The European choice is gradually becoming a sacral question for Ukraine. Unfortunately, it increasingly resembles the dogmatic slogans of the Soviet leadership, such as “We stand for universal peace,” “Let us implement the decisions of the Nth Party congress,” and so forth.
I will note immediately that I consider myself a conscious dissenter about all the rhetoric concerning movement toward Europe, this conviction growing in direct proportion to the imposition of this clichй on the Ukrainian public. The weak and inconsistent movement of “Euroskeptics” in Ukraine (as opposed to Europhiles) has been compromised for the following reasons:
— an inclination toward reactionary Russophilia as in a vision of political association with the Russian Federation;
— a second-rate basis of Euroskepticism (as in we’re worse than them, we’re different, etc.); and
— the inheritance by the Ukrainian Right of the views of Visegrad Right, the replacement of liberal state-sponsored nationalism by irrational Europhilia. In other words, the Left or, as they put it, fringe environment remains the only medium for the development and spread of Euroskepticism as an alternative to Europhilia.
I think that the trend of my research and the content of the education I have gained primarily in the aforesaid Europe and America give me a certain right to cast an unbiased glance at the necessity and the prospects of Ukraine’s association with and integration in the EU as well as to study possible (oh yes, they do exist) alternatives.
Here are the standpoints of my personal, liberal-statist Euroskepticism:
— enlarging the EU by at least one country implies profound institutional reform within the EU. The community has been moving toward its current design for half a century. Is this process gaining speed? We can conclude from Nice and Gogenborg that it can be and is speeding up, albeit insignificantly;
— the demands the community issues to the actual and potential associate members are sometimes ruinous and have often been deliberately lobbied by West European producers of goods and services; and
— the present-day Ukrainian white economy (the gray one is another topic) is of a design a la Henry Ford, a theater of operations for large industrial enterprises. Who will compensate us for its collapse, be it even steady and gradual? Whence do we get the portion of GDP that we are going to lose? From Euroaid, Eurocredits, or massive investments? This is as naive as the idea of a free trade zone our government ministers try to package to either Russia or the EU. The European community was established precisely to ward off bitter competition by of non-members, be they neighbors or distant relatives;
— all current EU members are parliamentary democracies to one extent or another. Does this mean we must adopt a different constitution to comply with European standards?
— is there any difference now between being European, American, or Japanese? None at all! These are the three geographically far-flung stereotypes of citizens of developed countries, the residents of an “axis,” “technosphere,” “triad,” “center,” and so on. The EU cannot be regarded outside the criteria of national economic development and those of “modern” society; and
— in most Ukrainian Europhiles, the striving for EU membership is based on a banal subconscious desire to flee Russia rather than on the rational expectations of the EU opening its markets to Ukraine, removing travel barriers, etc. “We are not Soviet people, we are Euro-Soviet people.” Where else will you find this kind of scorn poured on the idea of symmetrical interdependence in a given region of the world, the idea of the eternal guarantee of human rights?
Of special interest is the Russian connection. Let us admit the bitter truth: the living standards of the ordinary Russian, the level of the banking system, and of intellectual production (the latter refers to Moscow) is higher in Russia than here.
We should not cherish second-rate status for this reason. Russia started in a better position: its two industrial and R&D megapolises, resources, whatever was left of the USSR gold and hard-currency reserves, and sizable Western aid have brought about the result we see today.
In addition, a bitter rivalry between two media-empires speeded up the development of civil society, and the making of a de facto confederation — emergence of a long series of autonomous donor republics, an armed conflict — outlined the horizons of national interests for most Russians. It is an open secret that the Russian economy is more liberalized, workers in the public sector better-off, while the nuclear button still makes Russian government ministers more self-sufficient than Ukraine is with all its charitable waivers and shutdowns.
Taking into account its starting position, Ukraine has achieved many successes, much to the surprise of our contemptuous neighbors. Ukraine has not split asunder, has not become a totalitarian regime, it is even growing despite the innumerable prophesies of its inevitable end by hundreds of Western and Eastern analysts. Moreover, our government members have shown enviable self-criticism and sober judgment in recent years.
So who and what are our Europhiles running away from? From billions of dollars worth of investments in idle enterprises? From a consumer market embracing a hundred million population? From the opportunity not to hamper the free movement of labor and above all reunions of relatives? From our only defense from the tyrannical extremism now plaguing Eurasia? Are we the appendage of a country which exports primarily resources? What nonsense: in this case the classical colony is not we but... Shall we hack our platinum pipe with medieval axes and then build an alternative one that nobody needs?
And where are our Europhiles running to? To the world of prejudices? Of second-rate status lasting for decades? To the place where we will beg to be allowed to sell even a bag of sunflower seeds? This is precisely a colony of resources. What self-identification! What a national idea!
The residents of Australia are more European than we because they are richer and personally freer, and they never ignore but live off their relations with China.
This might be an awkward but telling example.
My conclusions thus become quite obvious:
— associating with and going toward Europe are not synonymous with achieving the living standards commensurate with those in Europe. Poland is experiencing an investment boom not because of association but thanks to a flexible, state-oriented, well-balanced, and sound policy;
— the Europhilia of a segment of Ukrainian society, based on historical memories and xenophobia, is not rational and meets neither the realities of the world political situation nor the challenges of world economic development;
— it is in Ukraine’s national interest to expand the spheres of economic cooperation with Russian companies and the Russian leadership (except for some extremists who have little impact on RF policies). The more so that this has long been a reality.
In my opinion, modernization is our goal; The modernization of production facilities, liberalization of economic legislation, establishment of certain analogy to the EU among CIS industrial countries, modernization of the social security system, and materialization of constitutional rights and freedoms.
As to searching for a new big brother, turning into a true (and not so attractive) raw-material appendage of the EU, Europe-oriented claptrap, racing for a mythical panacea... This is a road to poverty. Are we not poor enough already?
