What was once known as Celestial Empire is expecting an important event: the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is to open on November 8 at Beijing’s House of People’s Assemblies.
Special importance is attached to even-number congresses because odd-number congresses usually extend the top party leadership’s tenure of office for another term but, at the same time, form the “substitution bench” of future leaders. It is the country’s reformer Deng Xiaoping who devised and implemented this system. The current leaders with Communist Party of China (CPC) Secretary General Hu Jintao at the head came to power in 2002. The newly-elected will rule the country until 2022 unless the tradition changes.
At the previous congress, Hu Jintao put forward a slogan to build, by 2020, a xiaokang (basically well-off) society, where most of the people will live a comfortable life. One year later the CPC will be celebrating its centenary.
Undoubtedly, China has achieved very much since it was ruled by Mao Zedong. The country is now producing the world’s second largest GDP and has become a space power. The urban population is steadily on the rise. Joining the WTO has promoted new foreign economic ties. China has considerably boosted its prestige and role in international politics.
Economic growth has allowed spending major funds on modernizing the army and the navy. There are no ample grounds to speak of all-out militarization, but, for example, the Chinese Navy has become a serious factor in the Asian-Pacific region to the extent that the US is redeploying more than 60 percent of its warships in the Pacific Ocean.
In spite of obvious successes, the country is more and more debating on its future prospects. This is linked with serious transformations not only in Chinese society, but also in the party.
Let us note an article, “Hu and Wen’s political legacy,” in the journal Xuexi shibao which was reprinted on a number of websites and triggered a heated debate. The emergence and, what is more, publication of this article is an extraordinary event for several reasons.
Firstly, the journal is a publication of the CPC Central Committee’s Central Party School which not only grooms top party cadres for the entire country but is also the most important think tank that deals with the party ideology and policies.
Secondly, by tradition, the Central Party School head is the party’s No. 2 functionary who is expected to become No.1 at the upcoming congress. It is Xi Jinping. For this reason, many experts believe that the journal’s position mirrors his views.
Thirdly, the author of the article, Deng Yuwen, is not a run-of-the-mill professor but the journal’s deputy editor-in-chief.
By Chinese standards, it is not just a bold article – it lays claim to being part of a program. It claims that the authorities, especially at the local level, fail to keep pace with the ongoing societal reforms. The fast development of networking technologies radically changes social ecology, encourages the masses to become aware of their civil rights, and challenges control and leadership on the part of the ruling party and government. As a result, this may call into question the very legitimacy of the political system.
The article highlights 10 key problems of the country. “But the gravest problem is a slow pace of political reform and democratization, which thwarts the people’s hopes to regain their rights. In the course of 10 years, Hu and Wen [secretary general and prime minister, respectively. – Ed.] have been emphasizing the importance of democracy, freedom, law and order, and reform of the political system, but this has been in fact implemented to a limited extent. As the experience of modernization in a number of countries and the actual situation in China show, it is impossible to carry out a consistent political reform and democratization immediately. It is a process that requires caution. However, we must at least give people a hope and show – by concrete actions – the ruling party’s sincerity of intentions.”
As we can see, the party leadership is really facing serious political problems. And very many things in China, the region, and the entire world depend on their solution.
In spite of ostentatious monolithism, the Chinese party leaders and top bureaucracy are divided into several rivaling groups. They should not be viewed as something consolidated and organizationally shaped. Nevertheless, they can be classified on the basis of the interests they are defending and the political actions they are supporting.
The first group is that of the so-called princelings and the Shanghai clique. The term “princes’ party” (taizidang in Chinese) was applied in imperial China to the throne successor and his inner circle. But in present-day China, this word is used to mean representatives of the new Red aristocracy – the descendants of former party and state leaders.
It is believed that the former vice-chairman Zeng Qinghong could form this grouping. This happened after an alliance was struck with the “Shanghai clique” – former members of the Shanghai city party committee headed for a long time by Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the People’s Republic of China. However, as Hu Jintao was elected CPC Secretary General and PRC Chairman, the power of the Shanghai apparatchiks noticeably diminished.
The current alliance of the princelings and the Shanghai clique is a largely tactical coalition based on the personal connections between its participants. The status of a princeling by no means guarantees support from the grouping. A convincing illustration of this is the recent downfall of Bo Xilai, a noted functionary, who was expelled from the party. Neither Xi Jinping nor other princelings and Shanghai men lifted a finger to salvage him. After suffering some losses during the rule of Hu Jintao, this grouping is on the rise again. Comrade Xi Jinping, a representative of this alliance, is going to be the new leader of China.
The abovementioned grouping is opposed to tuanpai, a far more united “Communist youth faction.” The current Secretary General Hu Jintao comes from its ranks. He managed to rally his Young Communist League colleagues around himself and make them his loyal comrades-in-arms. This formed the core of a Young Communist grouping in Beijing. The young comrades Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao were Hu Jintao’s first deputies. The former will assume the office of Chairman of the State Council (cabinet) as a result of party congress decisions. (Formally, this will be done in March 2013 at the congress of the All-Chinese Assembly of People’s Representatives.)
The third important grouping is the military. Officially, the army is subordinated to the Communist Party, which is confirmed by the fact that the supreme commander-in-chief is a civilian. At the moment, it is CPC CC Secretary General Hu Jintao. Nevertheless, the army was and still is a key political player, even inside the party itself. The military account for 11 percent (251) of the 2,270 delegates of the forthcoming congress. The military represent 24 out of the 203 members of the party’s Central Committee and 2 out of the 25 Politburo members.
By their world outlook, many Chinese uniformed servicemen are conservative. Their ideological manifesto is the book China Dream by Colonel Liu Mingfu, published in 2009. He writes that mainland China has no other option than to become a new superpower instead of the US – otherwise, the country will face “degradation and destruction.” The conservative military have allies among the civilian bureaucracy. It is not ruled out that last October’s portfolio redistributions were aimed at breaking up this alliance. Also of importance is the appointment of more “technical” generals, for example, those of the Air Force, to executive positions. But what really matters is the fact that these generals maintain close ties with Hu Jintao himself. This in turn shows that the leaders who have left their offices still have a great deal of political clout.
China is facing serious challenges. And very many things depend on the way the current leadership will respond to them – whether it will continue to follow the present-day line or will try to modernize political life.
By Yurii RAIKHEL
COMMENTARY
Andrii HONCHARUK, head of the Department of Foreign Policy at the National Institute for Strategic Studies:
“The experience of the past years has showed that China had managed to solve social and economic issues it had faced during its rapid development. Last year it was made clear to the world community and experts that there is an internal struggle in China between people who have different views on the future of this country. If the Congress will be held as it was planned, it will refresh the staff, and the fifth generation of state leaders, whose core is Xi Jinping, will come to power. Therefore, I think, the gradual development of China toward democratization and involvement of the general public to the political process in the country will take place in a normal and moderate way. Another issue is that it is not the kind of democracy the Western countries are used to. However, for the Confucian world it is a sufficient level of progress at both the state and the social levels.
“Will China become more relented in its relations with the United States, who demand a devaluation of the yuan? This topic is not as relevant now as it was five years ago. First, the United States have significantly softened their rhetoric in relations with China. Second, China has gradually aligned the yuan against the dollar. After the last visit of the US Secretary of Defence [Leon Panetta. – Ed.] to China, when he said that the United States seek to establish a very close relationship with them, any confrontation is out of the question. This may mean that China and the United States have, in fact, formed a ‘Big Two,’ although this has not been announced and people in China avoid such formulations. Even though they have the relationship that affects the whole world, unfortunately, the rest of the world has nothing to do with it. They together decide for themselves how to balance the opportunities and threats of the two largest economies in the world.
“With the advent of Xi Jinping relations between China and Ukraine will not change at all. Both Ukraine and China are consistent in bilateral relations. All the presidents of Ukraine confirmed previous agreements and declarations.
“The rise to power of Hu Jintao also did not change approaches of the Chinese leadership to Ukraine. His successor Xi Jinping will take into account the fact that China considers Ukraine to be (according to their formulation) ‘an important European country.’
“Since the last visit of Hu Jintao to Ukraine the turnover between the two countries has significantly increased. Modernization of major energy infrastructure facilities is in progress, despite all the obstacles. But the main problem is that in order for private businesses to start operating in Ukraine, the state business has to start operating first. And the state investments and business are only possible under the state guarantee of Ukraine. It is a complicated process, mechanisms are limited, a lot of routine work should be done to get it going. But the dynamics of cooperation is generally positive.”
By Ihor SAMOKYSH, The Day
