On July 1 Poland will take on the EU presidency. What are Warsaw’s expectations regarding its first presidency in the European Union, and what are the expectations of Kyiv, that seeks to conclude an agreement on the free trade area, the association agreement and to advance in the realization of the plan on visa regime liberalization with the EU in the second half of 2011? How will these goals be affected by the undemocratic behaviour of the government and the ongoing “selective persecution” of the leaders of the opposition? Read about it in The Day’s interview with Arkady MOSHES, director of research programs on the EU Eastern Neighborhood and Russia, at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
“Poland’s expectations are serious and grounded. In my view, after all, for Poland the most advantageous and promising topic and opportunity to show itself as a first-rate European player is connected in one or another way with the policy of the European Union in the East. For it’s difficult to say whether it will be able to do something in other directions of EU foreign policy. Its interest to show itself as an efficient player is obvious. But so far it’s hard to say how much Warsaw will be able to do it. There are a number of circumstances connected with both the internal backroom of the European Union, in particular, the EU’s preoccupation with other issues, and with the objectively very serious and difficult task to combine the policy on Russia and other partner countries of the European Union in the East. Therefore I would say the Polish presidency has a chance to speed up the agreement on the free trade area between the EU and Ukraine, while I have a cautious position on the development of the process on the visa-free regime.”
What is the reason for this caution: is it more technical or political?
“It is stipulated by two things. First, currently in the EU the position that visa relations with Ukraine and Russia should be similar is getting stronger. There was a period when supporters of separating these positions got the upper hand. But it is not the case anymore, first of all because Russia is very persistent. Last year Ukraine pulled ahead but now, it seems to me, Russia is trying to catch up with it. Then there is the fact that the European Union is not satisfied with the situation after granting the visa-free regime for some Balkan states. There is a viewpoint that one should be cautious at least now, because opening the borders for Balkan states is not considered to be fully successful. We already see how the entrance of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area is being deferred. All this, in one or another way, are links of one chain. I think that the European Union now for some time will take a more cautious position on the visa-free regime.”
Do you think the Freedom House report that decreased the level of democracy in Ukraine and the adoption of the resolution in the European Parliament on “selective justice” can hinder Ukraine’s signing of the abovementioned agreements with the EU and the visa liberalization?
“Indirectly, of course, it can. I already repeatedly said that Ukraine lost its informal status of the major hope of the democratic process in Eastern Europe, which had existed the previous year. And, of course, around Ukraine different image games take place. The Freedom House report draws a picture and it is really a very serious signal. I won’t say how much this organization influences EU decisions. It rather has a very implicit impact. And the resolution of the European Parliament showed how much each political force represented in the European legislative body tried to play its own political game. That is nothing new. But anyway, the fact that the European Parliament today believes it should adopt such resolutions, pointing to an unsatisfactory, in its opinion, situation in Ukraine, works against the deep political rapprochement of Ukraine and the European Union.
“Regarding the free trade area, this is a more technical agreement, and it is not obligatory to sign it taking into account political moments and the overall political atmosphere. Or at least this will be taken into consideration less. Regarding the visa regime, of course, when the country is seen as moving in the wrong direction, this country and this government will not be encouraged, at least because it will be difficult to ratify such an agreement in the European Parliament.”
By the way, some deputies representing the government say that few people voted for this resolution, so it can be ignored. What can you say about it?
“This resolution is so controversial and full of compromises, and the entire process of its adoption was so obscure and non-transparent for outside observers that the field for its interpretation is broad. But I’d like to stress that the fact of discussing such resolutions and their adoption beats this drum very much. This shouldn’t be neglected. Europe will not move toward some sanctions regarding Ukraine, notably freezing up the negotiation process. But these are drops which in one or another way wear away a stone. And today Ukraine and its government have a much worse image in Europe than it had a year ago, let alone the image it had two years ago.”
If in Ukraine the “selective justice” applied to the opposition leaders persists, can Brussels enact entry bans, and freeze the accounts of Ukrainian officials and the top brass authorities who are directly involved in this process, as it was done for Belarus?
“So far we are not at this stage. I don’t want to guess what will happen if. So far I don’t see reasons for that. Speaking about Belarus, Lukashenko intentionally created the image of the last dictator in Europe. Though he is in no way the last dictator in Europe, because the things happening in Minsk to some extent happen in Moscow, let alone Azerbaijan or Armenia. That is Lukashenko, unfortunately, is not an exception. But Europe sees him exactly as an exception. Certainly, Ukraine, fortunately, is still far from these standards.
“As a result, most likely, there will be no policy of pressure on Ukrainian leaders, but rather a policy of demonstrative ignoring them.”
You said that the EU will have the same approach to the visa-free regime regarding Ukraine and Russia. Don’t you think it’s not quite right? Moscow doesn’t aspire to join the EU, unlike Kyiv. Perhaps Europe should conduct a more realistic policy toward Russia and insist on Moscow’s adherence to certain values, as the ex-head of YUKOS Mikhail Khodorkovsky recently said?
“In the EU the position that the approach to the partners in the East should be similar always dominated. The times are changing. We now observe the end of the period which started with the Georgian war. At that time there was a surge of fear and the elaboration of more or less realistic proposals. At least there was an active search for policy. And this period is over. Now Europe acts on the premise that it has no particular problems with Russia. And it will get from Putin’s Russia as much gas as from a Russia governed by liberal methods. The period of active propagation of democracy is over. The major problem now is how to end the war in Libya and not who will come to power in Russia in 2012. Therefore, whether we like it or not, we see the bureaucratization and amalgamation of policy regarding the East of Europe. In order to leave this slough, if you will, Ukraine needs extra efforts, though first of all in its movement toward democratic standards. And if this doesn’t happen, generally, no one will look at how many things are bad.”
