The new parliament, starting on May 14, reached the stage of forming fractions on May 16. At the morning session the chairman, Valery Konovaliuk, announced that six fractions were officially registered in Verkhovna Rada: the Socialist (22 deputies), Tymoshenko Bloc (23), United Social Democrats (37), Communist (63), Our Ukraine (119), and For a United Ukraine (175), bringing the total to 433 affiliated lawmakers, with 14 still uncommitted.
Also, an off-the-record structuring has begun, dividing parliament 4:2. Vote turnouts show the Four to consist of the Socialists, Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukrainian, and Communists. Accordingly, the Two is made up of the United Ukrainians and Social Democrats. The longevity of the quartet with the Reds is dubious and there is the actual possibility of a 2:3 division, with the CPU becoming the weathervane.
Counter to optimistic predictions, the 2002 Speaker Saga could prove drawn out, the first indication being the resolution on electing the parliamentary leadership triumvirate by secret ballot. And the alignment of forces appeared traditional: 202 (United Ukraine and the SDPU{o}) coming out for an open and 231 (of the Four) for a secret ballot. The Four exponents met the first turnout on the electronic billboard with catcalls and cheered the second. The atmosphere was thick with the euphoria of victory, dimming wits and preventing sober calculation of further moves and figuring out possible scenarios.
In fact, both types of voting procedures have advantages and shortcomings. Our Ukrainian and Tymoshenko’s people, fighting for the secret ballot, explained their stand by the desire to protect legislators who had voted the wrong way in the regime’s eyes against possible retribution by the administrative resource. On the other hand, the secret ballot offers a nice cover for vote tampering. During the 1998 Speaker Saga, the current prisoner overseas and the then leader of Hromada, Pavlo Lazarenko, would shove stacks of his subordinates’ ballots into boxes to secure the desired turnout. Viktor Yushchenko, legislative neophyte that he is, might not remember that, but Yuliya Tymoshenko must remember everything all too well, for she was Lazarenko’s Woman Friday at the time. The Communists must have also been quick on the uptake; although Petro Symonenko assured journalists in lobby interviews that his party had nothing to hide and that the voting procedures did not make any difference, they voted for the secret ballot. Healthy pragmatism, considering that the Communist votes are worth their weight in gold, as previously, and this time almost literally. In other words, it remains to be seen whether the Four or the Two is more transparent.
In short, the architects of the secret ballot fell into their own trap, and not just fell but triumphantly stepped down there. Many realized that the first attempt to elect the VR leadership that way would fail. Even a superficial analysis showed that none of the Four’s two packages, the CPU one (Adam Martyniuk, Viktor Musiyaka, and Petro Tolochko), and Our Ukrainian (Ivan Pliushch, Adam Martyniuk, and Oleksandr Turchynov), stood a chance of collecting the required 226 votes. Adam Martyniuk could have won the speaker’s seat if supported not only by his Communist and Socialist comrades, but also by the Tymoshenko Bloc and practically all of Our Ukraine. But this would be more like science fiction. True, the National Democrats, shining moralists as they were, entered certain relations with the Communists, but not to the extent of paving the way to the speaker’s seat. Adam Martyniuk’s result (172 ayes), however, looked quite impressive.
Former Speaker Ivan Pliushch was placed third (140). The thing is that 25-30 Our Ukrainians would have never voted for him anyway, so his nomination by that bloc appeared somewhat masochistic. Perhaps contrary to the bloc’s political coordinator Roman Bezsmertny’s admonition that “Pliushch is our history and our experience,” most centrists chose to look forward, not back. The Socialists made no secret of their opposition to the Pliushch candidacy. And of course, the world would have stopped turning if all the Communists had voted for him; they must still remember who took over their nominee Oleksandr Tkachenko’s post during the velvet revolution of 2001.
The United Social Democratic package (Volodymyr Lytvyn, Adam Martyniuk, Oleksandr Zinchenko) collected the largest 209 votes (after Our Ukraine’s Viktor Musiyaka pulled out of the trio proposed by For a United Ukraine) supported by Our Ukraine. United Ukraine’s Oleksandr Volkov told The Day he was sure the Volodymyr Lytvyn trio would have hit home at first try, given an open vote. In that case, he added, some lawmakers would have voted “actually not against Lytvyn, but against the system proposed during the elections, against the administrative resource, and particularly against the regime.”
Incidentally, Viktor Musiyaka offered no explanation of his pullout from the United Ukraine package, causing it to fall apart, although many had considered him the most logical and electable candidate. He may have done so on Viktor Yushchenko’s bidding who, in turn, may have been given such a recommendation by someone from his entourage. True, Our Ukrainian Musiyaka stepping down looks a bit strange in light of the bloc leader’s meeting with the president on May 15. Very little is known of what was said and done at that meeting, but there are indications that the meeting was initiated by Viktor Yushchenko. The following day, asked by a journalist about the package vote turnout, Mr. Yushchenko said something like they had been fooled. Meaning what? That some arrangement had been made but kept secret from the bulk of the deputies? Be it as it may, Viktor Musiyaka’s withdrawal must have taken Lytvyn & Co. completely by surprise. It is not likely that United Ukraine would have nominated him without his consent. Against this backdrop the defection from Our Ukraine by territorial mandate holder Mykola Polishchuk and joining For a United Ukraine looks quite symptomatic. His is not likely to be the sole precedent.
And so, the first episode of the 2002 Speaker Saga shows that the Four has a long way to go to achieve consensus among its ideologically polarized factions, despite its situational coincidences of interests. Actually, such consensus is unlikely to happen, ever. On the one hand, the “bloc” of power also proved unprepared for the parliament leadership trial. In the words of one lawmaker, one of the modern classics of “applied political science,” is that “one has to work with people,” meaning that such work was not done properly.
The process of distributing the new parliament portfolios might have been less painful in the presence of an appropriate legal framework — that is, if kept in accordance with the laws on the parliamentary majority and opposition. In that case both sides (although the current majority and opposition are hard to tell apart) would know precisely what they are after and can count on; they would save energy and breath trying to grab a bigger piece of the pie and calling each other’s bluff. For example, the coveted budget committee chairmanship is the opposition’s prerogative in the parliaments of “certain civilized countries,” as we like to put it. The previous parliament had an opportunity to pass a bill to this effect, but it was torpedoed by precisely the Yushchenko-minded factions: both Rukhs and Reforms & Order. Now they are afraid of being thrown overboard.
Strange as it may seem, the more one watches the speaker saga hustle and bustle, the more one is reminded of classic works — say, Beethoven’s Fifth’s leitmotif, popularly known as “fate knocks.” From what we remember, there was no such knocking on the door of Oleksandr Tkachenko, elected speaker after seemingly innumerable ballots; according to him, fate had fallen straight into his lap. Hopefully, we will soon learn of the next lucky one. Let us also hope that the new name will not engender despair.
The Our Ukraine fraction, as its leader Viktor Yushchenko said on May 17, is prepared to revise its stand on the speaker issue if all factions choose an integrated approach to solving the parliamentary leadership problem (i.e., if the deputies, while looking for compromise figures to take the three top posts, also discuss candidates for other parliamentary and government offices). The proposal to debate government offices looks like an ultimatum. Moreover, Mr. Yushchenko demands that the office of first vice speaker be taken by a representative of his bloc. As the For a United Ukraine (ZaYedU) faction offered on the same day a package proposing United Ukraine leader Volodymyr Lytvyn as speaker and Yury Kostenko and Viktor Musiyaka (both from Our Ukraine) as vice speakers and, according to United Ukraine’s statements, the largest parliamentary faction was also inclined to solve the problem of parliamentary and government offices in a broad package, it seemed that the two parliamentary Ukraines had struck sort of a deal on this issue.
The next heat of the speaker race is expected this morning. Whether this will be the last or another case of reciprocal probing depends primarily on the ability of the two largest fraction leaders to assume a common position.
