What are Ukraine’s national interests and how is one to defend them in the severe competition of geopolitical alliances, given a variety of scenarios? Several weeks ago, The Day wrote about a debate on the subject, involving Ukrainian lawmakers. This time we offer the reader expert views on the Ukrainian scenario, in the aftermath of Russia’s parliamentary elections and events following the elections in Georgia. The guests at this round table are The Day’s regular authors and experts: Yevhen Holovakha, Ph.D. in philosophy and deputy director of the Ukrainian National Academy’s Institute of Sociology; Oleksandr Yaremenko, Director of Ukrainian Institute for Sociology; and Andriy Yermolaiev, Director of the Sophia Social Research Center.
RUSSIA HAS FOLLOWED IN UKRAINE’S FOOTSTEPS
Are there any changes in public and expert opinions, in view of recent events and under the new circumstances? How are we supposed to act in this new political capacity? Ukraine appears to have far-reaching plans: EU membership and integration into NATO. What is actually happening? How can the situations in Russia and Georgia affect the Ukrainian attitude to this country’s prospects? What are Ukraine’s interests?
Oleksandr YAREMENKO: I believe that the proverbial Ukrainian man in the street does not care much for any of these problems, for they are somewhere outside his country. On the other hand, when something happens that has an impact on Ukraine, people are spurred to action; certain ideas and concepts are worked out, certain steps are taken. Our latest poll demonstrates that the Ukrainian public was strongly affected by the Tuzla crisis, showing a higher degree of public activity and a greater interest in the political process. Compared to 2002, we registered an increase in respondents closely following political events (+6%) and those watching and hearing news off and on (+4%). Tuzla was one of few examples when the political situation gave an impetus to patriotic sentiments, with people making unequivocal statements on the subject. Everything else happens outside public opinion. However, Tuzla demonstrated that practically every Ukrainian feels responsible for the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
As for the impact of events in Russia and Georgia on the situation in Ukraine, one ought to remember that the matter is somewhat theoretical, an opportunity to discuss what would happen in Ukraine in a situation like that. The Russian elections present one of a few examples showing that Ukraine is ahead of Russia, as our last year’s electoral model appears to have been projected on Russia, even if in a more distinct mode. In other words, Russia appears to have followed in Ukraine’s footsteps.
Can we say that the political elite is acting in a united manner? Why is the number of European choice supporters increasing so slowly?
Andriy YERMOLAIEV: Before we discuss the final choice made by our public opinion, it is necessary to determine precisely what we have in mind when assessing this or that choice. The way I see it, our foreign policy choice depends on moods, associative concepts of some common interests or another. Here the choice is made at the emotional level, [in the context of] a social mass myth; it is not rationally argumented. An average voter, while filling in his ballot, is not likely to explain the situation that has developed — I mean his attitude toward Russia, NATO, and so on.
Simultaneously, talking about decisions made at the highest level and views expressed by our political elite, we have in mind not their emotions, but their knowledge, stands, and interests, which they are supposed to be able to theoretically substantiate and defend. Here lies the principal distinction. On the one hand, we have sporadic public moods that can’t be quickly changed. On the other hand, they constantly reflect the stand taken by certain elite groups; this stand is mostly caused by conjuncture, often depending on the pragmatism of such decisions.
Unfortunately, in both cases we are faced with an ambiguous situation. This society should not be blamed for those in power failing to work out clear guidelines over the past twelve years. Our elite groups, present at the legislative and executive levels, as well as those remaining in the shadows — what we know as business groups — turns out heavily dependent on the political conjuncture. Nor is it coincidental that political business appears increasingly topical. In other words, everything depends on the situation among those who wield power. The government’s official stand, the impact of external factors forces our elite constantly to alter their guidelines in terms of their foreign policy course and priorities. In the domestic public eye, such changes appear to be the result of inconsistency, lacking a clearly defined stand and even final social choice.
On the one hand, we have a rather stable social picture. Some might find it unattractive simply because it lacks clarity. Half of all Ukrainians are Russian-minded, regardless of what kind of Ukrainian-Russian cooperation they are offered; the other half wants European integration.
As for the national elite, the last three years have shown that their personal, business, and shadow-economy dependence on the northern neighbor is by far greater than their desire to move westward, regardless of the values involved. It was paradoxical when the elite signed the SES agreement after forming the parliamentary majority and setting forth priorities for the new coalition government. It was evidence of a conceptual crisis within the elite. The elite was losing its critical attitude to its own efforts; now acting in keeping with the political conjuncture appeared more important than adopting a clear-cut foreign political stand, it being a guarantee of progress
Ukraine needs creative ideas to make the best of its new capacity. Who do you think could come up with such ideas?
YAREMENKO: Constantly changing rules of the game is one of the problems. Mind you, everybody wants such changes, including our oligarchs. It’s a system rather than an attempt to have more time to go through the motions of doing something, because there are no decisions on which way Ukraine should go in its evolution. The big question remains open: Where is Ukraine going and what are we trying to build? I might agree that the oligarchs have a quite strong influence in this sense, but this influence has everything to do with economic interests. Politics, however, must rely on feedback, producing an impact on the situation. Unless we find answers to these crucial questions, we may find ourselves faced with an uncontrollable process.
YERMOLAIEV: The oligarchs cannot possible beget creative ideas. They are slaves to their cause. Something could happen probably only after a revolution among the hired political managers.
YAREMENKO: Then why shouldn’t our oligarchs hire political managers capable of producing creative ideas? Simply because the kind of ideas that we find prevalent in our society cannot be described as creative. The idea of changing the form of government does mean solving the problem.
Yevhen HOLOVAKHA: I suggest that we adopt a more serious attitude toward the issue. It is really a crucial one. If and when we manage to carry out the political reform, the presidential elections will lose their relevance — and this would be a symbolic occurrence, in many respects. In other words, we would then have a single scenario to play out. However, if we cannot agree on political reform, the elections will prove a turning point in the development of Ukraine for the next decade, perhaps even longer. I have long supported the idea of a presidential-parliamentary republic, believing that our unstable situation, with the economy on a downward curve, has not made it possible to discard the authoritarian levers of control. This follows from the social psychology law; when a team is in a breakthrough, it must be kept under authoritarian control; when the team gets stable, it must by ruled by a democratic leader. Now I am inclined to support the parliamentary model, because the unpredictable turnout of the presidential elections constitutes a greater threat for Ukraine (imagine what would happen if we had a Ukrainian Putin as the next president, who would want to reshape this state after his own image) than whatever losses this country would have to sustain in becoming a parliamentary republic .
THE PEOPLE WANTS A STRONG PRESIDENT AND STRONG PARLIAMENT
We had previously to choose the lesser of two evils, now we have to choose between two horrors. Does it mean that we are following a logical trend in our evolution?
YERMOLAIEV: I agree that our political reform is in a way that Rubicon we will have to cross. But we also have a number of other problems affecting the destiny and visage of Ukrainian society, as people will then have to elect those wielding power within a new political system. Among those problems I would mention the new status of local self- government, the new stand to be adopted by social institutions such as local self-government and territorial community leaders. After all, we have Soviet people living in towns and villages, not in territorial communities. Add here the housing- municipal management problem and that of small-scale local self-government (I mean all those housing committees and so on). And, of course, the land reform comes first. President Leonid Kuchma said not so long ago that his Russian counterpart Putin would have to make unpopular decisions, for he needed power. Granted. What about Ukraine? We need such unpopular decisions now, because no one is sure who will be there to govern a parliamentary republic. Those in control of television channels, newspapers, being in a position to manipulate the government without carrying out any such reforms and currently fighting for power, may well turn that parliamentary republic into a kind of fetish. Here lies the gravest danger for Ukraine. Now try to imagine what would happen if Ukrainian society, disillusioned about democratic values, would likewise feel dissatisfied with the new political model. This would mean a disastrous setback in terms of social progress. New leaders would appear, whom I wouldn’t want even to discuss. Well, I guess our sociologists have better answers to these questions.
HOLOVAKHA: In other words, you believe that we don’t need that reform?
YERMOLAIEV: No, I believe that we need a new package of reforms. I mean that we must make a number of radical decisions during the calendar year, with regard to changing the political system as well as the whole social basis on which this reform will rest; I mean a civil society.
Who do you expect to accomplish all this?
YERMOLAIEV: The legislature and the executive. In this case the president, remaining he number-one VIP, cannot serve as a locomotive.
YAREMENKO: One ought to bear in mind our people’s mentality, their desire to have a strong figure as head of state. Our polls show that the population wants a strong president as well as a strong parliament. This attitude is understandable under the circumstances. Our economic situation is not good enough for us not to wish to have a strong personality capable of putting Ukraine in order. Even though we have our parliamentary majority acting in agreement with the cabinet, the presidential influence remains a powerful factor in the development of the Ukrainian state. This factor — be it containing, guiding, or undermining — should perhaps be retained. If we change the presidential-parliamentary form of government for the parliamentary-presidential one, my question is, Who will act as the consolidating force? Our parties? If so, which ones and how? Considering that they are not showing any consolidating trends.
HOLOVAKHA: Remember the dynamics of Ukrainian development in 1994-98? It was a total fiasco. Strange as it may seem, during his second term President Kuchma implemented the few powers he was given and in many ways did consolidate the elite and society, acting as an arbiter. The critical attitude toward the president on the part of certain political forces is evidence that Ukraine still lacks a dominant, despite the rigid course of its evolution. A political dominant constitutes the worst threat for a post-Soviet country. This country can only exist as an authoritarian, totalitarian, or police state. As has been mentioned, our people want a strong leader. I might add that they want someone even tougher than Putin, someone like Stalin. And this desire is present in Russia as well as Ukraine. Ukrainians believe that Putin is the most popular political figure (scoring 6 points on a 10-point ratings scale). Incidentally, our respondents also find Lukashenko quite appealing (over 6 points on that scale).
Larysa IVSHYNA: This also gives one sufficient food for thought. After all, our media are in many ways responsible for the existing public opinion. We have repeatedly tried to ascertain whether the absence of Ukrainian-centrist media indicate discarding any efforts to build a truly national state. What about the public responsibility of those running our television channels? Dr. Holovakha has mentioned crisis and ambivalence. They are dangerous because we exist in a highly competitive environment. Russia is closely cooperating with NATO in the G-20 mode; Russia feels perfectly at home in the civilized world, regardless of how the presidential elections turn out. In many ways Russia is following in US footsteps while learning from Ukrainian historical lessons. The United States recognized the Soviet Union just as Ukraine was in the throes of the Holodomor, with millions dying of starvation. This must prompt us to see our prospects, just in case we find ourselves unable to get rid of that ambivalence.
EUROPEAN UTOPIA NEEDED
HOLOVAKHA: Developing public structures is, of course, the only way to Europe. But then why shouldn’t Ukraine bide its time? We know that we cannot meet [all of] the European community standards.
YAREMENKO: But perhaps there no sense discussing Ukraine’s European choice — or that we should uphold friendly relations with Russia? Perhaps it’s time we forgot all about Ukraine’s inferiority complex. We hear complaints about Ukraine still not being “in Europe.” But we know that Ukraine is geographically in the heart of Europe. We live in an independent state, yet we seem at great pains trying to join some alliances and getting integrated somewhere. Personally, I would like to see Ukraine as a nonbloc state.
HOLOVAKHA: With all due respect, I resolutely object to this assumption. It is true that a small part of the Ukrainian population supports the nonbloc idea. I am strongly opposed to this attitude. Political scientists and members of the elite, getting together to discuss such problems, more often than not seem to overlook a little aspect which nevertheless proves quite important. Namely, the way people live in Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. My opinion remains the same; people in Russia live like swine; people in Ukraine live likewise; people in Europe live the way human beings who respect themselves should. No one will deny this, not after visiting Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. I also believe that our political choice should be in favor of living like civilized fellow people, rather than existing independently — or in union with Russia — and living like swine. That’s the only choice we can make. Why do you think many postsocialist countries (among them Bulgaria and Romania) are eager to become members of the European community of nations, without being overly concerned about their independent modus vivendi? Simply because they have been through all this and they do not want to live like this any longer. Talking of new concepts, I have one in mind: New Europe. We could do it, now that we have Poland, our faithful ally. Let’s face it. Old Europe remains manifestly egotistic, unable even to defend its European values, lifestyle, even its ideology of tolerance. There is only one strong geopolitical force, the United States, actually capable of protecting democracy. It will continue to do so while it has enough energy in store. Europe does not have that energy. A New Europe, with its idea of close contacts with North America, offers a realistic and promising path. We could embark on it and follow it — of course, retaining enough room for maneuver.
YERMOLAIEV: I am convinced that the Ukrainian project is possible only in the European context and perspective. It has no Eurasian future, as Ukraine would only serve as a raw material appendix there. Ukraine, taken separately, appears as a nonsensical entity. It’s like living within a society and trying to pose as totally free from it. Things like that never happen in real life.
YEAR OF CHOICES
Do you think the next year will strengthen Ukraine’s geopolitical choice?
HOLOVAKHA: I have not changed my position; everything will depend on Verkhovna Rada’s resolution next week. Also, I would rather support the parliamentary-presidential model. I consider it most effective for Ukraine’s further evolution.
Would you please specify? Do you think that a parliamentary-presidential republic will secure Ukraine against degrading into authoritarianism? Do you agree that authoritarianism would be the worst choice Ukraine could make?
HOLOVAKHA: Absolutely. This would be the worst possible situation.
After all is said and done, the president of Ukraine has pushed through all those decisions meant to raise this country to a higher level, including our Euro-Atlantic strategy, sending Ukrainian peacekeeping contingents to other countries, and so on. Herculean efforts have been exerted, using that ill- famous administrative resource and acting in so many other ways. Still, such decisions were made. What will happen after Verkhovna Rada becomes the sole decision-maker? Are you sure that our parliament will not pass absolutely odious resolutions, given this new modus operandi?
HOLOVAKHA: There would be considerable risks involved, of course. I believe, however, that the risk of having someone replace the current head of state, who then would spend his first or second year in office to turn this country into a horrible totalitarian replica [of what Ukraine was under the Soviets], seems even more repulsive. We know what happens afterward; we have enough post-Soviet examples to learn from. Yet no one can tell what will happen in 2004.
YAREMENKO: We need this reform. But I think that it will start at a later date.
YERMOLAYEV: It takes cultivating a certain lifestyle, in all spheres and at all levels, to awaken Ukrainian society to the necessity of our European choice. This Ukrainian experiment could become a unique way to have the political and business elites reach a compromise. This reminds me of the Kaniv Four [a promising political project], that was first realized and then discredited. Yet the approach remains quite interesting, first being able to consider a new political design, so as to be able to come to terms in the administrative, business, legislative, and other spheres. The big problems remains that we have our only decision-making research-and-development center concentrated around the president.
What are we supposed to do to use of what we have in a qualitatively new situation? Russia, with its resources and authoritarianism, appears paradoxically capable of making headway. It is effective; it can reach set goals. Ukraine, in its current totally unconsolidated and ambivalent condition, might well be thrown back to feudalism, with all that talk about our European choice.
YERMOLAYEV: Discussing [Ukraine’s] chances would be considerably more difficult without altering the accents in the policy-engineering domain, without allowing all those political managers, as sources of creative ideas, to operate more actively. The trouble with a number of Ukrainian politicians is that they believe that possessing capital and property entitles them to make top-level decisions. Therefore, formally choosing a model is not enough. People capable of making decisions and pondering important issues must be allowed access to politics.
Granted, but such people will be allowed access only when there is the kind of interest we have discussed earlier. What kind of interest does that political majority have? All those people in a position to make crucial decisions affecting Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy? Are they anxious to protect their money while competing severely with all those Russian oligarchs? How will Ukrainian public opinion respond to all this? Most likely, that response would be easily predictable when questioning the conditions in which Ukrainian society would never vote to lose its national sovereignty. No Ukrainian politicians would then dare indulge any backstage intriguing. However, society often does not understand the pros and cons of a given scenario, its likely economic and political consequences, we lack clear-cut guidelines.
YERMOLAYEV: Be that as it may, it is safe to assume that Ukrainocentrism stands a good chance, for this approach appears the only way to oppose the so-called liberal empire scenario.
