For the first time Ukraine has found itself in a situation showing sufficiently dynamic development, which neither the analytical centers nor individual politicians can assess in a timely fashion. There is a military rule saying that one’s own decision-making cycles should be quicker than the enemy’s. Otherwise inadequate decisions are made and this has always happened. For example, our ancestors thought that the Tatar cavalry always appeared out of nowhere and then vanished into thin air, because their data-collection and assessment system was slower than that of the Tatar-Mongols. Something like this is happening now; the regime is unknowingly making decisions prompted and in a way programmed by others. And even if it knows this, there is nothing it can do about it.
For example, what does this regime lack and what has to be taken into consideration?
(a) Clarity. There is no clear information on many issues, which is evidence that the information must be often repeated, albeit in a different form.
(b) Systematic nature. There is no systematic approach to the issuance of official information. Also, those in power seem to forget that the channels or programs where they are most active are less seen by the people.
(c) Regionalism. No work is being done with the regional authorities. Recently, for example, the first deputies to the heads of administrations of all oblasts had training courses, but the curriculum has no mention of information relating to the problem.
(d) Dynamism. There is no dynamism; in time of crisis one has to work constantly, not just from time to time. Critical communications are different from regular ones primarily by their round-the-clock format.
The opposition also should take into consideration one very important aspect. The situation with the freedom of speech was far more favorable than it could become in a different situation leading to the Belarus option. Previously, our media wrote and spoke if not everything, then almost everything. Perhaps this was precisely because the regime made no serious attempt to get the information sphere under its control. The reason was that no one in the country was placed in charge of it. Ivan Drach’s committee can only control a certain stable unchanging parameter. They chose language and are waging a pitched battle to expand the sphere of the official language; what is being spoken in it or in any other language remains outside their competence. It is not the fault but specificity of a certain bureaucratic unit — and the committee is precisely such a unit — which is capable of controlling only that which is easiest to control.
Now this situation could change (let me repeat: if the situation changes for the worse). Now they might become able to start controlling other parameters of the information space and the result may also be other than virtual — quite earthly censorship. Let us consider a recent Russian example. In the aftermath of the Kursk tragedy and the situation being brought out into the open — primarily by Russia’s NTV — Vladimir Gusinky and Boris Berezovsky lost their channels and left Russia. Moreover, attempts are being made to forcefully return them to Russia and put them in the dock. It was then that Russian experts discerned the pattern that had emerged: an industrial disaster turning into a media catastrophe. They tried to mitigate such a future possibility, placing commercial channels under more rigid state control. We are experiencing a similar situation, when a political calamity (eavesdropping) is turning into a media catastrophe, meant to result in political changes (for some it will mean substantial political dividends). Thus we offer THESIS 1: we could receive a form of the freedom of expression worse than the one we had previously.
Under all the laws of politics the opposition should keep pace with the regime, lashing out at it for the slightest setback. This is an axiom. The opposition’s victory might consist in getting some posts or others, which is of relative importance to the rest of the population. After all, it is not the population fighting the regime but another segment of the regime. In reality, one set of political ambitions clashed with another set of political ambitions. Incidentally, all this can be understood purely biologically; there no other opportunity for growth in this country, except via executive structures. Hence we offer THESIS 2: the opposition and regime are twins, because both are after the same thing, that is, being in the position to order all the rest of us around, guiding us along the only correct course, which they themselves set. Everyone considers one’s own path more correct than anyone else’s. Everyone has a right to do so, yet this can be done only as a result of elections, when such functions are delegated to them by the population and not seized by force.
It should be stressed also that there are many respectable people rallied round the opposition and the regime itself is to blame for failing to put their brains and skills to good use, for placing them in a situation in which such people could see themselves only in opposition to those in power.
Events are moving constantly. Let us recall the key points of the story:
(a) Eavesdropping made public knowledge from the parliamentary podium.
(b) The regime denies the authenticity of the illicitly recorded conversations.
(c) The opposition resorts to a series of demonstrative acts of protest.
(d) The West begins to view the events as a popular revolution gaining momentum.
(e) Violent clash between the regime and opposition.
(f) The West shows an interest in the opposition.
(g) Civil war in Ukraine is predicted.
Meanwhile, Yuliya Tymoshenko is jailed, which is another element of the situation, making it even more strained. Without doubt, she was arrested for criminal offenses. At the same time, however, everybody obviously believes that she fell into disfavor after she became connected with the opposition.
In this situation, the opposition has touched a whole series of sore spots heretofore more or less dormant in Ukraine. Suppose we list only some of them:
(a) the Jewish issue reflected by opposition posters and speeches during rallies;
(b) the eastern Ukrainian territories becoming increasingly irritated by the western regions;
(c) emergence of a new Communist Party of Workers and Peasants branding Petro Symonenko as lacking in the revolutionary spirit and being prepared to build barricades; and
(d) the Viktor Yushchenko issue, collecting signatures in his support, with one of the supporting party leaders declaring that a civil war will break out if Yushchenko is dismissed.
There is a law binding on every system; once any of its functions stops, it is replaced by another. We have the same principle here; all points of tension were activated once the state fell silent, so that now any such point can be touched to stimulate a response leading to destabilization. This can be done not only by the existing opposition, but also by any interested person in or outside Ukraine.
All of the elements of the situation that has developed prompts us to understand yet another aspect that can be formulated as THESIS 3. It is necessary to take advantage of the situation to democratize the regime, rather than push it toward the Belarus option. Here one must bear in mind two facts: (1) legally, the future impeachment procedures can hardly be implemented. Incidentally, this is precisely why the opposition is betting so heavily on [the president’s] voluntary resignation. Here precisely the moral emphasis comes to the fore, because the legal aspect is simply not feasible. Simultaneously, the opposition seems oblivious to the realities surrounding a second fact: (2) the regime only seems weak. It is just that those in power will continue to pose for the cameras and Western observers and remain just as ineffective, but only until someone encroaches on their foundations. Try to touch this component and you will find yourself on the way to Belarus. Stay clear of it and we will keep drifting between two options.
Hence the answer appears to the question born of the opposition camp, which we will formulate as follows: THESIS 4. Is it possible to cooperate with this regime? We must be interested in making those in power respond using a more civilized vocabulary and methods. To this end, Russian and Ukrainian history demonstrates an interesting phenomenon, the more distance the regime puts between itself and all those partocrats, the sooner it starts using force to defend itself. Kravchuk and Gorbachev surrendered their office without using force because they were inwardly afraid that they, being at the highest echelon of party power, would be accused of all conceivable sins. Yeltsin ordered the parliament assaulted when his seat became shaky. All subsequent democrats will protect their power even more intensively. In other words, the paradox consists in the following THESIS 5: The more democratic those in power within the CIS get, the more willing they are to resort to force to protect themselves once their seats become shaky.
No less importantly, this confrontation is taking place entirely in the heads of a narrow circle of politicians. This conflict is nonexistent anywhere else, especially in the regions. People living there are struggling to survive, not for political portfolios. THESIS 6: The plane of the conflict is abysmally far from the people which has its own problems entirely different from those facing the politicians. The conflict replaced all talk about meager and late pay. Everybody started talking about the freedom of expression. Yet this sore point is not for our society, not for the man in the street with just three hryvnias to his name to last him until his next pay packet.
Interestingly, Lviv rather than Kyiv students are being used as cannon fodder by the organizing committee. This is also dangerous and points to a growing misunderstanding between various regions of Ukraine. Incidentally, Western Ukraine voted for Kuchma, not Kyiv. So first they elect the president and then disown their choice, betraying a degree of childishness in their political conduct.
The war has been declared, yet the warring sides are still sizing up each other, trying on their suits of armor. Of course, each assumes it is stronger than the enemy. Without doubt, each feels more legitimate than the other. Yet while approaching the warpath, it is worth considering the consequences. We are far from sure that both the regime and opposition were that accurate in their victorious estimations. The situation is always richer than the plans imposed on it. More often than not we get the opposite result; we are eager to accomplish something, yet the outcome proves altogether different. So who is to be held responsible for that different outcome? In fact, over the past ten years we have most often received results opposite to those we expected. One is reminded of Chernomyrdin’s phrase, “We wanted to make it better, but it turned out like always.”
THESIS 7: A conflict is never as horrible as it seems. It is not the conflict that proves wrong but the method we adopt to get out of it. Various options of negotiations should be the basis on which to find a way out of the situation. Such negotiations may bring this country face to face with new realities and develop more democratic traits. After all, we must build a country rather than stage fisticuffs by way of opposition. It is not negotiations but forceful confrontation that will drive Western and Eastern Ukraine apart, regardless of whether we emerge triumphant, because the eastern regions are becoming increasingly irritated. They are ready to bring their one hundred thousand protesters to Kyiv at any time.
The opposition must think and realize that this geographical divergence of interests is the most dangerous aspect today. An outburst coming from the eastern regions is far more complex than any in western territories, because the number of people involved would differ by a whole order of magnitude. Over the past decade the eastern regions have had more negative emotions than the western one, even if because the western regions gained from the changes they dictated.
Negotiations are always difficult. It was easier for Yeltsin to order Chechnya shelled than sit at a round table. Negotiations are difficult not only psychologically, but also intellectually. One must be better prepared, smarter, and stronger than the enemy. One must learn to retreat and not only to advance. Most importantly, one must learn to win not just a battle but the whole campaign. So far nobody seems to be thinking along these lines.
