The relationship between Ukraine and Russia has had its frequent ups and downs. A team of experts at the Kyiv Institute for the Study of Russia (KIVR) decided to ascertain how much the attitude of Ukraine and Russia to each other has changed over the past couple of years in the course of the study “Ukrainians and Russians: A Look at Each Other.” This research is the first sociological study in the history of both independent countries, involving 2,100 and 1,300 respondents from Russia and Ukraine, respectively.
The sociologists established that the residents of the Russian Federation rely only on their own resources to build a better future: 79 percent of respondents are convinced that they are responsible for their own well-being, 75 percent rely on the state, while 70 percent rely on local authorities. The Ukrainian respondents followed suit: 89 percent are fully convinced they can build a happier future by themselves.
This study shows that the neighborly relations index is the main criterion for assessing Russian-Ukrainian relations. It currently shows +11 points (on a с)xp 100-point scale), a bit higher in Ukraine than in Russia (14:9). KIVR Director General Andrii Blinov says that both countries are in a state of cool neutrality. If the political and social situation in Ukraine and Russia continues to evolve in the same way, this neighborly index may drop by several points.
Blinov is convinced that “the political situation in both countries is complicated these days. Ukraine is still feeling the effects of the Orange Revolution, while Russia is getting ready for the presidential elections, which may have a tangible effect on current bilateral relations. Additional surveys will be carried out in order to monitor changes in Ukraine and Russia’s views of each other. Whereas today 21 percent of respondents in Russia and 25 percent in Ukraine regard these relations as neighborly, after the presidential elections in Russia this March these relations may become neutral or hostile. This is the current view of 14 percent of respondents in Russia, with 8 percent noting that these relations are competitive. The Ukrainian respondents appear more optimistic: nearly 11 percent of them believe that these relations are friendly; 12 percent say they are on a partnership basis, something their Russian counterparts decisively reject.”
There is only one thing on which the Russian and Ukrainian respondents agree, namely, that the relations between their people and governments have worsened over the past year (40 and 35 percent of respondents in Ukraine and Russia, respectively). Blinov says that it cannot be otherwise, considering that Russia’s television keeps insisting that Ukraine has stolen gas from Russia. Ukrainian television, in turn, accuses Russia of pumping oil and gas through Ukrainian pipelines free of charge. Under these circumstances, a mere eight percent of residents in both countries believe that there are positive changes in Ukraine-Russia relations. What are the sources from which people Ukrainians and Russians derive their information about each other? In Ukraine, it is mostly Russian television channels (72 percent; Ukrainian television and radio channels (65 percent); the Ukrainian press (32 percent); newspapers from Russia (22 percent). Ukrainians receive a small amount of information from their relatives and friends who live in Russia (21 percent). Residents of the Russian Federation obtain information about Ukraine by watching their television channels (72 percent) and reading the Russian press (21 percent). There are no Ukrainian sources available there, period.
Oleksii Borovsky, a researcher at KIVR, said: “It’s a shame that most of the information about both countries is being received from television, not through personal contact. Every fourth Ukrainian noted that s/he was receiving news from Russia through relatives or friends. In Russia, only one in ten does this. This data confirms the thesis about the lopsided exchange of information between our two countries. Ukraine has a bigger media choice, so people can make more objective and deeper analyses. Also, it is easier for residents of western Ukraine to visit Russia than for people who live in Siberia or Russia’s Far East to visit our country. Here geography is the obstacle: the distances from Lviv to the Russian border and from Vladivostok to the Ukrainian border are very different.”
The sociological study conducted by KIVR shows that varying latitudes have an effect on relations between Ukrainians and Russians. Two-thirds of Russia’s citizens and almost 50 percent of Ukrainians have neither personal nor professional contacts. Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, more than 60 percent of Ukrainian nationals have never visited Russia, while more than 80 percent of Russia’s residents have never crossed the Ukrainian border. According to this study, five percent of Russian nationals and nine percent of Ukrainian citizens are crossing the border, mostly migrant workers from the Russian Federation’s central and northwestern regions and from northeastern Ukraine. Despite the low level of contact, people in both countries point out the same problems that exist between Ukraine and Russia. An average of 35 percent of respondents in both countries believe that energy dependence is the most serious issue; 35 percent say it is lack of trust among political leaders; almost 25 percent complain about domestic political differences. Experts believe that all these problems are freezing Russia-Ukraine relations and preventing both countries from progressing. These statistics will change over time, but the main thing is to keep the neighborly index above the minus mark: keeping one’s home warm costs a lot these days.
COMMENTARY
Yevhen HOLOVAKHA, sociologist:
A long time ago Russian-Ukrainian relations stopped being regarded as neighborly, in the traditional patriarchal context that has become totally obsolete. Gradually this stereotype, which was formed over hundreds of years, including during the Soviet era, when the only state-building nation was the Russians, will lose its patriarchal content. In this sense Ukrainians accept this stereotype less emotionally, but it is still hard for Russians to accept the sovereignty of both countries, with their separate world views, orientations, directions of progress, and problems. This will cease over time, of course. Here the important thing is the formation of historical consciousness of the two nations, one that has quite deep roots and is not so easy to destroy. That is why it is significantly easier for Ukraine to build relations with Slovakia or Hungary. We are more open and friendly than Russians. Ukraine’s accession to NATO will be a real test of its relations with Russia. So far, Ukrainians regard this question negatively. To Russia, this is an unfriendly, if not enemy, organization. Therefore, once Ukraine proceeds along its path to NATO, its relations with Russia will change on both the governmental and psychological levels. The inference is simple: you have to pay for everything, including democracy. When a country has many elections, you end up paying for instability and economic problems. A multi-vector foreign policy sounds great, but we must walk away from it, step by step, because every decisive political step has its price.
Viktor KONSTANYNOV, Candidate of Political Science:
The reserve of strength in relations between Ukraine and Russia, dating back to Soviet times, has been practically exhausted. Nevertheless, both countries were formed as independent countries within the same social, political, geographic, and other limits that they had when the Soviet Union collapsed. Because of this, the political-information field of Russia and Ukraine is becoming the most important factor from which the populations of both countries are obtaining knowledge about the outside world. For quite a long time there was a traditional approach in Ukraine’s internal political struggle: worsening of relations with Russia, which would emerge during election campaigns. After an election, the political field would quiet down.
Lately, the situation has changed cardinally because, on the one hand, there are too many elections and on the other, because of politicians’ activities. Therefore, political events remain in the headlines, and they are a constant propaganda factor for the Ukrainian and Russian political communities. All this is affecting the formation of public awareness. The inertia accumulated by politicians is flowing into the sphere of public opinion. This trend is not likely to change in the nearest future because the image of an external enemy has always been convenient in domestic political struggles. We should also expect important developments in Ukraine and Russia, which will make toughen the policies of both countries, and one way or another they will influence public opinion and moods. I am referring to the coming presidential elections in the Russian Federation and the later-scheduled presidential elections in Ukraine. In the first case, Russia’s tendency to attract more attention to itself will be strengthened, even though its society has little interest in the outside world. Ukraine will not be an exception to the rule: media interest in it will lessen. The only thing that will interest Russians on the eve of the election campaign will be foreigners’ views of Russia. In Ukraine, relations with Russia long ago become a factor of internal political struggle. These relations are increasingly often discussed as the orientation of various political forces, so relations with Russia will once again become the main topic during the next election campaign in Ukraine.
