It looks as though it will be some time before Kyiv learns to take advantage of opportunities arising from regional or international events, or the favor in which President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, the current president of the EU, holds Ukraine. At one time he even mentioned Ukraine’s “privileged partnership.”
Graphic proof of this attitude was seen at the 12th EU-Ukraine summit held in Paris last Tuesday. The recent events in the Caucasus, specifically the conflict between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia, prompted the EU to pay more attention to Ukraine. Europe’s diplomatic circles are concerned about the possibility of Ukraine becoming Russia’s next victim after Georgia. Before the summit major European newspapers published editorials stressing the need for Brussels to give Kyiv a clear signal concerning its EU membership.
Therefore, it is safe to assume that prior to the Paris summit Ukraine had better foreign political conditions than before the NATO summit in Bucharest (April 2, 2008). At that time President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko took a joint stand, and both formally applied for NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP). But whereas then the Ukrainian side demonstrated its unity and correctly declared that the summit would be “the moment of truth” for the Alliance, now the situation appears to be the exact opposite. It may be said that the EU-Ukraine summit was “the moment of truth” for Ukraine, because unity and stability are precisely the very things that are expected from the Ukrainian leadership. This has been emphasized since 2005.
Thus, the Ukrainian president’s statement about the “absolute success” scored by Ukraine during the EU summit in Paris sounds rather strange. In Bucharest, President Yushchenko said that NATO’s refusal to grant Ukraine the MAP status was also a victory. “We welcome the signals that the EU is sending to Ukraine. They are hope-inspiring and offer remarkable prospects; they are encouraging us to carry out a whole range of tasks that our country is facing,” he declared during a press conference in Paris.
Prior to the Paris summit, Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Yelyseiev said he was certain that Ukraine’s prospects for EU membership would be clearly defined in Paris in some form or other. Ukrainian diplomats acted in a similar way before the NATO summit in Bucharest, when they declared that the Alliance’s leadership was paying attention to the need for both consensus within the political elite in regard to Ukraine’s NATO membership and the population’s support. As for Ukraine’s EU membership, this issue is not on the agenda because the majority of the population supports this course.
In fact, the European Union’s complete support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the agreement on the start of a dialog to cancel visas for Ukrainian nationals, can be referred to as a success. In addition, the agreement on the signing of a treaty on association in the second half of 2009 can be added to the summit’s achievements. However, none of these documents contain a clause about Ukraine’s membership prospects – something Ukraine has been insisting on since 2005.
Thus far, no such clauses are being foreseen for inclusion in the new agreement on Ukraine-EU association. France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy said during the press conference that he was not speaking as a president but rather on behalf of the European Union, whose position is that this agreement doesn’t close or open any roads. He went on to say that, under the current complicated circumstances in the region, the EU wants to stress the values and interests that are shared with Ukraine. Sarkozy added that his position at the EU does not allow him to make a different kind of statement because the EU Council is divided on Ukraine.
What signals did the Ukrainian leadership actually receive during the EU-Ukraine summit? What does the West expect from Kyiv? Why did Ukraine fail to receive membership prospects, even though a favorable foreign political situation existed? Is the Russian factor influencing Ukraine’s EU membership prospects?
COMMENTS
Valerii CHALYI, deputy directors general, Razumkov Centre:
I’d like to start by pointing out that this is not some epochal event cardinally altering the rate of Ukraine’s integration into the European Union or one that is giving clear signals concerning the timeframe.
Of course, we can talk about where we are today, where we have greater achievements in European integration, where we are having problems. The summit’s objective was to define priorities, the key issues in our mutual relations in the nearest future. In assessing this summit, one can mention the possible successes of diplomacy in Ukraine’s domestic political circumstances.
I would also like to point out that Ukraine’s domestic political developments, the collapse of the coalition, had no bearing on the results of the summit. Its documents and statements were coordinated in advance through diplomatic channels. This work took months, so there is no way to make cardinal changes in the space of a few days. The European Union is only too well aware of the situation in Ukraine, that our domestic situation has been turbulent since 2005. Therefore, we must welcome our achievements calmly and without announcing any victories, as another step in certain directions of interaction.
To begin with, only two-thirds of the agreement has been formulated. The political aspects have been practically agreed upon. Now we have to advance trade. I believe that the fact that the EU has agreed to work in the spheres of justice and internal affairs, specifically in terms of the Road Map-based visa procedures, is of principal importance to our country. I am talking about specific issues that Ukraine has to resolve in order to reach the level of similar visa procedures for its nationals – in other words, visa-free entry. This work will take years.
The second important question concerns inter-sectoral cooperation, joint airspace, and joint power supply systems.
The third group of questions includes the formulas that are contained in the joint statement, in particular the agreement on signing an association agreement. It should be noted, however, that there are different kinds of association agreements, specifically ones signed by the countries of the former socialist camp, which passed muster as candidate members and then became EU members. Certain countries also signed association agreements with no membership clauses. I believe that the point in question is not the title of the agreement but its content.
Another new and important aspect is the EU’s clear-cut stand in regard to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity guarantees. It is also important to carefully study the new instrument declared during the summit, the one that will replace the Ukraine-EU Membership Action Plan. There is an understanding that this instrument will be created next year. It includes clauses agreed upon by the contracting parties even before the signing and implementation of the new reinforced agreement.
I don’t agree that we should focus on the membership prospects phase. On the contrary, we must focus on matters relating to the EU and its readiness to allow Ukrainian nationals broad access to EU countries, and on specific issues relating to investments in joint projects and support for upgrading the gas transportation system. Ukraine’s successful progress to EU membership depends on whether European integration will be a program of reforms in Ukraine. Today, European integration process is proceeding separately, as are certain changes and the transformation of the administrative structure. We must have programs to approach European standards in one sphere or another.
As regards the Russian factor in Ukraine-EU relations, it would be wrong to say that among the old countries of Europe there are many supporters that are in favor of Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Unfortunately, even Russia has distanced itself in its relations with the European Union, even though in recent times it has shown some progress in its cooperation with the EU. Today it is not worth expecting support because Russia is saying little about counteracting or slowing down Ukraine’s EU membership. Russia believes that now is not the time to discuss our membership in the EU. However, as Ukraine advances to this goal, its counteraction will increase. The Russian factor is present in questions pertaining to Ukraine’s strategic and geopolitical choice, its progress toward Western structures, particularly the economic, political, and safety structures of the European Union.
Professor Rainer LINDNER, German Institute for International and Security Affairs:
This was a meeting that had a symbolic meaning in connection with the events in the South Caucasus. Of course, it would have been wise to give Ukraine a clear signal about its EU membership prospects and the association agreement, without specifying the date. We are on the highest level of relations anyway.
As it was, there was no signal about membership prospects. But as regards association, this is the beginning of a process whose end goal is EU membership. It is understandable that no date has been specified. We are not very satisfied with Ukraine’s domestic situation. We are aware of the direction in which it is evolving. We don’t understand who our partner will be in the European integration process. This is precisely why no mention has been made of Ukraine’s EU membership prospects.
As for the opportunities Ukraine has lost as a result of the events in the Caucasus, Ukraine has lost these opportunities not only because of the war in the South Caucasus; it is constantly losing opportunities to get closer to the European Union. The EU expected after the last parliamentary elections that there would be a degree of consolidation in Ukraine’s political arena. This never happened.
In principle, Ukraine could have been way ahead and won a great deal more from its cooperation with the European Union. However, because of its unpredictable political culture, Ukraine is at risk of losing much. After the Orange Revolution we in the West regarded Ukraine as an area with a dynamic political culture. Your country has lost this image, so we are now in a phase where various political elites have no consensus in foreign political terms.
As for the Russian factor, I believe that even Russia realizes that Ukraine will continue its progress in the direction of the West. However, it is necessary to single out an important aspect: Russia is essentially worried about the expansion of NATO, not the EU. I think it is important for Ukraine to realize this. I also believe that NATO won’t consider the possibility of Ukraine’s membership until 2017, while Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is still stationed on the territory of Ukraine.
As for the expectations that the West has for the political parties in Ukraine, they are easily understandable: they must be prepared for and capable of setting up a cabinet coalition that will exist for at least a couple of years. Of course, we would like this coalition to be a balanced one that would work in the new format, embracing a large number of parties. I think that after the elections Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions will be totally different. In the present situation, it is very difficult for them to conduct a coherent policy or implement a coherent partnership.
