At this time, the status of Cossack Ukraine was a crucial point in the relations between Muscovy and the Crimea. Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich’s envoys Zherebtsov and Titov demanded that the Crimean leadership recognize the legitimacy of the Treaty of Pereyaslav on the incorporation of Ukrainian lands into Muscovy. This sparked a bitter argument about the use of the tsar’s new titles, on which official Moscow was insisting. In particular, this debate centered on whether to title Moscow Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich as “by the grace of God, the great monarch, tsar, and grand prince; autocrat of All Great, Little, and White Russias and many eastern and western states, the ruler, father and grandfather of northern lands...” During their mission in the Crimea the Moscow envoys emphasized that some European rulers, including Austrian Emperor Ferdinand III, had already recognized this tsarist title. It may be assumed, however, that the emperor simply did not know what “Little Russia” meant, and the emperor chose to make concessions to the tsar because he wanted to reconcile the ruler of Muscovy with the Polish king. Naturally, this triggered an extremely negative reaction from the Crimea. Qalga Ghazi-Girei said to the Moscow envoys, “You say your monarch rules the whole world, but there are other states in the east, west and north, too. Moscow’s previous tsars never boasted of such things because this is ungodly and untrue.” Still harsher was the reaction of Khan Mehmet Girei: “Where is Moscow, where is the east, where is the west? Are there not many other great rulers and states between the east and the west? You know this full well and should not have written that you are the father and grandfather of the universe, for it is indecent and improper to say things like that.”
The Muscovite envoys maintained that the demand to use these titles was justified by actual territorial changes: Moscow had conquered a number of new lands, including parts of the Lithuanian Duchy and the Polish Kingdom. Despite this, the Crimean khan refused to recognize the proposed tsarist titles and, hence, the position to which Moscow was laying claim. In reply to Moscow’s arguments, the khan’s officials said that “our tsars do not brag, nor do they write bragging letters to other states. Our ruler Islam-Girei has fought against 600 cities and has never bragged about this to your monarch or written letters of self-praise to any other state.”
The new tsarist titles were interpreted as Moscow’s claim to being regarded as a new global empire, as well as an explicit threat to gain new territorial acquisitions, which became especially evident after the signing of the 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav with Muscovy. Naturally, in these circumstances the Crimea could not help being hostile toward Moscow’s pretensions. Moscow was also planning at this time not only to strengthen its grip on Ukraine and Belarus but also expand its influence to the Balkans. The Moscow leadership cherished a dream of turning its state into a united Orthodox empire. It was in the Balkans and the Danubian basin that the interests of Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire bitterly clashed. So it cannot be ruled out that Istanbul, too, goaded the Crimean rulers into taking a firm stand against Moscow. Naturally, the khan had no intentions of losing his clout in the Ukrainian lands. Therefore, contrary to Muscovy’s representatives, it was out of the question for the Crimean leadership to recognize Muscovy’s annexation of Cossack Ukraine.
In response to Moscow’s political initiatives in 1654-1656, Crimean officials concentrated their political efforts on two areas. Firstly, in their polemics with the Muscovite envoys, they always argued that tsarist claims to Ukraine were groundless. They claimed, for example, that “the Cossacks were slaves of the Crimean, not the Muscovite, tsar.” Secondly, the Crimea tried to coax Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky into severing the agreement with Muscovy. Quite illustrative in this context is the meeting that took place between Khan Islam-Girei and the hetman’s envoy Semen Savelyev on April 29, 1654. The khan was so resentful of Ukraine’s actions that he even struck the envoy and reproached him, saying “At first your hetman and all the Zaporozhian Cossacks concluded a friendship with me, and now the Cossacks are under the tsar’s hand.” He also sent a delegation headed by Tokhtamysh to the hetman in order to win Khmelnytsky over to the old “brotherhood.” The Crimean side toyed with the idea of a joint military action against Moscow, involving the Crimea, the Cossack Army, Poland, and the Moldavian principalities.
The attitudes of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s government showed that Bakhchisarai’s hopes were not unrealistic. Although the hetman kept emphasizing, especially in 1654 and early 1655, his loyalty to the oath he had given to the tsar, calling himself “Hetman of His Tsarist Majesty’s Zaporozhian Army,” and “obedient servant and subject” of the tsar, at the same time he never stopped pursuing what is now called a multi-vector policy, i.e., to implement the idea of collective vassalage.
The question of titles deserves more attention. An analysis of titles offers important information on the changes that were taking place in interstate relations during this period. For example, the hetman’s messages assume new, characteristic features in mid-1655 against the backdrop of nascent misunderstandings and contradictions in the relations between Chyhyryn and Muscovy. On the one hand, Khmelnytsky increased his correspondence with such European potentates as the Swedish king, the Turkish sultan, and the Danubian princes, thus attesting to the hetman’s search for a counterweight to Moscow. On the other hand, the hetman’s letters to the rulers of those countries are devoid of such titles as “Hetman of His Tsarist Majesty’s Zaporozhian Army.” Instead, Khmelnytsky signs himself as the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army.
Quite illustrative is the Ukrainian hetman’s letter to Turkish Sultan Mohammed in late November and early December 1655: “Oh, mightiest and most radiant Turkish sultan whom all states fear! Our kind and great master, we bow in great respect to your exalted throne and pray to the merciful Lord for you as your loyal slaves...All our troops are going to serve your grace.” He wrote this at a time when Moscow claimed it had established full and eternal control over Ukraine. It should be noted that the terminology that Khmelnytsky uses here in no way shows that he harbors any slavish feelings towards the sultan and his power. These were polite expressions of courtesy commonly used at the vassal-suzerain level. Moreover, whenever it was necessary, the Ukrainian hetman could sound firm and unyielding. For instance, in response to Islam-Girei’s accusation of treason, Khmelnytsky reassures him that he had never abandoned the old friendship but at the same time upbraids the Crimean ruler in rather harsh terms for beating up the hetman’s envoy: “You in fact slapped me, not him. And you must know that you will have to pay as soon as possible for the bread you received. If you don’t send me your official envoys soon, I will soon send 30,000 warriors by boat to the Crimea and will lead an army across the steppe. And you will never know from what side you must defend yourself.”
The first years after the signing of the Treaty of Pereyaslav were marked by a fierce diplomatic struggle to recognize the legal force of this act. Russia was very active in this respect. At the same time, practically all the interested parties — Muscovy, Cossack Ukraine, and the Crimean Khanate — had entirely different interpretations of the essence of this treaty.
