Now, 56 years after the end of World War II, events of that stormy period remain subject to numerous scholarly historical studies. One of the most pressing issues drawing debate on the pages of quite a few editions is still the role played by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukr. abbr., UPA) in that war. The Day (No. 37, December 19, 2000) earlier carried an article written by Prof. Stanislav Kulchytsky. This time the case is argued by one of our readers, Kyiv political scientist Kostiantyn Zholkovsky.
One of the most painful issues for scholars, the media, and people representing various strata and age groups, especially the older war veteran generation, is the attitude toward what happened during World War II (1939-45) — or the Great Patriotic War for the Fatherland of 1941-45. Specifically the role played by the OUN and UPA. In his latest publication (Den, No. 48, March 16, 2001, not translated in this digest) the learned Prof. Kulchytsky made another attempt to assuage somewhat the confrontation between those harboring polarized views on the matter. The author refers to the fact that the UPA and the Soviet Army had a common enemy, Hitler’s National Socialism with the Wehrmacht as its strike force.
Precisely this assumption cannot be left unchallenged. Having a common enemy is indicative of having relationships of alliance. In the case of UPA and Soviet Army, the relations were anything but allied. Assessing UPA is inalienable from the assessment of OUN, as the latter stood by the UPA cradle. On the eve of World War II, OUN emerged as an active satellite and junior partner of National Socialism and the Wehrmacht, as evidenced by a number of facts. Forestalling accusations of using biased sources, I will take the liberty of referring to just one edition (specifying page numbers), considering that the stand taken by the author and editors leave no doubt whatsoever. I have in mind Volodymyr Kosyk’s Ukraine in World War Two, 1938-45. (Ukrainian Defense and Relief Council of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Kyiv — Paris — New York — Toronto, 1992).
Prior to the war, OUN initiated the formation of two Abwehr- controlled units, Roland and Nachtigall. Both were among the Wehrmacht forces invading the Soviet Union almost 60 years ago. Nachtigall, commanded by Roman Shukhevych and all men wearing Nazi uniforms, entered Lviv, and took strategically important positions, including the radio station. In other words, OUN entered Ukraine not as an enemy of the Wehrmacht, but as its partner and accomplice (pp. 153-160).
OUN’s next move was the proclamation of a restored Ukrainian state in Lviv, June 30, 1941. The declaration stressed that the rejuvenated Ukrainian state would closely cooperate with National Socialist Great Germany which, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, was creating a new order in Europe and the rest of the world; that the Ukrainian army would continue to struggle jointly with the allied German Army (p. 573). Thus OUN’s intentions were formulated clearly and unequivocally.
When the Nazi command declined to use its new junior partner’s services any further, OUN did not abandon its anti- Soviet course. UPA was formed in the fall of 1942 and placed under the command of Roman Shukhevych, former commander of Nachtigall. True, UPA also fought Wehrmacht units. Regrettably, there is no conclusive evidence attesting the scope of such operations (at least I have none), only fragmentary data. For example, 47 UPA battles against the Germans and 54 against Soviet partisans in the last two months of 1942 (p. 456). There are two eloquent examples. In early 1944, UPA men lethally wounded General Vatutin, a renowned Soviet military leader. In March of that same year, they executed the legendary [Soviet] intelligence officer Nikolai Kuznetsov (pp. 480; 482).
It is important to bear in mind that, as the Soviet troops and partisans were fighting pitched and exhaustive battles against the Wehrmacht, their men could not tell who was killing their comrades-in-arms — German or UPA soldiers. They regarded both as their enemy, which is precisely what they were. Thus assuming that the Soviet army and UPA had a common enemy is rather improper, even if for ethical reasons toward all those fallen [Soviet] soldiers. All this would long determine the extremely negative attitude toward OUN and UPA, an attitude which (let us face it) would also manifest itself in an exaggerated and unjustifiably cruel way. Incidentally, this is mentioned in a number of governmental documents, research papers, especially over the past several years. As for the OUN, this author has not read or heard any admissions of guilt and not a hint at repentance.
Such are the historical facts and no other considerations, however well-intended today, can warrant such free interpretation.
