A bicameral parliament is an object of bitter criticism on the part of MPs, political scientists, and journalists: they are saying it is a legislative brainchild of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, and so on.
In my view, criticism of the president regarding this constitutional question should be based not so much on the very idea of bicameralism (can it be still worse than it is now?) as on the following three points.
Number one. A few years ago Viktor Yushchenko vehemently resisted the idea of a bicameral parliament. Having taken a diametrically opposed view on this crucial constitutional matter, he never explained why he had made this U-turn. Why?
Number two. The president has moved the draft of “his” Constitution in parliament as an urgent bill. The question is: Why couldn’t the head of state in more than four years of ruling in a quiet and routine atmosphere, without any “all-hands-to-the-pump” calls, get all the key political players involved and draw up a Constitution that would become a point of compromise between the factions rather than an apple of discord?
In order to take effect, the new Constitution has to be adopted by parliament in two readings (getting at least 226 and 300 votes, respectively), examined by the Constitutional Court, and approved at a national referendum. But the prospect of its adoption is bleak because major political parties disagree with a number of presidential initiatives.
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has said that introducing a bicameral parliament is a step toward federalism, which will give corruption in parliament a new lease on life. She was supported by Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn who called the Senate “a sanctuary for Ukrainian oligarchs,” who will aspire to go to the upper house “to obtain immunity.” In his turn, the Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych believes that the text of a new Constitution should be written by members of parliament, not by the president. He suggested that the Verkhovna Rada form a commission for this purpose.
What does this mean? The largest factions in the glass-domed building, the BYuT and the Party of Regions, will not support the presidential version of the Fundamental Law, which a priori means a voting failure.
But why on earth was Yushchenko dragging his feet until the last moment? Didn’t the head of state announce loudly that 2008 would be the year of constitutional reform? But words remained words last year, and now the economic and the never-ending political crisis may be supplemented by a constitutional crisis because it is easier to believe in a snowfall in the heat of a summer than in the Verkhovna Rada quickly reaching a painless compromise on a new Constitution.
Moreover, the presidential elections are around the corner, which means that constitutional passions will exceed fever pitch. So the question is whether it is worthwhile to make, for the umpteenth time, the same stupid blunder by passing a new (updated?) Constitution while the election fire is raging. What for? To hear the new head of state, the new premier, and perhaps the new parliamentarians criticize — six months after the presidential elections — the Fundamental Law the way the current MPs are running down the existing one which they themselves amended by a concerted effort in 2004?
Number three. In his one-hour-long parliamentary speech, Yushchenko called political reform the root of all the evils of the political crisis. The president ironically wondered if it was accidental that the Law on Constitutional Changes was No. 2222. Indeed, it is difficult to deny that the political reform has not only unbalanced the powers of various institutions but also torn the central executive branch away from the regions, which were, in fact, left to their own devices.
However, criticizing a “faulty” political reform, the president discreetly omits that in 2004 Our Ukraine, a clearly pro-Yushchenko force at the time, voted for introducing amendments to the Constitution. The only faction that said no to political reform was BYuT.
The price Yushchenko had to pay for the constitutional amendments at the time is another subject. After the political reform had been voted in, Yushchenko still enjoyed the same powers as Kuchma for a year. Yet the new Orange team, including the newly-elected president, were busy in-fighting, instead of healing the obvious constitutional “sores,” which in September 2005 led to the scandalous announcement of Oleksandr Zinchenko and a sudden dismissal of Yulia Tymoshenko’s first Cabinet of Ministers. In other words, it is a pot-calling-the-kettle-black situation.
Incidentally, journalists, experts, and parliament members only focused on constitutional changes in the president’s hour-long message to the Verkhovna Rada. Meanwhile, Yushchenko also broached some other very important points in his speech, which for some reason vanished into “thin informational air.” Too bad.
It follows from the president’s speech that, in addition to the Constitution, all fields of public life need reforms. Besides, before spelling out a reformatory anti-crisis course for this country, the president looked back on the past, recalling the Holodomor, and peeked into the future, saying he was sure there would soon be the united national Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The overall impression was that the president was delivering his last speech as the guarantor of the Constitution.
Yushchenko dwelled at length on the Orange Revolution’s gains (the key word was “freedom,” which became as natural as air, he said) and on the economic and geopolitical successes in the past four years. “We have been focusing our efforts all this time on practical steps, not slogans,” Yushchenko said, claiming that there is progress in relations with the European Union and NATO. In this context he also mentioned the Eastern Partnership agreement, the free trade zone, the Ukraine–EU Association, “a unique agreement to be signed shortly,” as well as a nonstop dialogue with Europe on canceling visas for Ukrainian citizens.
Yushchenko also said Ukraine had been standing on the edge of a demographic abyss a few years ago but the situation has radically changed now — for the better, luckily. The president gave an example: there were 84,000 more newborns in Ukraine last year than in 2004. Besides, Yushchenko pointed out major progress in child adoption. “In 2008 every tenth orphaned child found a home. Today, it is families that are on the adoption waiting list, not children, as was the case just a few years ago,” the president proudly concluded.
According to Yushchenko, in the past four years Ukraine has attracted $27 billion in direct investments, which is three times more than in all the years since 1991. What is more, the president came to parliament with not only the draft of a new Constitution but also some concrete anti-crisis recipes, such as restoring financial stability, revising the budget, streamlining the financial plan of the Naftohaz national joint-stock company, revamping the Pension Fund, abolishing special-type pensions, and levying a real estate tax on the rich.
Yushchenko also suggests “putting the system of privileges and reliefs in order.” The head of state claims there is an estimated 19.5 million of people eligible for all kinds of exemptions, which is a “distorted and unfair” situation. Another point of the president’s anti-crisis plan is healing the banking system, “the Ukrainian economy’s backbone.”
This was only a second time that Yushchenko personally presented his annual message in parliament during his presidency. In 2005 the president did not address the Verkhovna Rada because he had assumed the office as late as January 23. Accordingly, he did not have enough time to draw up an address that would comprise the annual development plan: no bodies responsible for preparing this document had been formed yet.
On Feb. 9, 2006, Yushchenko presented for the first time a message on Ukraine’s domestic and international situation in the VR. He spoke in detail on his vision of reforms in various sectors, including the judicial system, law-enforcement bodies, public health and education, as well as on the programs of rural modernization and the development and application of high and energy-saving technologies. As for this country’s foreign political prospects, he set a clear task: to form a free trade zone with the EU in 2007 and sign an association agreement with the EU in 2008. Besides, Yushchenko said it was necessary to continue the political reform and promised to establish, after the March 26 parliamentary elections, a new constitutional commission that would draft a new version of the Constitution.
In 2007 the head of state refused to present the message in the VR because of an acute political crisis which brought about a snap parliamentary election on September 30.
Last year the president was supposed to deliver the message on February 5. But he failed to do so, for members of the BYuT (!) and Party of Regions factions blockaded the parliamentary rostrum.
This time Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko listened to the presidential message in the government’s box. Every now and then her face showed satisfaction over the president’s theses (especially when Yushchenko was saying “we” instead of “I,” enumerating the Orange Revolution’s gains) but sometimes the premier demonstrated her trademark ironic and wry grin. Anyway, the prime minister had more reasons to show joy because Yushchenko suddenly chose to refrain from bitter criticism of the Cabinet and tried to play the role of a peacemaker, focusing not so much on problems as on the ways of solving them.
After hearing the head of state’s speech from A to Z, one cannot help asking: was it a message or a farewell? Many experts are sure that it was the last appearance of Yushchenko as head of state in parliament. Incidentally, when asked the other day by the day whether he will run for the second presidential term, Yushchenko said: “I will tell you this in the summer.” Asked about what he thinks of the fact that four years ago he was treated as a national hero and now his popularity has drastically fallen, down to 2 percent by some reports, the president replied: “I will not comment on ratings and percentages, but I can see that a politician who speaks about Stalinist terror and the Holodomor, visits Brussels every month, and tries to promote NATO membership will never be collecting the points of popularity.”
With these words of the head of state in view and drawing the line under his parliamentary speech, I would like to point out the following. Undoubtedly, Yushchenko, like any other top executive, is doomed to make mistakes. There are no absolutely ideal leaders. Yes, Yushchenko may have made more mistakes (of a local or global nature, in portfolio distribution, etc.) in the four years of his presidency than might have been expected. After all, scathing criticism of the current head of state is now as much a tradition in Ukraine as is a morning coffee. What is more, the president is also under fire from some little-known MPs who made their way into parliament thanks to, let us say, a lucky chance, failed to draw up any bill in the six months in the Verkhovna Rada, and, in contrast to Yushchenko, have so far done nothing for the state of Ukraine.
Naturally, one can and must criticize the president and, what is more, there are objects for criticism. But there are at least a few noes. Number one: given the low rating of the incumbent head of state, many of his former comrades (I do not mean those whom Yushchenko himself undeservedly “ditched”) are running away from Our Ukraine as from the plague. It is extremely unpleasant to watch some ex-Our Ukraine members who, commenting on the coming reshuffle in the NSNU, are crying from housetops that they have dropped their party membership. Excuse me, dear sirs, but is it not this party (incidentally, one of the most popular political forces a few years ago) that paved you the way to big politics? Can the flight from a sinking party ship be called a responsible action? It is all too easy to run away and then form something new (undemocratic and unpromising at that), such as the United Center, for example. But an easy way is a way for the weak.
Number two, which is the main thing: immediately after Yushchenko’s appearance in the Verkhovna Rada, our politicians and political scientists rushed to criticize the head of state’s constitutional ideas and did not even try to go beyond the limits of this question. A pity, though. Why? Because, unlike the Communists who hung out insulting posters in the parliament room on the day Yushchenko came, the president is a patriot of our country.
Unfortunately, no one said this. You could feel patriotism in almost every word of the presidential message. Even the intonation of Yushchenko’s speech showed patriotism and concern over the future of Ukraine. Incidentally, this sharply contrasted with Tymoshenko’s ironic smile of and Yanukovych’s grins.
Finally, much to the detriment of his rating, Yushchenko speaks frankly and straightforwardly about the Holodomor, the united national church and NATO, whereas the current and the former premiers are doing their best to avoid sensitive subjects, saying one thing in Brussels and another in Moscow. Is this patriotism? Just the contrary, it is an attempt to play up to and be liked by everybody and a traditional aspiration to reap as bountiful an electoral harvest as possible. So far, both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych succeed in doing so. But Ukrainian society is changing, and we will probably feel the first wind of change immediately after the H-hour, which is relentlessly approaching, i.e., the 2009 presidential elections.
