On October 7 Russia’s President Vladimir Putin marked his 60th birthday anniversary. For our northern neighbor (just as for its other neighbors) this event means something more than just a personal landmark. It is traditional to sum up the results of a political leader’s career in such cases, and make plans for the future. Let us skip the usual eulogies for the nation’s leader, citing his role in raising the nation from its knees and other mythical achievements. There will be plenty of it soon. Let us see how it looks from Ukraine’s perspective.
After 1991, all post-Soviet space split into two uneven parts. The Baltic States, after a relatively short transformation period, confidently stood on the tracks of democratic reforms, with joining NATO and the EU. It was not easy, but they made it. Unfortunately, the rest of the former USSR opted for a different road.
Russia led the way, being the first to form an oligarchic regime. Others followed suit. Remarkably, in the first half of the 1990s, they still preserved the momentum of democratic transformations, albeit formal. Yet they were made, anyway. Against the background of openly authoritarian regimes in Central Asia and Belarus, Russia looked not bad at all.
Everything was over with the end of Putin’s first presidential term. He expressly gave up the spirit of the “rough nineties” and proclaimed the policy of rising from the knees, and regaining the former imperial grandeur, lost through democrats’ fault. The implementation of this policy started with the easiest method, polished to perfection back in Soviet time: the concentration of power in the center, i.e., in Putin’s hands. For this, he made cadre rotation: almost all of Yeltsin’s men, with very few exceptions, soon had to go. They were replaced with reliable secret police staff and men from Saint Petersburg, who had been working there with Putin, or whom he knew well otherwise.
Cadres decide everything. Putin made good use of Comrade Stalin’s famous axiom. The concentration of power formed a close oligarcho-chekist circle around him, with a slight admixture of absolutely indispensable technocrats, brought from Russia’s second capital.
Oligarchy has many faces. It is present in each CIS country, but it is in Russia that it acquired its classical shape. The monopolization of fossil fuel mining helped achieve several goals. Firstly, concentrate huge money flows in the hands of the few. Secondly, feed crumbs from the master’s table (i.e., from the superprofit) to the masses. Thirdly, buy all the regional bureaucracy en masse. Bureaucrats were allowed to openly embezzle public funds, and appropriate or misappropriate anything they set eyes on. As a result, a close-knit structure of balanced mutual interested existed for a certain period. The center yielded the regions to governors. The latter served with faith and fidelity. As long as the superprofits from energy carriers and other mineral resources were pouring in, despite the barbaric mining practices and neglect of all environmental regulation, the system worked like a charm. It looked as though this idyll would last for a long while.
The first antagonisms in the system, which had been so painstakingly created by Putin and his entourage, were caused by the first wave of the global economic crisis. But this was only an external cause, while the internal one was much more important. The regional bureaucracy had gotten stronger and resented too much centralization. The princelings in oblasts, territories, and national republics started demanding for a bigger piece of the pie which was sent to the center. The process intensified during the pacification of Chechnya and other mutinous North Caucasian republics, which took shape of an uncontrolled flow of transfers from the center. Why, indeed, can Kadyrov demand and spend huge sums of money, while others may not? The problem was aggravated by the dwindling proceeds from oil and gas exports, and the prospects are not encouraging. This resulted in mild separatist movements in Siberia and the Far East. These regions are potentially very rich, but Moscow’s excessive surveillance is increasingly causing more and more vexation there.
Another factor is the consolidation of the so-called creative class, so far only in both capitals and in great industrial centers. It is sick and tired with all of the so-called “power vertical,” and it is getting more and more prepared to take decisive action, which we could witness last winter and spring. So far, this has only been a foretaste of the growing discontent, but a very menacing one.
The somewhat confused regime, led by Putin, was later able to curb the growing unrest and split the opposition’s ranks, but this has not removed the problem. The disease is masked, but not cured.
Psychologically, Putin is unable to accept any reforms or changes except “cosmetic” ones. That is why the promise to show the society a new president after the election is implemented through an ever increasing pressure on all the dissenters. At the same time a message has been sent to all the discontented bureaucrats both in the center and regions that they had better not look forward to the weakening of centralism. Moscow’s power will only grow, and there will be no concessions to the regions. Thus the fire of separatism is disguised, but it is ready to flare up at any moment.
An aggressive foreign policy has become another constituent of the process of consolidating central bureaucracy, led by Putin. Everyone has felt it, especially Russia’s close neighbors. This policy is dominated by a paranoid idea of reintegrating the former Soviet republics into a likeness of the USSR. At first economically, in the form of the Customs Union and “common economic spaces,” and later, politically. The first step has already been taken: the Customs Union of three countries was created. Then problems followed. There is no problem with including Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia, but it is essential that Ukraine also be there. Otherwise, the whole enterprise is not worth a dime. All efforts of the Kremlin are directed at this goal.
The general tendency of Moscow’s policy towards Kyiv is increasing the pressure, disguised as the “carrots” of economic preferences. However, here Putin’s interests clash against those of Ukraine’s oligarch’s, preoccupied with their own survival. Due to a number of reasons, Ukrainian oligarchic state structure is somewhat different from that in Russia, although our regime takes pains to copycat (not too successfully, as a rule) the most odious Russian legislation. Recently we saw witnessed it on the example of the law on slander. Our powers that be even wanted to outdo the neighbors, but they forgot that Ukraine is not Russia.
For Putin, the involvement of Ukraine into the Customs Union and its further reintegration is not only a matter of foreign policy. All his domestic policy, which he has been building during his first and second presidencies, is rooted in the imperial idea. Without Ukraine, it merely will not work. Let us not forget purely economic factors. The large country is an attractive market for Russian companies, first of all, for state monopolists. For Gazprom, the prospects of losing Ukraine, against the background of inevitable losses in Europe and a lack of new achievements in the east, are not very cheerful. The two weeks, which were allowed for Yanukovych for considering the matter, is over, but there still is no word from Kyiv. The Kremlin is waiting for the results of the parliamentary election. After that, trade wars will break out.
There is another matter to consider. Despite the defeat of Saakashvili and his party in the Georgian election, it is not worth expecting abrupt changes in the Southern Caucasus. Despite the Georgian president’s authoritarian style, he succeeded in making an important step, introducing elements of economic freedom in the country. This is not yet European style, but it is very different from what we can observe on the territory of the CIS. This is what scares Putin on the eve of his birthday anniversary. What if others follow this path?
The regime in Kyiv is scared even more. Here the vertical power structure, based on monopoly and oligarchy, is much weaker. Despite all its drawbacks, the Georgian model looks very attractive – not only for the opposition, but also for the most far-sighted representatives of the incumbent government. All this together is a great obstacle for involving Ukraine in Putin’s cherished unions and commonwealths, even if the Kremlin model remains a guiding light for the Party of Regions. Honey is sweet, but the bee stings.
The Russian regime, created by the “birthday boy,” appears to stand solid. So the power of the incumbent Russia’s leader also looks eternal and solid. Actually, it is not quite so, as the Arab Spring has shown. While Putin himself is trying to perpetuate his rule, strong controversies are growing inside the system he has created. The crisis can arrive any moment, maybe even caused by accidental external factors.
If this is the new Putin, then we have seen him. The question is, whether he can make Russia happier.
