It is no secret that all the important political decisions in Russia are taken by one person who is well-known to the world. Rumors stating that there are several centers of influence in the Kremlin, or that Putin’s Ukrainian policy is developed under competing influences of the “party of war” and “party of peace,” are generated by the Kremlin propaganda itself, and intended for external consumption only. The purpose of this kind of speculation is quite clear, as they may encourage Western partners to be more compliant with regard to Russian actions in Ukraine, so as not to play along with the mythical “party of war” in Russia. In fact, all major decisions, both on the Ukrainian crisis and on other major policy issues, are taken by Putin alone. These decisions are difficult to predict, as with any dictator, for one simple reason – the Russian president is not internally responsible for his decisions, while the total Russian propaganda will always be able to convince the vast majority of the Russian population, and not just Russian, that whatever is the president’s decision, it is the only correct one.
However, when coming to his decisions, Putin undoubtedly listens to the advice of his inner circle. In this case, as in any dictatorial, totalitarian regime, advisers to the boss, if they speak in public, play the part of bad cop, so that the dictator could play the part of good cop, charming the Western audience and showing a tendency to compromise. Advisers can also afford to pronounce threats that the boss would find awkward to voice, but which may be implemented in the future.
In the case of Ukraine, Putin’s circle of advisers can be more or less fully delineated. It is obviously small. It is striking that economic adviser to the president Sergey Glazyev, who is, incidentally, an academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, plays a prominent role in the current Ukrainian crisis, in contrast to the era of the Orange Revolution. His responsibilities include, inter alia, overseeing the regional economic integration, which involves the creation of the Greater Eurasia under the auspices of Russia. Glazyev is notorious for his public recommendation to close Ukraine’s skies first using Russia’s aviation and air defense, and then destroy Ukrainian artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft with airstrikes.
According to him [Sergey Glazyev. – Ed.], if this is not done now, the Ukrainian authorities, who have already begun introducing mobilization measures, will incite the country’s population against Russia. As an example, he cited the disappointing (for Russia) trend, claiming that “there were 2,000 Nazis in Kyiv in December,” increasing to 20,000 by February and likely to raise to 200,000 by September, and 500,000 by the end of the year. It seems that Sergey Glazyev means Ukrainian soldiers when speaking about the Nazis.
He also tried to scare his president with the great and terrible Ukrainian army, which supposedly would be reborn overnight like a phoenix from the ashes, “We face a powerful military machine, which is aimed at us and full of Nazis who are determined enemies of Russia ideologically. The ultimate goal of this whole action is a war with Russia. We cannot keep the peace by losing the Donbas, as their next declared target is Crimea.” (http://fakty.ua/182956-putinu-sovetuyut-nanesti-masshtabnyj-aviaudar-po-...)
MOSCOW. MARCH OF PIECE. SEPTEMBER 21, 2014 / Photo by Vadim PRESLITSKY
I would like to note that back in September 2013, Glazyev warned the meeting of the Yalta European Strategy in Crimea that signing the agreement with the EU would be “suicidal” for Ukraine. (http://inosmi.ru/world/20140919/ 223104947.html#ixzz3DwfsTENX)
He is also deeply convinced that Russia can do without imports: “Most imports can be replaced with our own products. We just have to start to produce them.” (http://www.kp.ru/daily/26203.4/3089118/) He recommends to transition to ruble settlement in Russia’s trade with Europe, and generally expand the ruble zone, apparently by including more post-Soviet states in it. One can consider attempts by militants of the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics to put ruble into circulation in the territories under their control in the context of Glazyev’s proposals.
Another of his proposals involves responding to the Western sanctions by transferring state-owned assets and accounts in dollars and euros from NATO countries to neutral ones, returning all state-owned valuables (precious metals, works of art, and so on) to Russia, terminating exports of gold, precious and rare metals, and creating Russia’s own SWIFT – a system of information exchange for interbank payments and settlements in the Customs Union, the CIS, and with partner countries. (http://www.regnum.ru /news/polit/1848744. html#ixzz3Dwxfucdq)
While these ideas have not been supported by the government so far, Glazyev, obviously, does not expect immediate adoption of the proposed measures. They are only outlined, to be acted upon if further escalation of the Ukrainian crisis by the Kremlin will force the West to enter the final-level sanctions which will stop almost any kind of cooperation with the EU, including in the energy sector, and virtually eliminate the convertibility of the ruble. Glazyev is used to thinking in Soviet economic categories. He is committed to self-sufficiency and the nationalization of major industries and used to assessing growth in natural, rather than money terms. Therefore, he is ready to measure the level of economic development of Russia using only domestic rather than international criteria, and even sees a long-term isolation of Russia from economic cooperation with the EU and the US as an acceptable option.
The dynamics of the Ukrainian crisis so far shows that Vladimir Putin uses Glazyev’s advice in one way or another, however extravagant it may seem initially. While there has been no massive air strike on the Ukrainian army yet, Russia has sent no less than 10,000 to 15,000 regular army soldiers into the fight in the Donbas. Retaliatory sanctions by Russia which Putin has introduced are worsening Russia’s isolation from the West, and sanctions against Ukraine are designed to show it how suicidal its choice of European integration is. Finally, attack on billionaire Vladimir Yevtushenkov and his house arrest are directly linked to the intention to conduct further nationalization of the oil industry.
Glazyev has correctly determined the reason why Putin cannot afford to leave the Donbas alone. Should the Ukrainian government restore control over the Donbas, the occupied Crimea issue will inevitably emerge both in Russian-Ukrainian relations and Russia’s relations with the international community. Getting more time for the final annexation of the Crimean peninsula is a major reason for the Russian leader to keep the Donbas stand-off on.
Russia’s current prime minister’s role on Ukraine is no less important than Glazyev’s. Dmitry Medvedev’s links to Ukraine go beyond the fact that his wife and Putin are godparents of the youngest daughter of prominent Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, whom the Kremlin, in all probability, would like to see taking the prime minister’s portfolio at least in Ukraine, although it is hardly possible in the present circumstances. While being the head of the presidential administration in Russia from 2003-05, and then as the first deputy prime minister, Medvedev often harshly criticized the Orange Revolution and the state of the Russian-Ukrainian relations, advocating the complete economic domination of Ukraine by Russia. He continued this line after becoming president of Russia as well. Given that Medvedev was chairman of the board of directors at Gazprom until 2008, we can assume that he had a hand in the “gas war” against Ukraine, as well as the latest Russian-Ukrainian gas agreement. We can assume also that Medvedev has been responsible for the economic component of the Russian pressure on Ukraine. Characteristically, he said in the beginning of March, at the outset of the current conflict: “Ukraine for us is not a group of people who, having shed others’ blood in Maidan, have seized power in violation of the constitution and other laws of the state. We deal with the whole country, including very different people – Ukrainians, Russians, Tatars, Jews, and other ethnicities, all living in harmony... Russia needs a strong and stable Ukraine which would be a predictable and economically sustainable partner, not a poor relative, always standing with his hand outstretched. We told it all to Ukraine’s newly-minted rulers yesterday.” (http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/news-menu/vesti/tablo-dnya/item/14701-dm...)
Like Putin, Medvedev does not consider Ukraine an independent political nation, and would like to see in its place a conglomeration of virtually independent regions (lands), all completely dependent on Russia economically and politically.
The Russian head of government scares the West with consequences of anti-Russian sanctions, which, he said, would lead to Europe losing its market share in Russia (http://www.dni.ru/polit/2014/9/21/281305.html). Apparently, he and Putin are following Glazyev’s economic advice on this.
Putin’s policy towards Ukraine fits into the scheme of the Eurasian theory, in its current form as promoted in Russia by Aleksandr Dugin. It is unlikely that Dugin often meets with Putin, if at all, but the fact is that Putin uses a Eurasian scheme, creating his Eurasian Union with blood and iron and protecting the Russian World. This does not preclude Dugin entering into a direct conflict with the existing government. Thus, he stated that “I talk to some of the prominent leaders of the rebels in eastern Ukraine five to six times per day, and they share my disappointment with the Kremlin.” Also, according to Dugin, Putin “is vacillating, moving in the direction of a deal with Petro Poroshenko and thus encouraging the Nazi troops to destroy the Novorossia.” (http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/25444175.html). The latter assumption is likely caused by Dugin taking offense at the fact that Putin has refused the services of such Novorossian ideologists as Igor Girkin, Aleksandr Boroday, and Pavlo Hubariev. Well, from Putin’s standpoint, they are really unqualified to command Russian regular troops. However, it has been the deployment of Russian troops in the Donbas that has shown that Putin wants to secure a part of the Novorossia at least as a territory under his control. Putin’s take on Eurasianism requires, at a minimum, the restoration of the borders of the USSR, and ideally, the borders of the Warsaw Pact as well.
For Putin, aggression against Ukraine is primarily a partial solution of the ideological task to restore the empire. Therefore, even toughest economic sanctions are unlikely to stop it. The only real way to do it, as there is little hope for Ukraine’s NATO membership, is concluding a mutual defense treaty between Ukraine and the US, similar to those that the US has with South Korea, Japan, and Israel.
