US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s petulant remark of last year about “old and new Europe” was right for the wrong reasons. He meant it to refer to Europe’s divisions, but in May, ten additional states joined the European Union. The expanded Europe truly forms a new Europe. Should America be nervous?
Fifty-four years after the announcement of the Schuman Plan that began to knit together the economies of France and Germany, the EU now has 25 countries and a population larger than that of the United States. Eight of the new members are former Communist countries that were locked behind the Iron Curtain for nearly half a century. Their attraction to the Union is a sign of the appeal — the “soft power” — of the idea of European unification.
Of course, this new Europe faces many problems. The per capita income of the new countries is less than half of that of the fifteen members they are joining. Concerns have been raised about the influx of cheap labor. But average GDP growth rates in the new members are twice as high as in the original members, and this can provide a welcome stimulus to stagnant labor markets and sluggish economies.
Political arrangements are somewhat more problematic. Negotiations are underway to revise a draft EU constitution. Some Europeans worry that the constitution will enable courts to carry the integration process further and faster than public opinion in member states will tolerate. Lack of grassroots support might lead to rejection of the constitution in countries like Britain, where referenda have been promised before the new arrangements come into force.
Across the Atlantic, most Americans (to the extent they pay attention) regard these changes with general approval. But some express concern that the new Europe will be defined in opposition to the US. Not only do the remarks of French leaders about recreating a multi-polar world arouse alarm, but recent public opinion polls show a decline in the popularity of the US among Europeans and a desire for more independent policies.
The Iraq War proved costly to American soft power, with the US losing about 30 percentage points of attractiveness on average in Europe, including in countries like Britain, Spain, and Italy, whose governments supported the war. The recent photographs of detainees being abused and sexually degraded in Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison added fuel to the fire. Now some American neo- conservatives argue that the US should drop its longstanding support for European integration.
Such a policy change would be a serious mistake. Not only would it add to anti-American attitudes and fail to accomplish its objectives, but it over-estimates the extent to which the new Europe is being formed in opposition to the US. Whatever the rhetoric in France, for example, the policies and attitudes in countries such as Britain or Poland demonstrate that good trans-Atlantic relations can be maintained. If anything, the risks of a US-Europe split will be reduced rather than increased by the EU’s recent enlargement.
Moreover, there are several objective reasons why the current friction between Europe and the US is unlikely to lead to divorce. For one thing, the divisive war in Iraq may turn out to be the last act of the twentieth century rather than a harbinger of the twenty- first. American unilateralism is much less in evidence in the world’s other hot spots, such as North Korea and Iran, both because of the costs of the war in Iraq and the realities of the situation in those other regions.
Moreover, while the common security threat from the Soviet Union has disappeared, both the US and Europe face a new common threat from radical jihadist terrorism. Neither side of the Atlantic is immune to the threat, despite the efforts of Osama bin Laden to drive a wedge between Europe and America. Transnational terrorism can only be confronted by close civilian cooperation such as intelligence sharing, police work across borders, and tracing financial flows. These forms of cooperation survived the divisions over Iraq.
Europe and America also share a common structure of economic interests and values. While trade produces frictions in democracies, it also enhances wealth. If one looks at foreign direct investment, it is clear that the two sides of the Atlantic are closely integrated.
In terms of values, while some differences exist between Europe and America, at the fundamental level of democracy and human rights, no other two parts of the globe share more. As the writer Robert Kagan concluded in the revision of his book in which he declared Europeans to be from Venus and Americans from Mars, it turns out that Americans seeking democratic legitimization of their policies and self-images cannot escape Europe.
In short, it is good for Americans — and for the world — that old and new Europe are becoming one. We can all benefit from the soft power of an enlarged Europe.
Joseph S. Nye is dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
