On the crest of the second wave of NATO expansion, the issue of Ukrainian cooperation with Central European countries is coming into ever sharper focus. The Ukrainian political leadership made it clear they are willing to join the North Atlantic alliance, but this will take a great deal of painstaking arrangements and call for an active progressive policy. Naturally, many years of Kyiv-Brussels effective cooperation will have a definite positive effect, but once again, winning admission to a world body gradually turning into a bulwark of peace and stability on both sides of the ocean cannot be accomplished without making adequate arrangements. Stepping up Ukrainian-Central-European relations rests on a certain pragmatic footing. First, this is how Ukraine will be able to join NATO without breaching any established procedures — as has been the case with some of the neophytes. Second, another iron curtain would be less likely to appear on Ukraine’s western borders.
Obviously, this country should not venture any substantial changes in its strategy of relations with the participants in the first and second NATO expansion efforts. The very fact that the alliance is composed of countries enjoying equal rights, with all decisions made by consensus, demands that official Kyiv set a clear and active Central European political course. Being a venue of influence in the post-Soviet space, Kyiv stands a fair chance of enhancing its role on the European arena at large.
There are several key aspects to Ukrainian-Central-European relationships. After the Warsaw Pact and the socialist camp fell apart, the Central European countries set a course toward integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Quite effective economic and political reforms were carried out, and the living standard rose considerably. Determined to rid themselves of all remnants of Soviet influence, these countries reduced their economic and political contacts with the former Soviet republics to a minimum. But then globalization and the process of forming an all-European space forced Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest to revise many of their Eastern European political tenets.
It may be said without exaggeration that Ukraine is a major CIS partner for the Central European states. This partnership is made all the more transparent and promising in that Ukraine has clearly set its course on European integration, that it faces similar domestic problems, and that it can be used as a propagator of Central European interests in the post-Soviet theater of operations. Kyiv, in turn, strives to share Central European experience and in every way possible support their its political initiatives.
Considering that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are NATO members, and in the aftermath of NATO operations in [the former] Yugoslavia, there is every reason to expect their foreign policies to be Brussels— and Washington-oriented, and in many respects adjusted to instructions being issued from there. In other words, a host of matters heretofore decided on a bilateral basis — in terms of military and national security policies — will be largely withdrawn from that sphere and placed on the Ukraine-NATO plane. This has become evident, among other things, in the sphere of military and technical cooperation. Central European countries have much Soviet arms in their arsenals and Ukraine has a developed network of military repair facilities. The need to cooperate in upgrading such Soviet materiel would be apparent, except that political expediency is getting the better of economic considerations in Central Europe. As it is, military cooperation contracts with Ukraine can be counted on the fingers of one hand. This country wants to become a member of the European Union, the sooner the better, meaning that it must conduct an increasingly active dialog with both the Central European countries and EU, so as to avoid problems with integration in such bilateral relations.
Unfortunately, one must admit that there are currently irreconcilable differences between the power elite of Ukraine and its Central European counterparts. While the Ukrainian elite was formed mostly from among those wielding power under the Soviets, in Central Europe this elite took shape composed mostly of young politicians. This new wave makes it possible for these countries to view the realities of European politics from a different, more radical perspective. The Central European countries are well aware of the danger of finding themselves between Russian hammer and US anvil, so they are making every effort to speed their integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. As for Ukraine, it has had no such risks to take or decisions to make, until recently.
Ukraine’s military-technological cooperation has been markedly effective with Poland. Both countries are a case study in historical reconciliation after hundreds of years of rather strained relations. Our countries emerge as a single front in shaping the new architecture of European security. In this sense, the Ukrainian-Polish KFOR battalion stationed on the Kosovo-Macedonian frontier since July 2000 is a unique combat unit. The Ukrainian and Polish officers and men are there to secure observance of the accords between the Yugoslav and Macedonian governments and Albanian guerrillas. Ukrainian-Polish cooperation is so effective that the defense ministries are considering the possibility of reorganizing the peacekeeping battalion as a brigade. The unit is also likely to be attached to the European quick deployment contingent. Such cooperation with a NATO country is very useful to the Ukrainian military.
Another aspect should be singled out. Poland is part of the Weimar Triangle, with Germany and France, claiming the status of the strategic axis upholding the security of the Old World. Cooperation with Kyiv allows it to extend this axis to the post-Soviet theater, so Ukraine could take certain measures and have a stronger impetus on international relations in Eastern Europe. In addition, Great Britain is a commander of the Ukrpolbalt, which is evidence of NATO’s keen interest in this new form of military-political cooperation.
Ukrainian-Hungarian military cooperation is of a somewhat different nature. In addition to joint measures in air defenses and military training, both countries, jointly with Slovakia and Romania, organized the Tisza Field Engineers Battalion. This international military unit’s principal mission is combating calamities like floods in Zakarpattia [Transcarpathia]. The battalion’s first paper battle took place in May 2002. Regrettably, the ecological status of the Transcarpathian region of Europe does not make it possible to rely such training as the only form of cooperation. Most likely, the battalion will face its baptism of fire already this fall.
The emphasis on the military-technological cooperation between Ukraine and the Czech Republic is on joint efforts to find customers to modernize Soviet-made weapon systems. Both countries operate a large number of suitable military production and repair facilities. The problem of seeking commissions and upholding international cooperation remains the top priority in this bilateral relationship. The Czech leadership in every way supports Ukraine’s determination to integrate into European structures.
Ukraine’s cooperation with Central European countries has very good prospects, and not only in the military-political sphere. Precisely this aspect might make it possible to form a venue of stability in NATO’s border territories, preventing the appearance of artificial barriers in Ukraine’s way toward European institutions. Pursuing this bilateral cooperation, the Ukrainian leadership is laying reliable foundations for the implementation of their own foreign political plans.
