It is a strength of our democracies that even when a military operation is successful and commands overwhelming international support, many will question whether it should have been undertaken — on policy or legal grounds — and, once undertaken, whether it should have been conducted differently. A year on, it is worth reviewing such criticism to try to present the issues fairly. The main questions raised about NATO’s actions are as follows:
Did the international community insist on conditions that made a failure of the Rambouillet talks inevitable?
Some suggest that by insisting on a NATO-led international military force to oversee any settlement agreed at Rambouillet, the Contact Group made it impossible for the Yugoslav authorities to agree to the Accords, which would otherwise have been acceptable. It is further claimed that the rights of this force on Yugoslav territory would have been so extensive that the Serbs were bound to reject them.
It is true that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resisted the idea of a NATO-led force to guarantee any agreement, however, President Milosevic’s record speaks for itself. The international community had to take account of the fact that President Milosevic had repeatedly failed to honour previous agreements and that an international security presence was essential to guarantee that the Accords would be honoured. Also, without such a presence, the Kosovar Albanian side would not have given their agreement.
The rights such a force would have needed to operate on Yugoslav territory were based on a standard agreement on the status of forces that has been used on many other occasions. These rights were not raised as an issue at the time, and so cannot be blamed for the breakdown.
Despite the provision for an international security presence, the Rambouillet Accords recognised Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo and permitted a VJ and MUP presence and role in the province. The agreement, which provided for an interim status for the province for a period of three years, would have protected the rights of all sides. As a result of the Yugoslav government’s refusal to negotiate in good faith, Serb forces were ultimately expelled from Kosovo — a far worse outcome than had been on offer at Rambouillet.
Were NATO’s actions legally justified without a mandate from the UN Security Council?
Some argue that NATO should not have acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo without a specific United Nations Security Council mandate. The Allies were sensitive to the legal basis for their action. The Yugoslavs had already failed to comply with numerous demands from the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and there was a major discussion in the North Atlantic Council, during which the Council took the following factors into consideration:
- the Yugoslav government’s non-compliance with earlier UN Security Council resolutions,
- the warnings from the UN Secretary General about the dangers of a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo,
- the risk of such a catastrophe in the light of Yugoslavia’s failure to seek a peaceful resolution of the crisis,
- the unlikelihood that a further UN Security Council resolution would be passed in the near future,
- and the threat to peace and security in the region.
At that point, the Council agreed that a sufficient legal basis existed for the Alliance to threaten and, if necessary, use force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Had NATO not acted, the Yugoslav regime would have continued its brutal repression of the Albanian population of Kosovo. Today those who survived the ethnic savagery and the ravages of the winter would still be living in refugee camps outside their country, and the region would have been condemned to continuing warfare and instability for years to come.
Did the Alliance do enough to avoid “collateral damage”, and did NATO planes fly too high to be effective?
Some have suggested that, despite the low civilian casualties, NATO should still have done more to protect civilians. In fact, as explained above, NATO planners went to great lengths to minimise such risks, in keeping with the laws of armed conflict.
Apart from ensuring the relevance of each target to the military campaign, the kind of weapons used were chosen to reduce to an absolute minimum the risk of unintended damage. Targets were studied to determine the distance between the intended impact point and any civilian facilities. Timings of attacks were restricted to minimise the chance of civilians being nearby. Aircrew flew under strict rules of engagement, and were directed to break off any attack if they were worried there was too much risk of what is known as “collateral damage”. Despite all this, it was inevitable that some mistakes would occur and that weapon systems would sometimes malfunction. Top priority was given to investigating mistakes and applying any lessons learned.
The exact figures for civilian casualties in the air campaign will never be known, and NATO has had no access to target areas outside Kosovo. However, the independent group, Human Rights Watch, estimates there were 90 incidents involving civilian fatalities, which suggests that less than one per cent of the 10,484 NATO strike sorties led to civilian deaths.
Critics argue that measures to reduce the risks to our aircrew, which prevented them operating below certain altitudes, made it harder to find targets and decreased bombing accuracy. This is not the case. Modern weapon systems can strike from great ranges and heights with extreme accuracy. As aircrew themselves have pointed out, flying above most enemy air defences allowed time to properly identify targets, even circling them, before striking. It is not even true that all strikes were conducted from high levels. As the campaign developed, and conditions allowed, some aircraft operated down to 6,000 feet. A balance had to be struck between the risks taken, and the likely results. Poor weather and the need to avoid unintended damage were both far more important targeting constraints than operating heights.
Ultimately, air-power achieved its goals. In contrast, the Serb strategy failed. They had hoped to outlast NATO and to inflict losses that would undermine public support in Allied countries. Their inability to do so was one of the failures that in the end forced them to accept the international community’s demands.
Was NATO’s bombing campaign poorly conceived and executed?
Some argue that NATO’s air campaign should have been more aggressive, striking at the heart of power in Belgrade at an earlier stage, while others have criticised NATO’s decision not to deploy ground troops for an invasion of Kosovo.
Such a debate is theoretical — NATO won with the strategy it used. Airpower worked. We must not forget that NATO decided to employ military force to achieve limited political objectives — to end the violence and repression — not to militarily defeat Yugoslavia. As mentioned elsewhere, President Milosevic’s only hope was to divide the Alliance, so any NATO strategy had to preserve Alliance unity and to reflect the democratic wishes of all 19 nations. Avoiding unnecessary suffering among the Serb population was also vital in maintaining public and international support for NATO’s actions.
As the Serb repression in Kosovo accelerated, NATO responded quickly to intensify the air campaign. And as the air campaign lengthened other military options were seriously discussed at NATO and in national capitals. Nations were understandably reluctant to launch a ground invasion, which would have been time-consuming, difficult and expensive, in terms of lives as well as money and equipment. Nevertheless, many believe that NATO would have taken this step if necessary. It is probable that President Milosevic came to believe that we would do so, if necessary, and this may have been one of the reasons for his capitulation.
Did NATO deliberately mislead the public concerning the success of its air strikes against Serb forces in Kosovo?
There is still debate over the amount of Serb weapons and equipment destroyed. Numbers cited are often contradictory and unsubstantiated. For its part, the Alliance and individual member nations have extensively studied the air campaign’s effectiveness to learn the lessons. On 16 September 1999, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark, briefed the press on the findings of NATO’s Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team. During this briefing, he said NATO carried out successful strikes against 93 tanks, 153 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 339 military vehicles and 389 artillery pieces and mortars.
In June, with the conflict still underway, it was estimated 120 tanks, 314 artillery pieces and 203 APCs had been struck. Given the extreme difficulty of judging results during combat, and without access on the ground, these figures stand comparison with later assessments, and show how hard NATO tried to give accurate information during the conflict. It should also be noted that although this still left the Serbs with many hundreds of armoured vehicles in Kosovo, they had mostly been hidden throughout the conflict.
Relying on numbers also misses the point. When General Clark was asked how many targets NATO destroyed he simply replied: “Enough.” Overall, NATO’s air campaign forced President Milosevic to accede to the demands of the international community, achieving the Alliance’s political objectives. This is the ultimate measure of NATO’s success.
Did NATO’s air campaign itself cause the ethnic cleansing it intended to stop?
Some claim the brutal ethnic cleansing, violence and refugee exodus was precipitated by NATO’s air campaign. The facts do not support this. President Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was well prepared and rehearsed, as the OSCE/ODIHR report shows. It was preceded by a military build-up that was underway even as the Rambouillet talks were in progress. Later intelligence showed that he had a pre-planned strategy (Operation Horseshoe) to drive the Kosovar Albanian population out of Kosovo.
What we also know is that he tried to implement this brutal strategy of ethnic cleansing, but failed. Those refugees are now home. Instead of hiding in hills, sitting in refugee camps, or being scattered throughout Europe, the vast majority of Kosovar Albanians were brought home within months. In comparison, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are still an estimated one-third of a million refugees, with over twice that number internally displaced. The firm and timely response of NATO and the international community stopped a vicious spiral of violence in its tracks.
