Many in Ukraine do not believe that the next presidential campaign will take place next year. Why? Below People’s Deputy Oleksandr VOLKOV shares his views on the third Verkhovna Rada session and presidential elections.
Issues relating to the political reform, Ukrainian politics and political analysts are regarded as being closely associated with the next presidential campaign. Recently, voices have been heard increasingly often, saying that the current head of state will prolong his term of office, this being one of the possible consequences of the political reform. How realistic does this scenario look to you?
Volkov: I think that the question of extending the term of presidency has a right to exist. There are enough indicators to predict that the political reform won’t be carried out in Ukraine before the end of 2004. This country is already plunging into the presidential campaign, with the key players of the political game having too many problems to cope with to bother with any reforms. If we really want this political reform, it stands to logic to extend the term of office of the incumbent president until the year 2007 by introducing a [constitutional] clause saying all elections are to be held once every five years. In other words, the parliament and local authorities would have a year added to their term of office and the president would have three years. In that case our political reform would have a realistic chance.
President Leonid Kuchma has declared on more than one occasion that he doesn’t want a third term. However, the possibility continues to be discussed — and not only by the opposition demonstrating their distrust of the head of state. What do you think?
Volkov: It’s true that Mr. Kuchma has repeatedly said he doesn’t want a third term. However, the point is not his willing or being reluctant to accept that additional term of office, but actually winning it. Personally, I don’t see any legal obstacles here, and I said so on the second or third day following the 1999 presidential campaign’s turnout. Our Constitution was adopted in 1996 and Leonid Kuchma was first elected president in 1994. So we have the Fundamental Law and we all know that it isn’t retroactive.
The third Verkhovna Rada session of the fourth convocation is practically over. How would you sum up its results?
Volkov: Nothing one could describe as having crucial significance for Ukraine. Moreover, despite the Herculean efforts by Speaker Lytvyn and his deputies, both the majority and minority deputies demonstrated the parliament’s apparent inability to make political decisions. Our highest legislative body is dominated by political ambitions rather than common sense — and there is all that deadweight of countless badly needed bills still to be passed, but Verkhovna Rada isn’t taking them up. We have all this and are taking a vacation. I think that what’s likely to happen afterward will largely depend on the struggle for power. In a word, 2004 will see a very expensive prize for the winner.
Ukrainian political life seems to have taken a rather tranquil course recently; no regime-opposition confrontations or conspicuous conflicts within either of the camps. And there seems to be fewer encounters at the upper echelons of power. Is this really the case or are all such conflicts simply being kept out of the public eye?
Volkov: I think that, even if there are any such confrontations, they’re grossly overstated by the media. I’m also convinced that, once the presidential campaign picks up momentum, the presidential camp will do its best to smooth over the rough edges. My own team has assessed the chances of different presidential candidates for the year 2004. We also did so a year before the 1999 elections and then the turnout proved we were right by 1-1.5%. We expect Communist leader Petro Symonenko to collect some 5.2-5.5 million votes in the first round; Natalia Vitrenko — if and when — will have 0.8-1 million, along with 0.5 million votes courtesy of the electorate still not on record. Of the Right opposition, Viktor Yushchenko will get 6.5-7 million votes, and Yulia Tymoshenko, if she decides to stay in the game, will collect between 1.5 and 5 million votes. The intrigue will consist in the positioning of the regime; it will all depend on how they act during the election campaign. Here I would single out two likely scenarios in the second round. If the regime puts forward two candidates, each will have a no chance to make it to the second tour, meaning that Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Symonenko will end up in the runoff, and that Yushchenko will beat Symonenko by a 3.5-4 million margin. In that case Viktor Yushchenko will become president. The other scenario reads that the party in power will come out with a single candidate, collecting about as many votes as Viktor Yushchenko in the first round (6.5- 7 million), meaning that candidate and Viktor Yushchenko would vie in the second round. Our estimates show that the party-in-power candidate is likely to win 12-14 million votes and Yushchenko will have to make do with 11-13 million. What will happen next is impossible to predict at this stage. One thing is very likely; given this situation, Viktor Yushchenko will face a formidable rival, meaning that the current regime will stand a real chance of winning the campaign. The obvious inference is that those wielding power are doomed to forget their differences and unite, otherwise they’re sure to end up on the losing side.
Experts believe that a very sizable part of the Ukrainian economy is already owned by Russian capital. Aren’t you worried that Russian oligarchs will be soon in a position to dictate their policy to Ukraine?
Volkov: I’ve always been surprised to hear about Western capital [in Ukraine] being referred to as investments and about Russian capital being described as expansion, intervention, and suchlike, every such term having a definite negative meaning. I think that the most important thing is, first, to have this process underway in a legitimate manner, and second, controlled by the state. The more money flows into Ukraine, the better for this country and its people. Look at the Chelsea Club stocks soaring after it was bought by Chukotka Governor Abramovich. If Russian capital can have the same effect on Ukrainian businesses, I really don’t see what’s wrong with that. As it is, whenever someone in Russia tries to invest in our economy we cry out that this is suppression. Who needs us? Russia doesn’t know how to feed itself. Why should it need another fifty million to take care of? This is just stupid!
So you wouldn’t complain about Russian oligarchs running the show in Ukraine?
Volkov: Not at all, I’d say go right ahead — if you can. At least there would be someone running the show here, assuming that our people can’t measure up. However, observing the rules of the game is the main thing. I mean they’d have to operate in keeping with our legislation.
Ukraine has made it perfectly clear that it intends to join the WTO, and eventually the European Union. Does this mean that the Ukrainian economy will have to play by the new rules? Is Ukrainian business prepared to do so?
Volkov: Ukrainian capital will end up out of play unless it accepts Europe’s and the world’s rules of the game. Another thing is that, should we join the WTO and EU, we’d have to act very tough to protect our own interests. In other words, Ukraine would have to do its best to take part in setting the rules, rather than just signing or refusing to sign various documents. We must make every effort to become an equal partner with the West.
Not so long ago we all witnessed pitched battles in the parliament, focused on the chairmanship of the State Property Fund. Do you think the property allocation process has ended in Ukraine?
Volkov: Property ownership is an issue calling for rigid legal regulation, something we don’t have. Here is a simple example. We passed that law on farming, allowing private farms to buy and own plots. It also says that plots thus acquired cannot be taken away other than when it serves the national interests. What does this mean? It means that someone buys a parcel of land, cultivates it and makes improvements, investing a lot of money and energy. Then the state (actually meaning the local bureaucracy, some of them plain fools) tells him to get off that plot. Is that the right approach? Of course, not. Yet the situation is precisely like this, legally speaking. Normally, the state should pay to have one’s plot if the state actually needs it. I buy a plot and then the state wants to build a highway crossing my property. Why not? We can have a deal if the state pays enough. As it is, no one will ask your permission to use your property for the sake of those so-called national interests. They’ll simply give you an official document saying you have to get off your plot, period. Then they’ll have a bulldozer that’ll make short work of your land improvements... In other words, all that property redistribution and reprivatization results from flaws in our legislation. We must have an adequate legal framework, so no bureaucrats will feel free to act as however they want. If and when we have this, we’ll have plenty of foreign investment and people will come with their money and put it to good use.
