On September 14 Yulia Tymoshenko made it clear that she and Viktor Yushchenko will not even be following “parallel courses.” In an interview with the Associated Press she said that Yushchenko “was picking up Kuchma’s baton and wanting to get rid of me in the same way.” That is how the ex-prime minister responded to accusations of having betrayed the ideals of the Maidan and of having used her prime minister’s post in her own interests, according to the Ukrainian president’s own interview with the same news agency. “Not a single word he said is true. I feel ashamed for the president,” she declared in a comment to the Ukrainian media.
It seems that the debates about whether the current government will gain a determined opponent in the person of Yulia Tymoshenko have ended (they lasted all of last week, ever since the president announced the cabinet’s dismissal). The last “t” was crossed by Viktor Yushchenko himself. In an interview with the Associated Press he stated that Prime Minister Tymoshenko had convinced creditors to write off billions of dollars worth of debts owed by the Unified Energy Systems of Ukraine, the company she once headed. Yushchenko also accused his former comrade-in-arms of having acted in the interests of certain business circles. He hinted that the cabinet decision on the reprivatization of the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant was the last straw, which forced him to dismiss the government. The head of state admitted to the AP — and it is obvious that lately he has found it easier to communicate with foreign journalists than with Ukrainian ones — that now he comes to work “with a calm spirit” and without expecting any unpleasant surprises in the privatization sphere. However, Viktor Yushchenko’s doors are not closed to Yulia Tymoshenko. The president, in his typical manner, said he was prepared to extend his hand to her, if and when she reconsiders her conduct and promises to correct her mistakes (e.g., by selflessly working for the victory of the ruling coalition in the 2006 elections).
Obviously, Viktor Yushchenko’s promises to “stay friends” with the people whom he so scandalously fired are becoming ridiculous. He will not be able to avoid a war with Tymoshenko. So far, only the format of this warfare remains unclear.
Incidentally, the manner in which relations developed between the president and the prime minister, and the government and the opposition is closely intertwined with the fate of the political reform, which is once again the main point on the political agenda. During his interview with the AP Viktor Yushchenko noted that two-thirds of Ukrainian citizens are not familiar with the contents and tasks of the political reform and that this is why they are not supporting it. The political forces must, according to the president, take their opinion into consideration. Every change in the constitution, Yushchenko said, must travel the road of open “discussion and polemic in society.” The Ukrainian leader also believes that once the representatives of the parliamentary groups and factions sign the “Declaration of Unity and Cooperation for the Sake of Ukraine’s Future,” the Verkhovna Rada will have an opportunity to “examine the issue of political reform without pressure and manipulations.” Of course, the American press may not be aware that, first, it is hard to imagine a more protracted “discussion and polemic in society” than the one involving the political reform. Second, the package vote that took place on December 8, 2004, which included the political reform, eventually opened the way for Yushchenko to gain the presidential seat. Third, the very fact of stepping up the implementation of the political reform, reallocating the powers vested in the branches of power, is regarded by many political forces in Ukraine as a way out of the political crisis. (At this stage Yulia Tymoshenko may become one of the most devout champions of the political reform; she is expecting to occupy the seat of a post- reformist, i.e., much stronger, prime minister).
As for the above-mentioned declaration of unity, the signing of which the president described as an “historic event,” each of the signatories had their reasons, of course. What are these reasons? The Day addressed this question to a group of experts. We also asked some well known Ukrainian historians what kind of events could be described as historic and when.
COMMENTARIES
“A pact between old and new oligarchs”
Volodymyr FESENKO, Penta Applied Political Study Center:
In my opinion, every signatory to this document had his own interest in mind, which is reflected in the text of this declaration. As for the common interest, it consists of stabilizing the political and economic situations. The document signed by the president and the head of the government, even before his candidature was approved, and by the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and the leaders of most of the factions in parliament testifies to the desire and the attempt to stabilize the political and socioeconomic situation in this country. The reference to stability is the main thing. Of course, different interests are involved. What I consider a very positive aspect is that this declaration takes into consideration the appeals and interests of the opposition forces, also those political forces that did not agree with the pro-presidential forces in matters of principal importance: the idea of implementing the political reform and putting an end to political repressions. Even the term that appeared in the declaration is a concession of sorts to the opposition forces — specifically to the Party of the Regions and several others. This illustrates the government’s desire to achieve a compromise. I would also stress that this declaration, if duly implemented, may help overcome the political rift that emerged during the presidential campaign.
Volodymyr POLOKHALO, chief editor of Politychna Dumka:
The interests of the key political players, the situation that had developed, the government vacuum, the negative effects of Tymoshenko’s dismissal, and so on — these factors were indeed instrumental in finding a key figure acceptable not only to Viktor Yushchenko but also to many other political players. It is difficult to find a more flexible player on the Ukrainian political scene, who would be as acceptable to the majority, than Yuri Yekhanurov. Another important step to escape the crisis and help the president save at least some face would be to set up a “transition government.” There is only one way to form it: by announcing an interim pact between the elites, as has often been the case in Ukraine’s political history (e.g., under Yanukovych, Kinakh, and Yushchenko). Such a pact would envisage intensive and accelerated “bartering.” Yushchenko must use this pact to demonstrate his ability to oversee all political processes.
After all, public opinion is becoming convinced that Yushchenko has actually stopped being a self-sufficient politician, that he is a tool being used by a group of certain individuals. Therefore, he had to confirm in the eyes of the public that his conduct has not deviated in the sense of diverging from the Maidan’s ideals. Of course, the international factors involved are extremely important. But what is the cost of compromise? The fact that the Party of Regions signed the document is very significant. It means that there is a degree of evolution within the regime and that Yushchenko is prepared to go halfway in any direction. The boundary line being set up with SDPU (U) and the Communists is a line that Yushchenko hasn’t reached yet. But this does not mean that he cannot cross this line. The declaration is a pact made between old and new oligarchs, and even between the old regime and the new one that has yet to be formed. This is Yushchenko’s way of pardoning many of his basic opponents: Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yanukovych, Renat Akhmetov, et al. Viktor Yushchenko has embarked on a political road that is germane to his political philosophy. It is, however, difficult to say how well it conforms to the principles and standards of democracy, because they envisage reaching compromises among the elites as the result of social expectations. In other words, there should be a pact concluded with those who are down rather than so high up the social ladder.
It is understandable that politically, the existing situation will stagnate as a result of this declaration. Conserving the situation makes intense progress impossible. At the same time, Yushchenko is choosing what he believes is a calmer presidency. Yekhanurov is actually a copy of Yushchenko, even if he lacks his charisma and popularity. The antioligarchical component of the Orange Revolution, being the key component, ceased to exist as soon as the declaration was issued — and this declaration is a remake of the political technologies practiced by the old regime. Undoubtedly, a second round of this pact may take place in April 2006, unless of course this process is impeded by a political force linked to Yulia Tymoshenko. For a long time Viktor Yushchenko has been telling us that there is no opposition and that this is bad. Was this sarcasm, self-irony, or a victor’s triumph? We have long been complaining about the lack of an opposition, and now we have one. But it’s an opposition that by no means guarantees the implementation of that “pact of elites.”
