The NATO summit in Bucharest has justified its reputation as the “summit of hopes.” Croatia and Albania saw their dreams come true when they were invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Another Balkan country, Macedonia, will have to wait until it officially changes its name and then Greece will not impose a veto, as it did in Bucharest. As for two other countries, Ukraine and Georgia, which only wanted to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP), the summit fell short of expectations. They will make another attempt in December 2008, during a meeting of NATO foreign ministers.
Even so, the leaders of Ukraine and Georgia hastened to call this summit a historic meeting and announced a victory, claiming that the NATO decision “even surpassed all expectations.” A more restrained comment came from Washington, which had actively supported offering Kyiv and Tbilisi the MAP in Bucharest. The Bush administration believes that it succeeded in making the NATO summit in Bucharest reach a “strategic decision” on Ukraine and Georgia, both of which officially received a “clear prospect” for NATO membership.
Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, without naming the reason why the discussion of Ukraine’s MAP request was postponed, that the decision of the North Atlantic Council is a very powerful signal for Ukraine.
Can Kyiv hear the NATO signals and draw proper conclusions. Is Kyiv capable of taking practical steps that will bring Ukraine closer to NATO? Below is a round-up of comments from Ukrainian and foreign experts.
What lessons should Ukraine draw from the Bucharest summit? What must the Ukrainian government do to turn the December NATO foreign ministers’ summit into a success?
COMMENTS
James SHERR, member of the Advanced Research and Assessment Group (UK):
“First of all, the summit should clearly demonstrate that NATO is not an instrument subordinated to the US but an alliance that reflects a consensus of 26 member states. Second, it should show that Russia is now the object of great worry and concern for the alliance. One problem is that those who share these worries and concerns come to different conclusions as to what attitude to adopt. Another problem is that, unfortunately, the leadership of at least one NATO member state has publicly linked Russia’s position with the membership problem of certain countries that are trying to join NATO, such as Ukraine and Georgia. In doing this, it has violated the well-established principle, which the NATO secretary-general constantly repeats, that membership decisions, including the one on the MAP, are made by the alliance and the interested country rather than with the participation of a third country.
“An additional problem is that, in the case of Germany, this undesirable public position hid a more constructive private position that recognizes the advisability and, at least in principle, the long-term inevitability of Ukraine’s NATO membership. And this position was clearly stated in the communique. The additional lesson is that a compromise can bring a better long-term result than an immediate success. NATO has now officially announced that Ukraine and Georgia will be members of the alliance. And the entire alliance supports this. In my opinion, the established mechanism should make it clear, at least between NATO and Ukraine’s leadership, that one must take the final steps that will assure NATO of Ukraine’s ability to meet its commitments.
“Since the summer of 2006 there has been stagnation and, in some fields, even decline in Ukraine-NATO relations. Instead of increasing, the political and strategic dialog diminished. The rate of impressive administrative and institutional reforms has slowed down. Defense and security reforms have also ground to a halt. One can say that reforms in this area have even worsened. Because these reforms are very important and still in their infancy, this deterioration has sparked deep concern among all professionals — concern about the prospects of Ukraine’s NATO membership.
“Unfortunately, in the past, part of the Ukrainian leadership reacted to every attempt to draw attention to this concern with an extremely inflexible, unacceptable, and even aggressive attitude. This deterioration and this response, both of which worry NATO, are an important part of the subtext of the summit’s Ukraine decision. In reality, this is more important for the future than the problem of Russia.
“NATO would like to see that the country’s leadership is listening again and taking a constructive approach to our proposals and concern about what should be done. First, the pattern of cooperation should be changed. We need to be constructive and cooperative again. Second, the alliance should receive assurances that the Ukrainian leadership is aware of the importance of supporting the national interest and pursuing a national policy in spite of political pressure and subjective political interests.
“Naturally, the alliance is aware of the political situation in Ukraine. NATO knows that there will be a presidential election in 2009. But what they do not see is determination in the top ranks of the government to see to it that these difficulties, the struggle, and the election race do not impair the long-term policy and the country’s national interests.
“There is no problem with America. Ukraine is receiving massive support from the US. Ukraine needs NATO’s support. But this is an alliance of 26 countries. So the Ukrainian president should respond the way his former Estonian counterpart, Lenart Meri, did when he was asked what could happen if Estonia did not become a NATO member. His answer was, ‘I will come back to Estonia and work even harder on reforms and transformations, and I will produce an even better result at home. That is how we will force NATO to think again.’”
Nikolai PETROV, member of the Scholarly Council of the Carnegie Moscow Center:
“It seems to me that the summit made an optimal decision both for Ukrainian-Russian relations and for the relations between Russia and the West as a whole. On the one hand, the door is not closed and Kyiv can continue going in this direction. On the other, Ukraine managed to avoid a confrontation on both the international and the domestic level. I think this problem requires sufficient time and effort and, above all, Ukrainian society should reach an understanding and agreement about the applicable model of Ukraine’s movement towards Europe. This decision is also important in that Ukrainian-Russian relations will also develop evolutionarily rather than by fits and starts in a crisis.
“I think that, given the rhetoric that we heard in the run-up to the Bucharest summit, different reactions and assessments are inevitable. But on the whole, I believe it is rather a calm reaction if you assess its likely consequences.
“It seems to me that, like in the Kosovo situation, abrupt changes are far more dangerous than a gradual evolution, especially if public opinion is split, which then requires a step-by-step approach to a certain model rather than an abrupt decision that will impair the interests of a large number of people.
“I do not think there are any special grounds for a deep crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations. There were no unexpected surprises in Bucharest. It is known that Ukraine filed a certain application to NATO. It is known that this was discussed and no final decision was made. In this sense, there are no radical changes in the situation.”
Andras BARSONY, Ambassador of Hungary to Ukraine:
“It is not true that Hungary was against offering Ukraine the MAP in Bucharest. Hungary has never changed its stand and supports Ukraine’s ambitions. At the same time, we said that we would prefer a consensus. But even if one country opposes the MAP, no decision can be made. Hungary and some other countries failed to win over those who persistently opposed this. It is very easy to refer to the so-called Russian factor and Russia’s opposition. But the point is that the alliance never accepts the so-called right of the outside veto. Russia’s opposition to offering Ukraine the MAP can be a political argument but not a decisive factor.
“In order to receive a positive answer in December, Ukraine should listen to the countries that opposed granting the MAP and had announced this in no uncertain terms before the Bucharest summit. If you listen, you will hear several arguments: about further transparency in political decision-making in Ukraine, further democratization of its institutions, and the need to persuade the Ukrainian people that Ukraine really needs to be a member of NATO. One of the fundamental features of the membership process is that NATO admits countries and nations, not political parties and institutions. Public support is therefore one of the necessary elements. I hope the Ukrainian government will be able to increase public support for Ukraine’s NATO membership before the December summit of foreign ministers. On its part, the alliance will be furnishing all the necessary information about NATO for you to inform the public.
“I do not think that the failure to offer Ukraine the MAP in Bucharest can have any negative consequences. First of all, the MAP is not membership: it is a new stage in Ukraine’s integration. I do not believe that a deferred MAP decision will postpone the real accession of Ukraine to NATO.”
Ihor SLISARENKO, journalist:
“The assessment of the Bucharest summit’s decision as someone’s personal victory or someone’s personal defeat means that the subject requires a very thorough analysis. This is a challenge not only for Ukraine but Europe as a whole. First of all, we saw a division into the so-called old and new Europe, which began in 2003 over whether to support the US and British military campaigns in Iraq. It would be too great a simplification to claim that the summit’s decision is a defeat for the United States or a victory for Russia. The processes are far more profound: they did not emerge on the eve of the summit but have been in place for years.
“We can say that NATO as an organization is in crisis, and the collective security system in Europe has equally blurred outlines. What we need now is a further analysis of the situation. At the moment, Ukraine must implement a clear foreign policy that should confine itself to questions pertaining to the European Union or NATO membership. We must be more active outside the traditional areas, for example, in the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77, or the Forum of Young Democracies, and make a name for ourselves. We must declare that we are not a buffer or a gray zone, because a number of European countries are saying that Ukraine should be given the role of a certain cordon for balance in Europe. We should really show ourselves in Third World countries.
“We will have time until December to see how the situation changes. There will be many events. For example, there are talks going on among Putin, Medvedev, and Bush. This may put an end to speculations about such events as Bush’s visit to Ukraine and the Bucharest summit. In other words, this meeting may well tell us about the advantages gained by one side or another. Then we will be able to say more confidently in which direction things will be evolving before December.”
Levan BERDZHENESHVILI, Republican Party of Georgia:
“The Bucharest summit showed that Ukraine and Georgia are not prepared for the MAP. The point is that the situation in these two countries is different. It seems to me Ukraine has fewer problems with democracy but more problems with public opinion about NATO. Things are exactly the reverse in Georgia: there are more problems with democracy, but about 80 percent of the population supports accession to the alliance. The situation is unstable in Ukraine from the standpoint of the country’s unity and in Georgia, from the standpoint of unresolved conflicts. All this prompted NATO members to deny both countries the MAP. The situation in Georgia is very special because both the opposition and the government favor the country’s entry into NATO. We do not have a party, a center, or a movement that is against this. First of all, we must hold normal elections in May. Once this happens, Georgia will be ready to enter NATO because this will give an impetus to the reforms we have been told to carry out. I believe we can be given the MAP in December provided we hold a fair parliamentary election.”
Ron KELLER, Ambassador of the Netherlands to Ukraine:
“The 26 NATO member states admitted in the communique’s Clause 23 that there are some problems that should be solved before Ukraine can be granted MAP status. I think these problems are the reason why the Bucharest summit did not say ‘yes’ to Ukraine. Some of these issues are about security and defense reforms. Others are about parliament’s performance. So without going into concrete details, I must say that some of them concern political and civic support as well as the commitment to continue reforms. And all the NATO member states said that these problems should be solved in the next few months.
“The Netherlands is one of the 26 countries that signed Clause 23. This clause states that Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members. The Netherlands, like the rest of the allied countries, supports Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. In other words, the Netherlands is not against, it is not putting up obstacles, or using the right of veto. We took a constructive part in the debate. I think the White House gives 100-percent support to this document.
“I do not know what decision the foreign ministers will reach at the December summit. We will find out in December. But I think we should look at Clause 23, which indicates the direction in which Ukraine and NATO should move.
“Ukraine has six months to work on the unresolved problems together with the NATO members. I am sure we will see the next step in December. But I do not know how the debate will proceed at that summit. I do not think it is worthwhile exaggerating the differences in the views of NATO members at the Bucharest summit. Yes, most of the countries had questions and concerns. The Ukrainian delegation answered these questions to some extent and removed some of these concerns. But some problems remain unresolved.”
