal to Ukrainian citizens, nobody in fact cared about their interests in practice. To tell the truth, unwillingness of the government to rely on the political initiative of individuals only aggravates the political crisis. No political crisis can be defused without feedback and continuous gauging of the public mood.”
CHERCHEZ LA FEMME
Viktor RYBACHENKO,
Vice President, Association of Political Psychologists of Ukraine:
“In the context of the past political processes, I would single out the following. First of all, the parliamentary elections showed the desire of most individuals not only to reject the system they do not like but also their readiness to put forward the leader of a certain type. In fact, the election result was reflected in the well-known figures and could have signaled a turning point in our political history. Yet, no turning point came about because the next stage — post-election struggle — immediately set in. This struggle exposed the victors’ inability to consolidate their gains. As a result, the finally-formed Verkhovna Rada majority in fact overrode the election results. This set off the third stage now underway, namely, the redistribution of forces and areas of influence.
“What do we see today? Although the opposition is too weak to take power, it is strong enough to obstruct parliamentary proceedings by downright aggressive methods. At the same time, having seized — by hook or by crook — certain parliamentary strongholds, the majority is unable to defend them.
“Now about the political personalities of 2002. The overwhelming impression is that the President is an outgoing leader. He looks today like a lions’ pride leader still capable of breaking his rival’s backbone but having his leadership qualities clearly on the wane. Presidential Administration head Viktor Medvedchuk, who once made a noticeable spurt, is now ‘laying low,’ mostly dealing with official appointments. He is now in the shadow, but this is a temporary thing.
“VR Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn turned out to be laying claim to chairmanship of the whole parliament, not only the majority, but he far from always gains from this dualism. In general, the absence of a strong leader capable of holding parliament in his hands obviously tells on VR’s behavior.
“Premier Viktor Yanukovych is the one who somewhat upset the political balance. In all probability, there are a few more people in the ‘political reserve,’ waiting for an entry on the political stage in the ‘last act.’
“The strongest figure in the opposition camp is undoubtedly Yuliya Tymoshenko. She is clearly the orchestrator of the latest developments in parliament. Other oppositionists — Moroz and Symonenko — are only ‘stage extras’ today.
“Now about the lessons to learn. When the objective laws of political processes are being broken and some political actors resort, by force of ambition, to voluntarism, the processes backfire — they get twisted, slow down, and cease to develop logically. This is why we are now witnessing the ‘collapse’ of this country’s political life.”
THE EXPERIMENT IS GOING ON
Volodymyr FESENKO,
Penta bureau of political consulting:
“The crucial event of 2002 in Ukraine, which set the pace of all the following political processes throughout the year, is elections to Verkhovna Rada and local self- government bodies. One of the indirect but very important social functions of elections is that they defuse the political tension that has come about in society in the inter-election period. The citizens who act as voters resolve the socio-political contradictions and conflicts that are of paramount importance for the further development of society.
“In 2002, the elections aggravated the accumulated political problems, instead of solving them. The election campaign, as well as the election results and the political structure of the new Verkhovna Rada have clearly marked a watershed between the two conflicting camps — for and against the current political regime, for and against the current President. The two camps are dissimilar and vary in the degree of the moderateness/radicalism of their ‘for’ and ‘against,’ but, objectively or arbitrarily, intentionally or by force of the confluence of circumstances, all the leading parliamentary forces and the overwhelming majority of people’s deputies had to state their adherence to one political camp or another. The end-of-year formalization of the pro-presidential and pro-governmental parliamentary majority and the opposition only rei nforced this tendency.
“This kind of political structuralization would be undoubtedly positive were it not for some circumstances. Firstly, a virtual stalemate has been reached. Both camps are now unable to decisively turn the developments round. Secondly, the ideology of conflict and political war prevails over the objective need of compromise. Both sides should take their share of blame for this.
“The past year could have been the departure point of the political reform proposed by the president, including the first real step — the formation of a coalition government, which could have deservedly won the prize in the ‘political experiment of the year’ nomination. But the success of these initiatives, which would in other conditions have been viewed as the year’s principal events, has been called into serious question by the current parliamentary crisis and a new spell of political tension.
“What has further aggravated the political tension is the worsening of relations with the USA and the virtual freezing of integration-aimed relations with the European Union.
“Is the year 2003 going to see the domestic political conflicts resolved? Very unlikely, from the angle of formal political logic and importance of the events to occur in the new year. As was noted above, political conflicts in a democratic society (or at least in one that claims to be such) are resolved by way of elections. The forthcoming elections (of the president) are to be held under the Constitution as soon as in the fall of 2004. But if the protracted parliamentary crisis assumes a more acute nature, this may provoke, in theory, an early parliamentary election. So far, it is rather unlikely, but if Verkhovna Rada deputies fail to break the deadlock they made, the President may opt for extraordinary measures. The very menace of Verkhovna Rada dissolution may compel the deputies to search for a compromise.
“The December parliamentary crisis is not the first and, by all accounts, not the last stalemate in the work of the current Verkhovna Rada. It is quite possible that the Ukrainian parliament will continue its sluggish lawmaking, occasionally slipping into political aggravations and crises, right until the presidential elections.
“2003 is a year in between the parliamentary and presidential elections. Politically, the new year will go under the sign of preparations for the oncoming presidential race. The pro-presidential camp will be concerned about finding Mr. Kuchma’s successor among them and solving ‘the Yushchenko problem.’ In all probability, no adequate solution will be found to both problems: either the ‘heir’ will come up on the eve of the presidential campaign or it will be decided to opt for a ‘collective successor’ scenario. As to the ‘Yushchenko factor,’ which is, incidentally, a problem not only for the pro-presidential camp but also for the opposition and, what is more, for Mr. Yushchenko himself, no radical changes can be expected here, too. The Our Ukraine leader’s rating froze at 25% and shows no response to external irritators and political upheavals.
“Another ‘holy war’ of the opposition against Leonid Kuchma will end up traditionally, i.e., with no tangible results in spite of what looks like bustling activity. This formula applies not only to the oppositional activities but also to the prospects of a constitutional reform. It is unlikely that the tough parliamentary confrontation will allow the formation of a constitutional majority required for reforming this country’s political system. What can be perhaps the only serious political intrigue of the new year is the destiny of the Viktor Yanukovych government. It will be able to handle the threat of a default and the problem of foreign debts, but will it manage to thwart setups and traps in its own camp? The current premier seems to have decided to take an active part in the game called ‘successor,’ which may cost him very much (both literally and figuratively).
“So 2003 is going to be a year of political conflicts and preparations for the oncoming grand battle. This kind of situation will hardly provoke any grandiose events. Yet... I still have an underlying sensation of great surprises to come. After all, can a New Year be without surprises?..”
IN SPITE OF...
Andriy YERMOLAYEV,
Director,
Sophia Center for Sociological Research:
“I would call 2002 an ‘in spite of’ year. For, in spite of the total public disappointment over politics and politicians, the latest polls show, above all, a handsome percentage of trust in the state, independence, and some kind of future. This reflects the new tendency of getting used to living in certain current conditions against the background of the tempestuous processes that occur, if television is to be believed, in the CIS. This obviously shows a downward trend in nostalgic sentiments rather than an upward trend in anti- Russian feelings.
“The second reason why this was an ‘in spite year’ is that politicians failed to disturb society (in spite of very hard conditions in the provinces). In other words, over the ten past years the leadership has failed to carry out the much-spoken-of reforms. Whatever the leadership may say in its defense (the opposition, a bad parliament), its failure to advance the reforms over such a long time is a negative result.
“The third result of 2002 is the beginning of governmental structuralization, even though this implies fierce competition and struggle for power. So far, this goes along the corporate, rather than politico- ideological, lines. This is why we have such a strange majority and equally strange opposition. But, in any case, this is a step forward in comparison with the previous years.
“And, finally, the last touch. I mean, above all, the ordinary, rank- and-file Ukrainian individual’ who, in spite of the technological and political methods of influence, proved to be prepared to distinguish between the word and the deed. The proof of this is that the past year was not marked with a coup, a revolution or a great mass- scale delight.”
A WASTED CHOICE
Oleh MEDVEDEV,
political technologist:
“In my opinion, the year was special in that, on the one hand, society showed quite a high level of civil maturity. For, contrary to all kinds of zombiing and quasi-governmental control over the media, the people nevertheless made their choice. On the other hand, society displayed glaring civil immaturity, allowing the government to dispose of the election results at its own discretion. Besides, in the past year the government was left to its own devices and completely forgot about the economy. The government reformed nothing and intervened into nothing. In a word, no serious decisions were made.”
A YEAR OF EXCESSES
Vadym KARASIOV,
political scientist:
“The past political year continued the leading trend of the previous eighteen months, when the political process (or, rather, excess) was dominated by the tapegate, an event traumatic for both the ruling class and the opposition. It caused the split of elites, a crisis of leadership, the collapse of the coalition of right-wing and centrist political forces, new foreign political dilemmas and diplomatic knots. The traumatic experience of the previous year guided the crisis-laden political events of the past year. In this sense, 2002 always followed the crisis-cycle trajectory of latter-day Ukrainian politics: crisis — pause of equilibrium — new crisis, etc. This trajectory could also be expressed in spatial terms: parliament — ‘street’ — parliament... As to the ruling elite, it still resembles a rodeo horseman whose goal is only to remain in the saddle. The opposition, in its turn, resembled another horseman from a well-known literary joke, ‘He jumped onto the horse and rushed in different directions.’
“At the same time, there was something special. It was a year of elections — the whole year in the literal sense. The parliamentary elections began with the election campaign in March and ended just by the end of the year. The final results, the winners and losers were in fact identified overtime by electing a new prime minister and forming a new Cabinet. The by-list leadership of Our Ukraine in March, the protracted uncertain status of the ‘two majorities’ in parliament, an unconvincing by-list result of the pro-governmental bloc forced the government to hastily react to the post-election crisis. The inefficiency of United Ukraine, the absence of a high-profile leader and a popular ‘front man’ in the ruling elite, the upsurge and fall of various pressure groups caused the government to regroup its forces (this was done in the style of ‘hot rotation’).
“The pro-presidential elites had to take up the electoral and popularity-rating challenge of Viktor Yushchenko and obstruct the formation of an OU-based majority. In his turn, Yushchenko, sandwiched between the opposition troika and the government, never managed to find a way out, showing ‘inability to be able’ to secure a firm position in the bid for power and convert his parliamentary seat into the premier’s chair.
“Trying to wriggle out of the awkward situation and reach their immediate and tactical goals, the presidential forces also set into motion some transformations of fundamental importance. In this context, the past year marked a very significant fault line and transition to the parliamentary logic of governance and to a coalition, even though imperfect, government relying on a parliamentary, even though controlled from outside, majority. The institutional reform and a more ‘parliamentarized’ political regime became a thing of real politics. The only question is whether the final transition to a new republic will proceed under the scenario of the government or of the opposition. So far, the former has a clear tactical edge, which still does not cancel the significance and importance of the process itself.
“And, what is more, the past year saw the beginning of a true change of elites — not on the basis of belonging to the radical or oppositional wings but by regrouping and seeking out the optimal modes of the ‘coexistence’ and ‘cohabitation’ of the main political cartels and resource groups orbiting around the presidential center. It is therefore important whether the pro-presidential ‘coalition’ will manage to pass the ‘casting’ for a successor in 2003, the decisive year in the current president’s second term.
“Supposedly, the ‘post-Kuchma era’ is to feature a broad coalition of resource-holding elites. This does not in general run counter to the spirit and trends of the new century which will show domination of the resource-holding and competitive types of elites admitted to the transnational club (suffice it to mention Bush’s America and Putin’s Russia). Meanwhile, struggle for the management, distribution and increment of resources will remain the axis of both the domestic and foreign policies. Many may take a dim view of this because it is at variance with the traditional European democratic mythology, but a resource-based coalition of power and coherence of the ruling regime on the basis of resource-related (in all meanings of this buzzword) interests gives the Ukrainian political class a chance to capture global and competitive positions. Being competitive and aggressive on domestic and foreign markets, having good prerequisites for participating in worldwide alliances and coalitions, and reinforcing this country’s strong positions tomorrow are the requirements formed by the particular crisis-laden political reality of 2001-2002 and the demands of a new great geopolitical game with stakes far higher than a few years ago. If this is so, the results of a ‘poor’ and crisis-ridden past political year can be converted into hopeful tendencies in the new year.”
