Craving undue titles is perhaps inherent in most of those in power in this country. This author has voiced his indignation over the self-styled governors being actually heads of regional state administrations. Legally there are no governors in Ukraine and those ranking officials might as well call themselves barons. Appropriating unofficial titles is not as innocent as it might seem. Thus, the leadership of the For a United Ukraine fraction publicly requested that they not be referred to or addressed collectively as ZaYedU [abbreviation for Za Yedynu Ukrayinu but actually meaning For Food in Russian], even less as Yeda [Russian for food] Obviously they do not like the acronym, a journalistic invention, and its variants. Remarkably, no one has protested the governors.
The current Verkhovna Rada’s neologism is “winners of the elections,” a status appropriated by the Yushchenko bloc. They never miss an opportunity to say that they are the winners, stressing that their rights in parliament are being ignored, that the electorate’s will, by which these people-elects found themselves in parliament, is being distorted. The demagogic thesis about winner status was obediently picked up by some media outlets, especially those taking orders from outside Ukraine. The question of who is actually distorting the electorate’s will and how is worth being considered at greater depth.
First aspect: Technologies. It does not take a Ph.D. in political science to see that the OU deputies are no winners. What we have instead is the usual kind of misrepresentation, such that a separate fact is raised to the level of generalization. Indeed, the Yushchenko bloc got ahead of the other parties, collecting a plurality of votes using party rosters. But even if we followed a completely proportional representation pattern, the OU percentage would not guarantee its victory, for it took far less than 50% of the votes. Likewise is their surprise at fewer Yushchenko people passing muster in the territorial constituencies than by party lists. The reason is perhaps not so much the election committees’ wheeling and dealing as that people cast their votes by lists for Viktor Yushchenko, having no detailed information about the “classified ” candidates lower down on the lists. Otherwise the bloc would not have collected even that many votes.
Our Ukraine showed practically the same results as the Communists back in 1998. Symonenko’s party could likewise call itself the winner and claim leading posts in parliament. They did just that, together with their situational allies. Then came the velvet revolution and the Left was relieved of all its portfolios. Yet no one shouted about the winners’ violated rights and ignoring the electorate’s will. A majority was formed, including today’s “winners” from the Rukh successors, PRP, and other OU components. They divided the Communist- Socialist portfolios among themselves with relish, and even showed a rather effective performance for almost half a year.
Now about the electorate’s will. So as to effectively implement their electorate’s will, the Yushchenko bloc (then consisting of 120 people’s deputies) had only to choose the right allies to form a parliamentary majority. I doubt that there was a single voter in Western Ukraine wishing Yushchenko to side with the Communists. As it was, Our Ukraine failed to build a normal alliance with other like- minded political parties. We all know why and what the consequences were. This, however, is not so much the point today as are the principles, by which Viktor Yushchenko has been choosing parliamentary coalition partners. A more unnatural alliance (albeit temporary) than the one between Our Ukraine and the Communist Party could not have been conceived. What could make the two open political antagonists combine efforts? How will the Communists explain siding with the Rukh members to their electorates or the Rukh members to theirs?
We have already been through this. Back in the memorable year, 1991, Rukh embraced its erstwhile opponents from the Group of 239, receiving in return a bit of power and forever losing the democratic electorate’s support. Rukh’s further split was caused not so much by inner divergence as by struggle for that little bit of power.
This time the Rukh leaders remained silent, backing the Yushchenko party roster including quite a few ideological antagonists. This was explained by the need to “unite for the sake of Ukraine.” Somehow no one bothered to explain why it was possible to unite with Liberal Volodymyr Shcherban or with recent SDPU(o) member Petro Poroshenko; why it was simply necessary to unite with former People’s Democrat and presidential representative Roman Bezsmertny; or why it was impossible to unite with the current representatives of NDP, SDPU(o), and other centrist parties. Any OU member attempting to do so during the speaker saga would have faced political anathema. This tactic on the part of the OU leader resulted in strengthening the Communists in the parliament. And this was at a time when the election turnout offered an actual opportunity to form a market-oriented majority, without any more velvet revolutions. Under the circumstances, all talk about Yushchenko being Western-minded sounds ludicrous. His conduct cannot be explained by political logic. Banal struggle for power is quite another matter.
Viktor Yushchenko opposed the United Ukrainians not because of significant ideological differences. Rather to the contrary – because that faction, just like Yushchenko’s, wanted to form a parliamentary majority and become its nucleus.
Experience is the best teacher. The Verkhovna Rada leadership’s utter fiasco during the elections taught the OU “winners” many things. The tone of their public appearances noticeably changed: less ultimatums and more constructive cooperation proposals. This could even help a number of OU members get seats on parliamentary committees. Most of these posts will flatter their vanity, entitling them to an office and a car – and the self-styled “winners” are beginning to accept this option. Yet even here the electorate will have questions to ask. If the unnatural Four proposes a Communist as the agrarian committee chairman (and the Communists are known to resolutely reject the very idea of private land ownership), what kind of land reform will the Yushchenko people be able to discuss with their supporters? What values will they talk about, especially before Western Ukrainian constituencies, considering that the “package bloc” with the Communists took place against the background of the “unifying” CPU convention, whereupon the party might well become the “legal successor” to the Soviet Communist Party’s property and crimes?
Most likely, Yushchenko’s clever image-makers will refer his inconsistent and sometimes plainly garbled acts at the Verkhovna Rada to “contingencies.” All these factions and committees make an ordinary voter’s head spin. Party leaders, being members of Our Ukraine, are quite another matter. As was to be expected, the issue of forming a single party based on the Yushchenko bloc has dissolved – as is the much advertised unification of the Rukh splinters. Without a leader of Yushchenko’s caliber this unity makes no sense, leaving both Rukh successors to struggle for survival. Although they will not rank lower than the current status of Yaroslava Stetsko’s Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, there are actually no prospects of getting any higher.
Therefore, the current status of the self-styled “winners of the elections” will not last long. After the OU-Communist joint exercise no one will reproach a nationally conscious lawmaker for quitting the fraction or refusing to carry out all its instructions. Some of the 1998 Communist “winners” and their 2002 Yushchenko counterparts have already parted company and launched solo power plays, leaving the “winners” to await the fruit of their victory that may well never ripen. In fact, there should be no hurt feelings. Nothing would have happened but for making unnatural alliances and jumping the gun, shouting about victory and assuming undue titles. Unlike realistic positions, self-assumed titles do not often help and sometimes even hinder.
INCIDENTALLY
The ideologically unnatural conduct of the Communist Party and Yushchenko bloc in parliament is already having an impact on public opinion. Certain proof is found in a poll conducted by the Razumkov Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Research in all regions of Ukraine on May 21-28. When asked about the opposition parties and blocs in parliament. 47.5% of 2,015 respondents pointed to the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc; 46.4% to the Communist Party, and 33.7% to the Socialist Party of Ukraine. As for Our Ukraine, the respondents’ views divided: 33% said it was opposition; 33.6% believed it was not in opposition, and 33.4% were not sure, reports Interfax Ukraine. “People do not understand what the Yushchenko bloc is actually all about,” noted center President Anatoly Hrytsenko.
It is possible, however, that this being “different from the rest” is the Yushchenko image-makers’ key stratagem. The question is whether the electorate will buy it for the next two years.
